Barack Obama approaches the end of his fourth month in power with the full impact of the legacy of the George W Bush administration across the middle east and south Asia only now becoming clear. The dispute over the publication of over forty photos of maltreated prisoners of the United States held in an earlier period of the post-2001 "war on terror" - in which the president appears to have acceded to the wishes of the army - is but a small index of how inescapable and toxic is this legacy.
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Paul Rogers is professor in the department of peace studies
at Bradford University, northern England. He has been writing a weekly column
on global security on openDemocracy
since 26 September 2001
More widely, events in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan are conspiring to present Washington with a stack of renewed problems. An upsurge of violence in Iraq reflects three ominous trends. First, the paramilitary transit route from Syria into Iraq is (after a lull of several months) operating again - bringing in young men from across the region, many of them willing to be "martyr-bombers" (see Karen de Young, "Terrorist Traffic Via Syria Again Inching Up", Washington Post, 11 May 2009).
Second, the process of releasing most of the 30,000 alleged insurgents held without trial in US detention camps is now underway. There is insufficient evidence to try the great majority in Iraqi courts; and while there have been various training programmes, Iraqi sources claim that many of the freed men have already turned to violence (see "Hope for the best when they go free", Economist, 7 May 2009). But even if the consequences are uncertain, letting go most of the detainees is a necessary part of the United States's military drawdown.
Third, the fate of most of the 100,000 or so members of the Sahwa (the Sunni "awakening movement") who collaborated with US forces in facing down al-Qaida and other radical groups is in question. Their payments by US forces have stopped; their expectation of being given jobs in the Iraqi government's security forces or elsewhere in the civil service has in most cases not been fulfilled. Furthermore, there are repeated claims that many are actually being targeted by the Iraqi security forces, now drawn mainly from Shi'a communities or are Kurds. The result, inevitably, is the beginning of a renewed insurgency (see Dahr Jamail, "Laying the Groundwork for Violence", Truthout, 7 May 2009).
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In addition to his weekly openDemocracy column, Paul Rogers writes an international security
monthly briefing for the Oxford Research Group; for details, click here
Paul Rogers's books include Why We're Losing the War
on Terror (Polity, 2007) - an
analysis of the strategic misjudgments of the post-9/11 era and why a new
security paradigm is needed. A third edition of his Losing Control: Global
Security in the 21st Century
(Pluto Press, 2009) is forthcoming
The Obama administration still aims to withdraw most of the United States combat-troops by 2011, but it is also clear that the US intends to have a major political role in Iraq for many years to come. Nancy Pelosi, the Democrat speaker of the House of Representatives, visited Baghdad on 10 May and promised "intense political involvement" (see Anthony Shadid & Nada Bakri, "Pelosi, in Surprise Visit to Baghdad, Promises ‘Intense' U.S. Political Role", Washington Post, 11 May 2009).
Such long-term involvement is inevitable given the overarching importance of the Persian Gulf region and its oil reserves; Iraq alone has nearly four times the reserves of the entire United States including Alaska. True, the Obama administration recognises this vulnerability and - recognising both the import-dependency and climate-change factors - is intent on weaning the United States off its oil addiction. But if ending this addiction may well downgrade the significance of the Persian Gulf, it will be far from easy to accomplish.
An early step is the carbon-emissions control legislation that will be going to Congress in the coming weeks. This is aimed at limiting climate change, but will also have an inevitable impact on the oil industry; little wonder that the reaction of the oil companies has been massive. They and other energy interests are determined to curb the plans and have increased the lobbying budget on Capitol Hill by 50% - to $44.5 million - in the first three months of 2009 (see Suzanne Goldenberg, "Barack Obama's key climate bill hit by $45m PR campaign", Guardian, 13 May 2009).
Two forms of warfare
If Iraq is a major problem, then the situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan is a great deal worse. This is revealed in the sacking - after only one year in post - of the commander of United States forces in Afghanistan, General David D McKiernan, on 11 May 2009. This abrupt decision is indicative of the deep unease in Washington over the deteriorating security situation on both sides of the border. His replacement, Lieutenant-General Stanley McChrystal, is a counter-terrorism specialist with considerable experience in Iraq; since the Afghanistan and Pakistan conflicts are much more a matter of large-scale insurgencies than "terrorism", it remains to be seen how far his expertise will match the US's predicament.
The difference is key: counterinsurgency operations try to combine political, economic and military elements, whereas counter-terrorism is much more about targeting the leadership of paramilitary groups rather than undercutting the support for the groups. General McChrystal may well adopt the latter approach, though this would entail a departure from his previous experience (see Gareth Porter, "US choice hardly McChrystal clear", Asia Times, 13 May 2009). This could include an increase in leadership targeting, with all the risks that entails: the air-strike in western Farah province on 5 May that is reported to have killed as many as 123 people is another example of the "collateral damage" that serves as a Taliban recruiting-agent (see "Pakistan: sources of turmoil", 28 April 2009).
An indication of the level of insecurity is the surge in US and Nato troops in Afghanistan, now moving towards 80,000 - with the possibility of many more to come. The conditions across the border in Pakistan are even more serious. Pakistan's army responded to strong pressure from Washington by launching on 26 April 2009 a major operation in Swat and other districts of the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) as well as parts of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).
The level of force the army has used - including extensive use of strike-aircraft, helicopter-gunships and artillery - is extraordinary. As many as 700 militants may have been killed in a matter of days, with many of the Taliban elements caught by surprise by the sheer intensity of the firepower (see Syed Saleem Shahzad, "Taliban on the run in Swat", Asia Times, 11 May 2009). Many civilians have also lost their lives, and in a major crisis of internal displacement hundreds of thousands of people have fled their homes as villages are flattened by the bombardments.
The character of the operation is predictable in that the Pakistani army is essentially organised on the premise of protecting the country from India through large-scale conventional military operations. This is a very long way from counterinsurgency; and while the Taliban may retreat, they will surely regroup with even greater support (see Antonio Giustozzi, "The neo-Taliban: a year on", 11 December 2008).
In their propaganda counter-offensive, the Taliban - and al-Qaida - are bound to highlight the fact that Pakistan's military recruits its soldiers mainly from the Punjab, and can readily be seen by Pashtuns (who compose the vast majority of Taliban supporters) as part of a Pakistani/American army of occupation (see Syed Saleem Shahzad, "Al-Qaeda seizes on Taliban's problem", Asia Times, 7 May 2009).
Indeed, one of the main aims of al-Qaida propaganda has been the project of convincing Taliban paramilitaries - in Afghanistan and Pakistan alike - that they are part of a global war for Islam. In this sense the "fusion" of ethnic, military and ideological issues in the current conflict could benefit both the "Pashtun nationalist" and the "universalist jihadi" elements of the militant opposition to the United States-Pakistan efforts.
A poisoned cup
In any event, the Pakistani army is not capable - even if its officer corps thought it desirable - of conducting successful counterinsurgency operations. It is very likely that the current bombardment is more a matter of keeping Washington off Islamabad's back than really seeking to subdue the Taliban. But whatever the "real" motivation, the longer-term consequence will be much greater resistance to the Pakistani state.
The Pakistani army's offensive in Swat appears to have been accompanied by a greater closeness to the American ally. But the news that for the first time, the US has furnished Islamabad with surveillance information gathered from pilotless drones - only days after General David H Petraeus announced a review of the use of drones along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border and the extensive civilian casualties they have caused - is more than outweighed by the deeper and longer-term problems in the relationship (see "Drone wars", 16 April 2009).
If and when the Barack Obama administration realises this, its outlook will become even more uncomfortable. Even now, there may be a recognition in its inner circles that this war cannot be won. If that is the case, McChrystal's appointment might make a strange kind of sense - in an unwinnable war, there is logic in trying to kill as many of the enemy's leaders as possible in order to maintain some degree of control, whatever the civilian casualties.
Much of the attention of Barack Obama's first four-year term will be on domestic issues. But the difficulties his administration faces in the middle east and south Asia will continue to force themselves onto the president's agenda. As with the kerfuffle over whether to release photos of detainees, the legacy of the George W Bush administration lies at the root of Obama's most urgent foreign-policy predicament. In time, some aides in and around the White House may come to feel that this was a presidential election it might have been better to lose.
Comments
A good paper on issues hard to align or find answers that will be appeasing. That is, not to say a 'particular' appeasing answer isn't there, but that the problems to earn that answer seem too complex at the moment.
My comment will be informed by the two statements, quoted below from Rogers, which in the minds of many readers might likely be the most central in his paper:
1) "As with the kurfuffle over whether to release photos of detainees, the legacy of George W. Bush administration lies the root of Obama's most urgent foreign policy predicament".
2) "In time, some aides in and around the White House may come to feel that this was a presidential election it might have been better to lose".
The first speaks about danger and frustration hence forewarns opinion-builders in and out of the Obama administration. At the same time seeking to grapple with notions of reality, the second invites two quite troubling questions: (a) What could the options have been?; and (b) Aren't those or such options clear to see or identify in course of the new administration's first four months with 3 years and about 7 months to go still for this first term of office.
Many of those embedded in 'complicities' of politics and even those not embedded, are likely to dismiss the 2nd quote, if they appreciate what experiment in politics is, and the right to that founded on principles of democracy as a form of rule.
The two attributes of Rogers' paper might thus be dimensioned: 1) to forewarn, and 2) inspire search for and re-fertilization of possible options. Lessons from Iraq could be essential hence a part of the first, but with what effects for Afghanistan and Pakistan? Rogers shows anxiety on the issue of replacing the General: David D. McKiernan with the Lt, General McChrystal. The point with it must be because of the not-too-long-ago announced AFPak Strategy, which was conscious of the combination: a) political, b) economic/social and c) military elements, in helping manage the complex human challenges unfortunately tied-up with adamant, misguided and misinformed insurgent groups.
At this point, it appears Rogers argues that options are blurred, likely to be troubling for the difference between set-up requirements of counterinsurgency operations against those of counter terrorism, with the terrorist leaderships as target and at times sad and unwanted consequences for civilian population. Pilotless drones are a part of the problem here even when the number of troops has been increased in the front of war on terror.
Readers see Rogers' "toxic gift" thesis credible, not the least when a version of that came to knowledge of the pubic on Ivory Coast - even if the one referred to here is of a different dimension. The problem is whether we can keep on creating the things we see in our world, remain deeply dishonest and think we are doing humanity good!
Obama is important, now at center-stage of issues, because that was the type of world he denounced and pledged during the elections to do something to correct: a) if 're-calicitrant' party politics interests do not consume his administration; b) if the Pentagon and the CIA would not provide him the right types of friends and advisers on the job, and c) if the public in and out would not be cornered into too quickly misjudging and misunderstanding him and his new administration. We cannot fail to return to problems of defining authority for a man of color no matter how good and realistic he might be on home and foreign policy challenges.
War on terror and mending the image of America locally and globally poses no little challenges. What worries is partly that fanatic insurgent groups fail to see that the heart of this new leader is pure and good and that they should lay down arms and talk peace and coexistence. Meaningless deaths and un-called-for frustrations do nothing good than only sap hope, strength and resources that could have been better exploited. Unwinnability of wars must be closely redefined and studied, because it seems even when wars are won their problems are not over, partly for sake of paucity of governance, ill-suited institutions and unfortunately also ill-scrutinized values/ practices.
A good paper on issues hard to align or find answers that will be appeasing. That is, not to say a 'particular' appeasing answer isn't there, but that the problems to earn that answer seem too complex at the moment.
My comment will be informed by the two statements, quoted below from Rogers, which in the minds of many readers might likely be the most central in his paper:
1) "As with the kurfuffle over whether to release photos of detainees, the legacy of George W. Bush administration lies the root of Obama's most urgent foreign policy predicament".
2) "In time, some aides in and around the White House may come to feel that this was a presidential election it might have been better to lose".
The first speaks about danger and frustration hence forewarns opinion-builders in and out of the Obama administration. At the same time seeking to grapple with notions of reality, the second invites two quite troubling questions: (a) What could the options have been?; and (b) Aren't those or such options clear to see or identify in course of the new administration's first four months with 3 years and about 7 months to go still for this first term of office.
Many of those embedded in 'complicities' of politics and even those not embedded, are likely to dismiss the 2nd quote, if they appreciate what experiment in politics is, and the right to that founded on principles of democracy as a form of rule.
The two attributes of Rogers' paper might thus be dimensioned: 1) to forewarn, and 2) inspire search for and re-fertilization of possible options. Lessons from Iraq could be essential hence a part of the first, but with what effects for Afghanistan and Pakistan? Rogers shows anxiety on the issue of replacing the General: David D. McKiernan with the Lt, General McChrystal. The point with it must be because of the not-too-long-ago announced AFPak Strategy, which was conscious of the combination: a) political, b) economic/social and c) military elements, in helping manage the complex human challenges unfortunately tied-up with adamant, misguided and misinformed insurgent groups.
At this point, it appears Rogers argues that options are blurred, likely to be troubling for the difference between set-up requirements of counterinsurgency operations against those of counter terrorism, with the terrorist leaderships as target and at times sad and unwanted consequences for civilian population. Pilotless drones are a part of the problem here even when the number of troops has been increased in the front of war on terror.
Readers see Rogers' "toxic gift" thesis credible, not the least when a version of that came to knowledge of the pubic on Ivory Coast - even if the one referred to here is of a different dimension. The problem is whether we can keep on creating the things we see in our world, remain deeply dishonest and think we are doing humanity good!
Obama is important, now at center-stage of issues, because that was the type of world he denounced and pledged during the elections to do something to correct: a) if 're-calicitrant' party politics interests do not consume his administration; b) if the Pentagon and the CIA would not provide him the right types of friends and advisers on the job, and c) if the public in and out would not be cornered into too quickly misjudging and misunderstanding him and his new administration. We cannot fail to return to problems of defining authority for a man of color no matter how good and realistic he might be on home and foreign policy challenges.
War on terror and mending the image of America locally and globally poses no little challenges. What worries is partly that fanatic insurgent groups fail to see that the heart of this new leader is pure and good and that they should lay down arms and talk peace and coexistence. Meaningless deaths and un-called-for frustrations do nothing good than only sap hope, strength and resources that could have been better exploited. Unwinnability of wars must be closely redefined and studied, because it seems even when wars are won their problems are not over, partly for sake of paucity of governance, ill-suited institutions and unfortunately also ill-scrutinized values/ practices.
A good paper on issues hard to align or agree on what answers/solutions ought to be. That is not to say either of the latter aren't possible. There is a dilemma, because of complexity of the problem. Two quotes from Rogers are nevertheless central and well connected with his portrait of that complexity on Iraq, AfPak as source of challenge: a) "As with the kurfuffle over whether to release photos of detainees, the legacy of George W. Bush administration lies the root of Obama's most urgent foreign policy predicament"; b) "In time, some aides in and around the White House may come to feel that this was a presidential election it might have been better to lose".
The 1st highlights dangers and frustration. If one is well informed, it seems to forewarn opinion-builders about the new administration. On the other hand, the 2nd, depending on one's picture of reality, invites two not irrelevant questions: i) if anyone else won the election, what better options could have been offered?; ii) aren't the options currently in operation clear to identify in favour of the new administration's first 4 months, with about 3 years and 7 months still to go for this 1st term of office? Complicity of trouble-time politics are seen around us. You do not have to be a particular expert to see 'trouble-time-politics' and appreciate or reasonable differentiate the extent endeavours of leaderships work to beat its challenges. For that reason the 2nd quote is rather "un-Rogers" in the paper! It has been said many a time that periods of rule are experimental: thanks to balance and respect for the rule of law as fountain of democracy.
That the 2nd quote is 'un-Rogers', means not that his paper fails interests for peace/answers/search for solutions to complex problems of a region at the center of concern. Here is 'backdoor' entry to the questions about options: to keep doors open on issues of: a) lives of allied soldiers, and b) civilians, matched by, c) concern for poverty and governance problems of the region. There is a humble advice here to inspire honest search working to enrich the options. Lessons from Iraq could be essential, but not escape the question: with what effects for AfPak region - both of which, though unique seem caught-up psychologically with history.
Like pro-lives and friends of earth, many are worried. Rogers might represent them. It is all about the best options: whether replacing generals serves for the best, and if so how is it in line with earlier AfPak Strategy? The latter made many expectant: it had political, economic, social and military elements for managing complex human challenges tied unfortunately to adamant, misguided clique of terror insurgents and their splinter groups. Will the change of generals dampen earlier strategy? Some say no and others argue options are more blurred and opaque. Rogers raises the case of difference between counterinsurgency operations and counter terrorism strategies, worried about civilian casualties in-between both strategies, which pilotless drones play a part. The complicity of this war is enormous parallel to ongoing reconstruction works in which soldiers and development aid agencies are doing their best under hard conditions.
"Toxic gift" thesis is credible. Its other dimension is heard of on Ivory Coast. Difference is noted, the question to ask is: whether we should tie our hands, remain silent or be 'forcefully' shut-up, while our positive engagements are needed to advance our world? President Obama is important: now at the center-stage, because that was the world he pledged to 'model' change for: a tool to advance! Returning to Rogers' 2nd quote above, couple these questions: i) What if recalcitrant party politics and interests work to consume and disable his administration? ii) What if Pentagon and the CIA, JFK-experience], fail the administration on mutual trusts and honest services of advisers on the job?, and iii) what if publics in and out are cornered into misjudging the new administration prematurely? Are these not interesting features, should we boldly return to the problems of defining authority in the US - what burdens for a man of colour no matter how good, alert and realistic he might be on home and foreign policy challenges?
War on terror and mending the image of America locally and globally poses no little challenge. On that, 'toxic gift' thesis for the Obama administration is well formulated by Rogers. However, about the war, what worries most, is partly the fact that insurgent groups like other enemies of the good instead of bad], fail to see that the heart of this new leader is pure and good. Insurgent groups would benefit by laying down arms to talk peace and coexistence in a world owned by all of us. Meaningless deaths and uncalled-for frustrations or sufferings do nothing sensible other than sap hope, strength and the resources that could have been better put to use for humanity. Unwinnability of wars should be more closely studied and redefined as a concept for those at peace research centers, since it seems that even when wars are won their problems are not over, partly for who we are, especially when 'soaked' in pranks.
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