1642 is near the end of the Ming Dynasty. The Mongols ruled during the Yuan Dynasty, 1271-1368 (though the Southern Song did not end until 1279). Marco Polo was long since dead by 1642, as were the great Khans. 1642 is around the time Shi Ke Fa died fighting the invading Manchurians, who became the Qing Dynasty emperors, and around the time my ancestors left Toulouse, France for the New World and religious freedom. These kinds of historical facts are important to discussions of this kind and getting the dates wrong creates credibility problems, maybe.

There are some similarities and considerable differences.

Not to quibble, but the author's dates are off -- Latvia came under Russian control in the 18th C, not the 19th. Even so, it was dominated by the Baltic Germans, even within the Russian Empire -- the Treaty of Nystad confirmed "the Capitulations" so-called, enshrining the privileges of the Baltic German nobility.

Latvian nationalism dates to the 1850s and wasn't explicitly political at first. The earliest nationalists actually looked to Russia against the German landowners -- Andrejs Pumpurs, who wrote what's considered the national epic, wrote a poem called "East and West," for example -- I give a crude translation here: "Fire and Night II". "The East freed nations to attain the land of the sun. They were granted the right to self-rule. The West awaited them bearing chains in its hands, locking them into slavery and introducing serfdom..."

The First Awakening (the initial national movement) petered out with social change -- the growth of an indigenous bourgeoisie, a huge underclass of the landless, the advent of Marxism, and coercive Russification -- by the 1890s. The modern nation was nonetheless born. 1905 brought a bloody revolution, including the burning of hundreds of German manors. Demands for autonomy were actually few -- and they were explicitly restricted to autonomy, not sovereignty, until 1918. The Riflemen fought for "a free Latvia in a free Russia" in World War One. Many became Bolsheviks. Others formed the core of the national army. The War of Independence ended in 1920 (not 1921).

There is indeed a long history and an ancient culture -- but it is a history in which Latvians were mostly oppressed peasants, not principal actors. In a sense, it begins with the German conquest in the 1200s. The romanticization of the the tribal prehistory was part of the national revival -- not an unusual mythology. By contrast, Tibet has a lengthy written history and literary tradition.

Essentially, the trouble with Professor Lopez's contention that "Latvia came under Russian control during the 19th century," besides the dating, is that there was no Latvia as such. There were Latvians, but there was no Latvian consciousness. Even the word "Latvia" ("Latvija") first appeared in the 19th C. In this context it is interesting to read Professor Fitzherbert's piece on the evolution of Tibetan nationalism.

Though Edward Lucas has also drawn parallels between the Baltics and Tibet of late, the parallels to the occupation and the restoration of independence in 1991 would actually be rather weak; Tibet's independence was never internationally recognized, and Latvia's was. Latvia was a member of the League of Nations, and most Western countries never recognized our country's forcible incorporation into the Soviet Union. Tibet was never a member of the international system in a modern sense.

The primary affinity, though, definitely exists -- sympathy for small nations with unique cultures and languages struggling against humongous Red or post-Red empires. The Dalai Lama himself noted parallels (and remarked upon the large number of Russians in Latvia, comparing them to the Han in Tibet). Juris Sinka, the founder of the Tibet support group in the Saeima, Latvia's Parliament, died in Lhasa.

I brought up Tibet vis-à-vis Latvia in this context at my blog not long ago. At Latvians Online, there's a debate about parallels and/or the lack of them. It's very interesting to read what openDemocracy has been publishing on this subject, and I'm delighted that Professor Lopez brought up the connection.

Mr Secor,
Mongols did not cease to exist after the fall of the Yuan Dynasty! Indeed various Mongol groups continued have considerable political power in central Asia and Tibet.

Gushri Khan (1582-1655) was a Qoshot Mongol chief from Dzungaria (modern Xinjiang Province). Pressed by Kalmyks in the west, he settled with his armies in the Kokonor Region of Amdo/Qinghai. He then became, as Professor Lopez says, the patron of the Fifth Dalai Lama and together they extended Gelugpa control over much of the Tibetan-speaking world.
It was not until the 1720's that the Qing were able to wrest influence over Tibet from the Dzungars and took over as patrons of the Dalai Lama lineage.

Perhaps its time you returned to the Old World and learnt a bit about historical nuance.

I have to say that how foolish the writer is. What he is not clear is that China is not Soviet Union, and Tibet is not Latvia. The complicated connection can not be represented in just this passage. The writer completely ignores the history of China and Tibet. And he also completely ignores the important status of Buddhism in this history.
The problem of Tibet has reached the deadline of China. As Chinese and a Buddhism, I unhesitatingly fight against any kinds of actions which will lead to Tibetan independence.
What the writer should remember is that Tibet is also not Kosovo, and China is also not Iraq. Although it meets the tribulation of several problems such as democratic reform and so on, China and it people will not allow their country be divided just like Soviet Union.

Lopez may think of himself as the true guardian of the Tibetan culture in its most pristine form. However, a culture--and the knowledge of the culture--is the product of socio-economic development of the time, not some abstract conception in an expert's head.

The problem with Lopez's argument is that he somehow imagines that Tibetan culture is so inherently enduring and immutable that it can outlast the evolution of the Chinese nation through revolutions, industrialization and globalization.

There are many questions with regard to what the Tibetans are destined in the age of, first nation-state then globalization, vis-a-vis what the Han Chinese (as who I am) have done to alter that destination. There are even more questions as to whether Han Chinese are capable of, or entitled to, governing a people that don't share their East Asian heritage (hence the Tibetan culture is labeled a "world heritage").

The different answers to those questions form different narratives of what is going on in China, and the West's image of its past and present in light of what is going on in China. There is always the desire to consolidate different narratives and to create a brand of knowledge, or better yet, the truth (about Tibet). The domination project is not completed until discipline is so instill that even the Han Chinese feel uneasy of having "occupied" Tibet. To me, the debate about Tibet is not as much about Tibet as about China, because Tibet may never challenge the Western but China does.

Edward Said says in his Orientalism that every Orientalist is, consciously or not, a racist. So I think of Lopez.

For a more detailed critique of the West's attitude toward Tibet, please visit my recent blog entry.