This is a response by Vron Ware to Paul Kingsnorth's review of her book Who Cares About Britishness? in which she sets out the fundamental differences between her approach to national identity and that of Kingsnorth in Real England.
Vron Ware (author): I bought Paul Kingsnorth's book Real England a few weeks ago after reading a positive review of it. I was enthusiastic about his project of bringing an anti-globalisation perspective to the destruction of England's distinctive environments as I also feel passionately about this. I have been writing about a particular English locality for ten years now, tracking the impact of global forces on every area of life. I've also been working on and against racism and nationalism, attentive to the past and future relationships between Britain and England. When I read him I realised that there are differences between us. Now, Kingsnorth's mean-spirited and inaccurate review of my book commissioned by the British Council, Who Cares About Britishness? A global view of the national identity debate (Arcadia, 2007) suggests that there is little common ground between us. Rather than just respond to his attack I'd like to assess his whole approach.
Kingsnorth employs the well-worn method of identifying the 'Real England' by travelling around the country to document a tale of damage, decline and neglect. The portrait of Englishness that he paints conveys a lament for better times, coupled with a reluctance to protest effectively at the destruction of 'ways of life' and institutions that once developed out of local, English culture. I thought the book would also bring an added dimension, especially since George Monbiot's recommendation on the front cover announces that the book 'helps to shape our view of who we are and who we want to be'.
In particular, given his knowledge of the movement inspired by the World Social Forum I hoped he would combine an environmentalist rage with a critique of the racially coded nationalism which is often implicit in this genre of writing about England. Instead, he does not really address the question of who counts as English, and who the 'we' are, talking vaguely of people 'of all backgrounds'. The fact that he is prepared to define himself as a nationalist indicates that he is not interested in connecting his position to a discussion about the future of England as a postcolonial country at ease with itself and alive to the value of a cosmopolitan future.
The project of my book was entirely different, not least because Britishness is not an ethnic or cultural category that functions in the same manner as Englishness. Britishness is a construct with deep historical roots in the country's imperial past, one that has left profound legacies in many parts of the world in the form of institutions, language, land ownership, and hierarchies of power. It made sense to travel outside Britain as well as within it, to see what could be learned about Britishness as a residual global concept.
I had two objectives in this project. First, I wanted to talk to young people in Britain whose opinions are rarely sought – those who had been migrants themselves or whose parents had migrated to Britain before they were born - to learn about and report on their experience and perspective. It was never my mission to go round to identify and learn about Britain itself 'as a country'. I made this clear in the introduction, that Kingsnorth chooses to cite selectively to suit his own prejudices.
Second, I felt that it was important to learn from debates in other societies that had been marked by British rule – particularly debates about national identity. I was especially interested in how young people in those countries negotiated identities, whether political, cultural, sexual, religious or ethnic, often in situations far more difficult and dangerous than the UK. A large part of the book entails listening to young women and men struggling to define themselves within and beyond their national states, in Bangladesh, Kenya, Pakistan, India and Ireland. The signs are that there is a converging generation of young people in different parts of the world who are wary of nationalism in all its forms, having witnessed the catastrophic damage that it does to social and political life.
Kingsnorth willfully misunderstands the scope of the book, and does not even attempt to discuss the second half. Very surprisingly for an anti-globalisation activist, for his own part he seems to have little interest in the idea of a global conversation. He is offended by my ironic summary of Britain's shortcomings in my introduction, and misquotes me as saying that 'Britain's only saving grace is its population of foreigners'.
I find it significant that in his review he refers to people born and raised in the UK as 'immigrants'. This suggests that he does not understand the stakes involved in interrogating terms like British or English. For example, he is so phobic about being seen to be anti-racist that he makes it clear he agrees with the 'immigrant' view of what's gone wrong with 'multiculturalism'. For my part, I am not interested in defining this term because it means so many different things to different constituencies. The word is routinely used to denounce a range of past mistakes made precisely because there was no coherent governmental strategy to address racism and cultural diversity in the UK. By recounting a series of conversations with young British people I hoped to offer a glimpse of what it felt like to grow up in a society shaped by this confusion, representing a range of experiences that were unremarkable, positive, frustrating or difficult.
Kingsnorth is particularly irritated by one one of my interviewees, Peray, who dismisses a social worker who implied casually that Muslim culture endorsed the harassment of women by men. He is even more scornful of my failure to correct Peray by reminding her that 'women's refuges are full of Muslim women who suffer terribly at the hands of men'. Happily in Britain violence against women is a crime whoever commits it. More important in this context, there is no evidence that Muslim women are disproportionately affected. Using culture as a stick to beat Muslims with is a familiar tactic among those who question their right to belong whether in England or the UK - or in Europe for that matter.
Finally, for someone who claims to be an expert on England, Kingsnorth should know that Andover is in Hampshire, not Buckinghamshire (he should have heard of the campaign to block the siting of the Tesco mega-shed on the A303). And in damning my account of my run-in with the National Front on my home ground he betrays his impatience with a writing style not unlike his own: a mixture of polemic, dialogue, observation and reflection. The reason I traced the contours of anti-racist politics in the late 70s and early 80s is that I wanted to anchor the current discussions of Britishness within a historical context that is often forgotten and increasingly mis-represented.
Kingsnorth's review clarifies what is so different about our respective efforts to engage in a political debate about Britain's future. He finds my avowedly feminist and anti-racist perspective 'insufferably pc' which says more about his perspective than mine. He attempts to articulate a purified form of English nationalism, paying scant attention to the untidy, complex and contested history of racism. In my view this makes his enthusiasm to identify 'the real England' appear opportunistic and shallow.
Comments
I don't particularly care for articles which don't contain the meat of the argument and which require a book to be purchased to fully engage with them. A summary of the book's views on Britishness would have been useful as part of this article for commenters.
I haven't read, "Who Cares About Britishness? A global view of the national identity debate", but in the index on Amazon of the 228 pages of text in the book, England and Englishness gets indexed four times, Scotland and Scottishness gets indexed four times, Northern Ireland gets indexed eight times and Wales and Welshness gets mentioned twice.
As a look at Britishness in the the multi-nation UK it doesn't seem a lot.
For a book entitled, "Who cares about Britishness?", published in July 2007, the lack of an index entry for the SNP in Scotland seems a little myopic in the light of both the new SNP Government in Scotland in May 2007 and the current calls by both the SNP and Labour for a referendum on Scottish independence.
In 2010 when the Scotland leaves and the UK dissolves Britain will disappear, and the question of, "Am I English or British?", will disappear with it. You'll have to work out what to do with the Welsh and the NI though.
Doug, and perhaps Scotland too has to work out what to do with Wales and Northern Ireland.
Even if you are 'independent' you will presumably still care about 'Britishness' insofar as your relationship with the other nations of the former UK is concerned. There's an assumption that Britishness as an identity will disappear after separation. It won't.
Personally I couldn't give two hoots about the 'global view' of Britishness.
Vron Ware:
<i>"The fact that he is prepared to define himself as a nationalist
indicates that he is not interested in connecting his position to a
discussion about the future of England as a postcolonial country at
ease with itself and alive to the value of a cosmopolitan future."</i>
I can't see how you arrive at that conclusion, I'm a nationalist and I'm perfectly happy with England's status as a post colonial country alive to the value of a cosmopolitan future. I just don't feel the need to beat myself up about it. Believe it or not some of us are perfectly comfortable with our identity. I think you need to move on from the politics of the past - which seems to me to be what Paul was saying.
Gareth, When Scotland leaves it will have no input into what happens to Wales. Wales is an integral part of England and has been since 1542. A lot of Welsh may not like that but it is an English Province legally and administratively and joined the Union as part of England.
When the Union breaks Wales will remain a province of England as it was before the Union.
The fate of Northern Ireland is different. It's the last remnants of the conquest of Ireland so when the Union dissolves who gets it?
The nationalists in NI will want to unify with Ireland and I suspect the Unionists in NI will want to remain with England as that represents the closest to their ideal of Britishness.
If I was a clever Englishman I'd try and palm NI off on Scotland but if there is uncertainty about who gets it then the population in NI should decide.
Once the state's gone the identity will fade fairly quickly.
Isn't this (to use nationalist jargon) cultural genocide?
Wishful thinking I'm afraid. 'Britishness' will remain as a political imperative and also as an identity, not least because of these progressives who are unable (or unwilling) to see past Englishness as an ethnic identity (and ditto for their accomplices on the far-right).
You'd be right in thinking that this doesn't apply quite so much in Scotland, but wrong to think that it doesn't count at all - witness the Ulster Scots, Rangers fans, or even the many Scottish ethnic nationalists who believe in the Celtic brotherhood between Scotland and other British nations.
As far as I am concerned we took on each others liabilities when we unified (even if 'we' - the people - had no say back then). It's not a case of palming anything, or anyone, off on anyone else. You don't undo 300 years quite so easily I'm afraid.
I wish we could, but make no mistake that it will be made incredibly difficult for you to walk away into your new dawn. And it will be some of your own people (Dalyell, Brown, Falconer, etc.) that will put these obstacles disincentives in your path.
I agree with Gareth in this spat, it is incredibly disrespectful of any people, not least once as bloodied and unbowed as those of Northern Ireland, now recovering from a civil war, to suggest anyone could "palm them off". Britishness is attractive because it is not a nation-based nationalism. Brown's project was to turn it into an equivalent of a nationalism - but this will almost certainly fail. Take, for example, the Goldsmith report on citizenship, which advocates removing the right of citizens of the Irish Republic to vote in Westminster elections, an actual residue of historical Britishness. There is nothing to stop a new generation saying 'thank you very much for this non-national identity and we are not worried about its imperial past, it does not effect us'. Indeed, even if Gareth does not care for the global view, this too is an attraction for many, it allows them to feel British even if they are strictly speaking 'foreigners'. The really important point, it seems to me, is the political institutional one: all this Britishness can continue with an English parliament. The question is whether the now profoundly multi-racial civil English (because born in England) should have their own voice and executive or not... the argument between Vron Ware and Paul Kingsnorth (and I have not read his book yet) may be about starting points. And where you think we should be starting from does indeed shape where you think we should be heading
"When the Union breaks Wales will remain a province of England as it was before the Union". Try saying that to the Welsh! Actually, an interesting point, though: there may be some parts of Wales - e.g. the more anglophile and anglophone South Wales - that would wish to remain part of the same (British) state as England; while other parts (e.g. rural North and West Wales) might wish to be separate.
"If I was a clever Englishman I'd try and palm NI off on Scotland but if
there is uncertainty about who gets it then the population in NI should
decide". I agree with Anthony, here: a bit of a contempt uous way to talk about Northern Ireland; plus rather ironic for a Scottish Nationalist to suggest that the people of that province should decide which state they wish to be affiliated to only if two larger neighbours can't agree whether they want it or not. Shouldn't the people automatically be the ones to decide?
Doug's comments do illustrate a slightly cavalier attitude on the part of some Scots nationalists: 'it's our right to decide our own future, and the rest of you can just sort out the resultant mess'. Well, it may be the Scots' right to decide their national future but not to do so in a way that deprives the rest of the UK of a say in its future after the end of the Union with Scotland. If Scotland gets a referendum in 2010, so should the other British nations: not on whether Scotland leaves - which is Scotland's decision - but on a comprehensive new constitutional settlement for a post-Scotland 'Britain'. This should be negotiated between all the UK countries and put to a referendum in each country, whether it involves a continuing UK with devolved parliaments in England, Wales and Northern Ireland; a federal 'rump UK' with the power mainly exercised by each nation; or full independence.
A single question should then be put to the electorate in all four (or five, including Cornwall) countries in a referendum. For instance, if what was agreed in the pre-referendum negotiations was a continuing UK of three (or four, including Cornwall) nations each with devolved parliaments but with a strong centralised UK state and government, then the question for the electorate in all the nations, including Scotland, could be, "Do you agree with the proposed new constitutional settlement for the countries that are currently part of the UK: independence for Scotland and a continuing union of England, Wales and Northern Ireland with devolved parliaments in each country?" Apart from anything else - and it's in the interests of the Scots nationalists to note this - it's actually fairer that the Scottish people should have a say in the post-independence future of the state they're leaving, because it could be highly material to the import and outcome of an independence referendum whether Scotland had to contend with a continuing UK as its neighbour after independence rather than separate English, Welsh and (Northern) Irish nation-states.
Precisely how the negotiations between the different countries of the UK should happen is unclear, to say the least. But here's an intriguing scenario: perhaps GB [Gordon Brown, that is] could demonstrate that he really is a visionary leader by seizing the initiative from Bendy Wendy and Alex Salmond, and saying that we will resolve this issue once and for all before the end of his term in office, in 2010. This is perhaps the real constitutional re-examination and debate about Britishness that we should have been having all along. Seriously - and I hope some Labour Party strategists are reading (some hope!) - this could be the way for New Labour to completely outflank both the nationalists and the Tories. GB could argue passionately for his vision of a united Britain, and he'd be bound to regain a lot of support in England for doing so, so long as this Britishness was advocated as one that was in the interests of, and was fair to, all the nations of the UK, and didn't suppress the very existence of England as his Britishness crusade has attempted to do up till now. The actual constitutional option to be voted on in a referendum would have to be genuinely open and not imposed by the executive. But then, if GB got the result he wanted, he could position himself as a sort of Churchillian saviour of the UK and would surely win a resounding victory in the general election of the continuing, resurgent UK in 2010. Worth a thought, isn't it, all you Labour guys? Let's have a bloody good fight about it, and winner takes all!
There is no chance that "Britishness" can continue with an English Parliament. Devolution is all about retaining power at the centre and the current devolution set up has left Whitehall and Westminster essentially unchanged with Scotland, Wales and NI as devolved provinces of a unitary British/English state. An English Parliament is federalism where the central institutions would have to undergo major changes to accomodate the division of Westminster into a Federal and an English Parliament. It would be the end of the Union. It's the reason that Labour don't want one, the Conservatives don't want one and why the Lib-Dems are backing away from federalism as fast as they can.
Northern Ireland is the last partial province of a failed colony. It costs about £5 Billion a year to the UK and it's still one of the poorest parts of the UK. If there is a referendum on its future after Scottish independence it would have to be a three part question, do you want to be part of England, Scotland or Ireland? And with the current population split it would be a moot point who'd win the poison chalice. Palm off is the right phrase.
There seems to be failure to grasp what we're doing on Scotland. The debate has advanced to the point where the dependence parties are not disputing the calling of a referendum on independence, they're arguing about the wording of the question. To put it bluntly, we're not fighting for some super devolution or the for some "independence lite" where we still have the right to take part in English and Welsh elections, we want out. A win for the nationalists in an independence referendum would be a direct rejection of Britishness. When Scotland leaves you can work out what your non-nationalistic British nationalism means among yourselves.
It is true, Doug and I are long acquainted spatters.
Post independence (or even federalism) it's quite plausible that a more convivial Britishness based on mutual respect, cooperation and commonality might develop. The people who are, at present, set against Britishness - for mostly political reasons - would have much less reason for antagonism towards the idea.
There's a lot of scaremongering from people like Doogie Alexander and Gordon Brown about people becoming foreigners when independence happens. They prefer the word 'separatist' because it implies something catastrophic.
If independence happens things will change but they will also stay the same. The use of English, Scottish and Welsh as primary identities will be accelerated (it's already well advanced) but people will still think of themselves as part of a British family of nations (possibly more so than they did before when Britishness was a straight-jacket and constraint on those identities). Britishness as a concept could develop into something much more meaningful than anything Gordon Brown could hope to dream up right now.
The real adjustment will be for those people that Vron Ware is primarily concerned with, the British-somethings [blacks, jews, muslims, asians, etc.] . But conjugating their ethnic identity to English, Scottish or Welsh would actually - I think - be a step towards fuller integration than we have now.
There's been a lack of vision, especially in England. Britishness isn't the only acceptable umbrella identity, and those that see it as the only vehicle for multiculturalism and integration are the ones contributing to the ethnicisation of Englishness, more so than the BNP and their ilk in my opinion.
Anthony, my nationalism is rooted in England, the land and its people. I suspect that Paul Kingsnorth is the same (and I've read his book).
It's not racial, or global. My starting point is England. For me there is no other starting point, and I couldn't care less whether 'foreigners' feel British or not.
My wife is a 'foreigner' and she doesn't feel British. She doesn't need to because she lives in England, not Britain, and she's married to an Englishman.
She recently sat her Britishness test. She was allowed 45mins to complete the test and did it in four minutes. She had to pay for the privilege of participating in this insult to her intelligence. And does it make her British, or feel British? No, it does not. Not in the slightest. But she'll cheer the England football team or rugby team to the death.
As can be seen from this website; The Duchy of Cornwall Human Rights Association: http://duchyofcornwall.eu/
....the Duchy of Cornwall, as with other Crown protectorates, has been never united to England and remains outside English law.
Therefore would the Scots have a legal claim over part of it or any of the other protectorates?
http://thecornishdemocrat.blogspot.com/
I think this idea that Britishness or Britain is somehow not a nation or not a nationality is central.Its like a defualt setting that is so ingrained it fades.
This analysis lends itself to failure to analyse the British State and is both ahistorical and ageographical. The idea that "Britishness is attractive because it is not a nation-based nationalism" just seems incredible to different cultures within this blessed union.
Post new comment