At his press conference on 12 July 2007, President George W Bush gave no indication that he is willing to change his Iraq policy. Indeed, his stolid determination prompted many observers to characterise Bush as "out of touch" or "in denial". Yet, those who've studied this presidency understand that Bush's insistence that progress is being made in Iraq is part and parcel of his endgame strategy: the war won't be lost on his watch.

While it's often noted that Bush is not a student of history, what's usually ignored is the number of Bush confidantes who worked for Richard Nixon. Dick Cheney and Karl Rove, among others, still harbour resentment about Nixon being forced from office. They've studied that ignominious event and concluded Nixon first lost control of his presidency during the war in Vietnam; as a result, they've formulated a set of four rules for Bush's handling of Iraq based upon lessons learned from the Nixon-era Vietnam experience.
Bob Burnett is a writer based in Berkeley, California. He can be reached here

Also by Bob Burnett in openDemocracy:

"A liberal foreign policy for the US: ten maxims"
(27 February 2007)

"America's choice: imperial vs constitutional rule" (10 May 2007)

"The road not taken: the Iraq Study Group" (21 May 2007)

"Alberto Gonzales's cookery lesson"
(30 May 2007)

"Bush's failed freedom agenda"
(25 June 2007)
Forty years on, four rules

The first White House rule is that the president must project confidence at all times, regardless of the actual situation on the ground. "Those of us who believe the battle in Iraq can and must be won see the satisfactory performance on several of the security benchmarks as a cause for optimism." Bush continues to see progress where it is not visible to others.

The second rule is that Bush must insist that his strategy is based upon the advice of his generals in Iraq - in this case, General David Petraeus. "I will rely on General Petraeus to give me his recommendations for the appropriate troop levels in Iraq." During his 12 July press conference, Bush was asked why he didn't send enough troops at the beginning of the war. His disingenuous answer was: "My primary question to General Franks [Tommy Franks who was in charge at the time] was ... do you have what it takes to succeed after you succeed in removing Saddam Hussein? And his answer was, yes."

However, Michael Gordon & Bernard Trainor's authoritative Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq tells a far different story: General Franks and other high-ranking officers were manipulated by the White House. Bush, and then defence secretary Rumsfeld "presided over a system in which differing military and political perspectives were discouraged." General Franks initially asked for far more troops but was pressured into agreeing that he could make do with a 50% reduction. Indeed, one of the debilitating side-effects of the Iraq war is the Bush administration's systematic purging of senior military personnel who are unwilling to acquiesce to the White House's Iraq policy.

The third White House rule is that the president must continue to link al-Qaida to Iraq. In his press conference, Bush emphasised this theme: "To begin withdrawing before our commanders tell us we are ready ... would mean surrendering the future of Iraq to al-Qaida." Credible sources indicate that "al-Qaida in Iraq" numbers a few thousand soldiers, at best a minor part of the insurgency; while the latest United states intelligence estimate is that al-Qaida has reconstituted itself in western Pakistan, with many thousands of new recruits - yet Bush steadfastly repeats the same line about the necessity of fighting al-Qaida in Iraq "so we don't have to fight them here."

The president's persistence has worked with a large proportion of the American public: a poll published on 23 June found that 41% of Americans "believe Saddam Hussein's regime was directly involved in financing, planning or carrying out the terrorist attacks on 9/11, even though no evidence has surfaced to support a connection."

The fourth rule that governs Bush's statements about the Iraq war is that the president defends his decisions on constitutional grounds: he's the commander-in-chief and no one can tell him about troop levels or deployments; Congress's job is to fund his decisions. "I don't think Congress ought to be running the war." This is a deliberate misreading of the US constitution, which states that Congress has the power to declare war: powers it can both grant to the president and take away.

The logic is political

Following these four rules, Bush's endgame strategy has been simple, but effective. He has continued the war, as he sees fit, regardless of the feelings of the majority of the American people and Congress.

A disinterested observer might ask why the president persists with his Iraq policy when so many Americans - roughly two-thirds of the electorate - have turned against it. There are several possible explanations that depend upon how one views Bush as a decision-maker: if he is seen as primarily a rational actor, then the president is "out-of-touch" because his Iraq policy has failed and he is unwilling to take corrective action - there should be a feedback loop and there isn't. If Bush is seen as an ethical decision-maker, a person whose actions are guided by a strong moral compass, then he is "in denial" because so many of his decisions are based upon either false premises or distorted data: e.g. al-Qaida is directing the Iraqi insurgency.

However, if one views George W Bush as a political decision-maker - as someone who takes action based upon a determination of what will enhance his power and that of the Republican Party - then his conduct of the war in Iraq makes grim sense. Throughout the war, Bush has had the strong support of his Republican base: the latest polls suggest that more than 60% of this core bloc approves of his handling of Iraq. Moreover, Bush's base sees him as a strong leader who sticks to his positions: they view him as "stalwart" rather than "inflexible".

The Bush inner circle, looking back on the Nixon presidency, sees George W Bush's Iraq posture as a calculated political stance that will have three positive consequences. First, it will pass the final resolution of the conflict to the next president; if chaos prevails, it will be blamed on the forty-fourth president, not on Bush. Second, it will solidify Bush's manufactured image as a single-minded, principled commander-in-chief who never relented in his battle against America's terrorist enemies. Third, it will strengthen the claim of Republicans to be the war party; the sector of American politics that will never countenance surrender, that believes that American military might can prevail in any circumstance given adequate political will. The White House's key figures contend that Bush's conduct of the Iraq war will - in the long run - help Republicans.

Whether the calculation is correct, and the president's Iraq policy helps his party, remains to be seen. What is clear is that Bush's endgame is to continue the war in Iraq at its current level until he leaves office on 20 January 2009.