How is the coronavirus pandemic forcing a rethinking of the configurations of power in the Arab world? And how could this impact on the quest for democratic politics in the region?
The global coronavirus or COVID-19 pandemic shows no signs of abating, with over 1,100,000 cases and 62,000 deaths reported by WHO worldwide, upward of 12,500 are in Arab countries ,as of April 5. These numbers are likely underestimations that will increase as testing becomes more widespread. The Arab crescendo of infections is still unfolding, yet to peak. Three populous Arab states (Algeria, Egypt, and Morocco) seem to be understated. In Saudi Arabia, another country with a large population, the low number (2370) may reflect slow testing protocols; it is not clear whether it includes the Eastern Province Al-Sharqiyyah. One can expect these numbers to double or treble rather quickly. Some states are in full or partial war (Libya, Syria, Yemen). Neither adequate testing nor resulting numbers are likely to be at hand, let alone accurate.
We discover anew the ubiquity of international power players that shape and dictate policy. The Arab world has long suffered from external directives. The IMF and its 1980s structural adjustment gave way to the austerity-inducing Deauville loans of 2011.
