True democracy needs a voting trail

The Republic of Ireland took its first steps towards the introduction of electronic voting in 1999. According to Irish legislation, “voting and vote counting at a Dáil [parliament] election may be undertaken on voting system equipment approved for such purposes by the Minister.” Remarkably, no objective or legal criteria for the selection of such a system were ever set out by our government.

The Nedap/Powervote system was selected in 2000 following a public tender process. Voters mark their preferences by pressing buttons on a voting machine. The votes are stored on wallet–sized memory cartridges called “ballot modules” which are transported by hand to count–centres. There, the contents are loaded onto a “hardened” PC, and the results are calculated.

My undergraduate thesis in 2003 was the first independent analysis of the government’s chosen voting system from a computer science perspective. As I began the research, I quickly became concerned.

Also in openDemocracy’s “How we vote” debate:

• Siva Vaidhyanathan, “What happens when we vote?” (October 2004)
• Louise Ferguson, “Democracy needs good design” (October 2004)

If you share openDemocracy’s commitment to discussing the workings of democracy, including voting systems, please subscribe for just £25 / $40 / €40. You’ll gain access to easy–to–read PDFs of these and other articles.

At first glance, e–voting seems like a wonderful idea. Counting is what computers are good at; automated voting seems like a natural progression. But truly automated voting – where the computer is voting instead of the people – is the stuff of nightmares. And this is what many computer experts fear from e–voting. If you don’t see your vote (which of course you can’t if it’s electronic) how do you know that it’s recorded correctly?

As Bruce Schneier explains in his article on openDemocracy, attacks on e–voting systems can be utterly silent and undetectable. What’s worse, they can have extremely far–reaching effects.

It’s true that ballot boxes go missing in paper–based elections. However, when a large metal box disappears, it’s pretty obvious and has limited impact.

If a voting machine didn’t record votes correctly – by accident or design – we might never know. Every election where the system was used would be compromised.

The difficulty of ensuring that a computer system behaves the way you expect is well known. No amount of testing will guarantee future behaviour. Besides, all the tests come to nothing if the system used on polling day is different to the one tested. We need a means of auditing the system that is independent of the system itself. This is complicated by the fact that voting requires ballot secrecy, which conflicts with normal auditing procedures.

This is where the “voter verified audit trail” (VVAT) comes in. A VVAT consists of ballots that have been verified by individual voters. This “paper trail” of ballots can be used to detect and correct errors in the e–voting system.

An e–campaign for safer e–voting

I started Irish Citizens for Trustworthy Evoting (ICTE) in 2003 to lobby for the inclusion of a VVAT in the Nedap /Powervote system chosen for use in Ireland.

ICTE serves as an interesting example of the potential use of modern technology in the democratic process. Operating as an entirely open group, with no clearly defined membership or leadership, we have had remarkable success.

At the start, I invited groups and individuals I believed might be interested to join an internet mailing list. It quickly became very active. We discussed the merits of various technologies, and agreed on goals and strategies.

The mailing list, open to all and publicly archived, is an invaluable tool for discussion and knowledge sharing.

We write our information leaflets, documents and even press releases in a consensus–based process. One person writes the first draft, and then other list members contribute suggestions and corrections until the group is satisfied. The format is genuinely democratic.

Of course, electronic communication has its weaknesses. Email cannot convey body language; it is a very “combustible” medium. However, thanks to the presence of experienced list users, ICTE hasn’t suffered too many “flame wars” – heated arguments common in electronic discussion groups.

We also have a website, where we provide useful information on e–voting in Ireland and abroad. Much of the material was retrieved under Irish freedom of information law by Joe McCarthy, an independent researcher and lobbyist. To date, he has spent more than €4,000 (£2,721) of his own money on these requests.

Open electronic participation makes for great transparency, but there are some problems. A campaign organisation like ICTE, operating in public view, must be willing to accept that discussions may be used or manipulated by cynical opponents. However, our experience is that the efficiency gains of operating transparently outweigh the possible “cost” of being monitored.

Governments can be made to listen

At the beginning of ICTE’s campaign, our prospects were bleak. The government had committed to rolling out e–voting without VVAT nationwide in less than a year. They were not prepared to listen to the concerns we raised. However, by clearly and persistently stating our case we helped to build political opposition and media pressure until the issue could no longer be ignored.

In March 2004, the Irish government agreed to set up a Commission on Electronic Voting who had six weeks to report on the “secrecy and accuracy of the electronic voting system”. They did a remarkable job in the time provided, and released a thorough interim report in May 2004.

The report said: “the Commission finds that it is not in a position to recommend with the requisite degree of confidence the use of the chosen system at elections in Ireland in June 2004.”

The government, having committed itself to accepting the commission’s recommendations, halted the introduction of e–voting nationwide after spending millions on inadequate systems. In June 2004, the Irish people voted once more (in elections to the European Parliament) using tried and tested paper ballots. The introduction of e–voting in Ireland has been postponed.

It is remarkable that a group with no real money, structure or secrecy could have been so successful. We didn’t do it alone, but we certainly were instrumental in bringing about a positive change in our government’s policy. Thankfully, in Ireland at least, the burden of proof has moved from the dissenters to the supporters of electronic voting – where it belongs.