Abdullah Anas’ long awaited account of Arab-Afghans is important work not only for what he tells, but also for what he doesn’t. It is the story of a journey of a young man from rural Algeria, who out of ideological convictions lands in Afghanistan to fight the Soviet occupation, before ending as an asylum seeker in England where he lives today. The central theme of the book is why the jihadi movement that was meant to be self-sacrifice out of idealism, went so wrong. In developing his narrative, Anas deconstructs some of the jihadi myths – and touches some of the central weaknesses of the movement, such as their lack of leadership and lack of political literacy. But the author does not go far enough; he does not reveal many secrets that still remain to unveil, because he remains ambiguous to the original foundation on which the Arab-Afghan movement was based upon.
Abdullah Anas is a privileged witness: he joined the Afghan jihad early on. He details how he first went to Afghanistan – early 1984 - after which he spent most of the next ten years inside Afghanistan, with occasional visits to the Arab Afghan headquarters in Peshawar, Pakistan. He also did some fund-raising trips to the US. He is one of the founders of the “Arab Service Bureau” or MAK – the Arab-Afghan logistics organization, which he even directed for a while. The Bureau had 52 legal offices in the US during the Afghan jihad, an information that could surprise many who cannot imagine the political alliances and divisions during the cold war era. Later, MAK would evolve to become “the base” for jihad, or al-Qaeda, under the domination of Ossama Ben Laden. Anas also knew well jihadi notorieties such as Ben Laden, Khattab (a jihadi who fought and died in Russian North Caucasus), and even had Abu Mus’ib Zarqawi in his wedding party, therefore making his revelations of particular interest.
The aim of the book seems to clean the reputation of the first generation of Arab-Afghans, Afghan mujahedeen, and especially that of Abdullah Azzam, by dissociating them from the horrors of al-Qaeda. “I, being one of the MAK’s founders, should bear some responsibility for the spawning of this monster that became al-Qaeda. But I am adamant that I am not responsible for it” says the author (p. 145). Anas has two heroes: the first is Abdullah Azzam, the Palestinian Islamist who could qualify as the father of Afghan-Arabs, for his role in issuing a fatwa (edict) in 1979, co-signed with leading Muslim scholars of the time, making jihad in Afghanistan the individual obligation (fard ‘ayn) of every Muslim. This is an innovation in Islamic law, where warfare is carefully regulated under the authority of the Muslim state.
