In Afghanistan, it is not uncommon for meetings of all kinds to follow a somewhat flexible interpretation of time. However, in the case of a recent high-level meeting with the Governor of Takhar, the start of proceedings was kept waiting for a less orthodox reason than usual: the provincial leader was unable to concentrate until his son had recounted to him all the details of the popular Indian drama, Kyunki Saas Bhi Kabhi Bahu Thi, the latest episode of which he had missed earlier that evening.
Such an incident may appear trivial, but it actually feeds into serious growing tension between regional players. Although such imports have enjoyed popularity in the country since at least the 1980s, public consumption of Indian music, television serials and Bollywood has reached new levels since 2001, dwarfing the influence of other foreign equivalents. The influx of Indian cultural imports in fact represents the crux of the new battle that is fully underway - the struggle for non-military influence in Afghanistan.
The Indian charm offensive
Philip Jakeman is the Afghanistan and Bangladesh researcher at the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies in New Delhi.India has sought to capitalise on its soft power with frenetic diplomatic activity. It hosted the November 2006 Regional Economic Cooperation Conference for Afghanistan, and tirelessly championed the entry of its ally into SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation), finally achieved at the 14th summit held this April.
Reflecting the increasingly warm ties between the two countries, President Karzai has visited India four times since his inauguration, with frequent reciprocal trips by Indian officials. Moreover, while Afghan-Pakistani relations have been characterised by acrimony and ongoing disputes, the Afghan leader is received as a hero in India where discussions have often revolved around ways to curb violence in south Afghanistan and Kashmir; both regions where Kabul and New Delhi suspect the interference of Islamabad.
Hard cash signifies a third front in the campaign. Following Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee's January visit to Kabul and the announcement of an additional US$100m of aid, the amount of pledged Indian humanitarian assistance has now reached an astonishing US$750m since 2001. In fact, despite the huge involvement and investment in the country by the USA - its competitor and ally, India remains Afghanistan's fifth-largest donor, well ahead of Pakistan's contribution of US$150m. Combined with initiatives such as the ongoing Preferential Trade Agreement and the US$50m Line of Credit facility, and considering India's history of aid giving, this represents a wholly remarkable level of assistance.
Building more than bridges
Moreover, India has targeted that aid money in smart ways, designed to boost its profile amongst the general population. While the US has spent billions on projects such as institutional capacity building, the results of which are largely invisible to the public, India has concentrated on more conspicuous ventures like the Indira Gandhi Children's Hospital in Kabul, a dam in Herat and the Parliament building.
An Indian project to electrify Kabul with power from Uzbekistan is due to be completed in eight months. This means that by next year, every connected citizen in the capital, equivalent to 10% of the entire Afghan population, will be using energy thanks to Indian help - another large feather in India's cap.
The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) agreed last year promises to strengthen cooperation in the field of rural development - a necessary but also highly visible undertaking that will further boost India's standing.
Likewise, the unprecedented annual award of one thousand bursaries for Afghan students, unveiled by Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in 2005, and the following year's MoU on cooperation in education, are also viewed in many foreign capitals (particularly in Islamabad, whose similar offer of five hundred scholarships was summarily rejected) as part of a ploy to gain influence. Though the number of scholarships is small relative to the population, it is recognised that only the very best students will be eligible and these potential future leaders will most likely remain positively inclined towards India long after their graduation. Indeed, the very fact that President Karzai is an alumnus of Himachal Pradesh University in Simla is considered by many observers as one reason behind his alleged fondness towards India.
Coalition efforts to train the Afghan police and armed forces have necessarily had to involve government bureaucracy and have therefore been associated by many local people with corruption and incompetence. By contrast, Indian companies have capitalised on the good relations between the two countries to ensure they can operate largely independent of government and the associated patrimony. Meanwhile, the Afghanistan Reconstruction and Development Service is effectively dominated by Indian businesspeople, and treats companies from India with a degree of greater deference. A rare commission for a Pakistani company to build the Mehtar Lam-Jalalabad highway ended in farce when the road began to break apart only weeks after its construction.
Other assistance, such as the Zaranj-Delaram highway (see Paul Rogers, "The West's Afghan Blues", openDemocracy, 1 March 2007) has been more overtly designed to coincide with Indian strategic goals.
Islamabad's wary gaze
Fears in Islamabad that vital ground is being lost in Afghanistan were aired after the reconstruction of two Indian consulates in Kandahar and Jalalabad. Despite the clearly internal nature of the issue, a national debate raged across the border where consensus emerged in Pakistan that India's rising profile in the country constituted an unacceptable affront to national security.
Considering the rebuilding brought the sum total of Indian diplomatic delegations in Afghanistan to five - the same as Pakistan - the amount and intensity of anxiety expressed was revealing. Indeed, it is hard to conceive of another situation where virtually a whole society would object so strongly to another country's level of representation in a third state. Even now, frequent accusations emanate from Pakistan that Indian agents use the consulates as bases from which to operate in Pakistan's restive province of Baluchistan and tribal border areas.
Pakistani officials fear that its once pliant neighbour will no longer return to Islamabad's hand of cards. If Afghan public opinion is anything to go by, such fears are justified. One survey in December 2006 revealed that eight out of ten Afghans believe that Pakistan actively allows the Taliban to operate in Afghanistan, while a miniscule 6% believe that their southern neighbour "is having a mainly positive influence in the world".
In English, the title of the never-ending soap opera so beloved by the Takhar Governor reminds us that "Every mother-in-law was once a daughter-in-law". Sixty years after their troubled birth, the two estranged sisters of India and Pakistan continue to wrestle for influence over their cousins in Afghanistan as they try to assume maturity within the global family of nations.
Pakistan remains a vital partner in the US-led "war on terror" and continues to enjoy Washington's at-times blind support. Combined with the influential role of its insurgent proxies, Pakistan's crucial strategic role in the region would make Islamabad, not New Delhi, seem ideally placed to exploit any potential scenario in Afghanistan. However, as the international coalition fails to win the "hearts and minds" of local people, no actor can expect to influence proceedings in Afghanistan without the support of the populace. Pakistan's reputation in the country has only plummeted further, while that of its arch-rival India is on the rise.
