Much of the recent debate surrounding the future of Iraq is irrelevant to unfolding realities on the ground. A discussion of the merits or otherwise of Iraq's division into ethno-sectarian regions ignores the reality that there are really only two plausible future trajectories for Iraq's political development.
The first follows the path defined by Iraq's constitution voted on in October 2005. This almost inevitably culminates in the division of Iraq into four or five largely autonomous regions loosely governed from the centre. Whether this outcome is desirable or not, these regions will be largely congruent with the ethno-sectarian distribution of the population.
The second trajectory deviates for whatever reason from the procedures outlined in the constitution and ends in the disintegration of the state itself.
Gareth Stansfield is reader in middle-east politics at the Institute of Arab and Islamic Studies at the University of Exeter, and associate fellow of the middle-east programme at Chatham House. He writes regularly on Iraqi affairs; his articles have appeared in publications such as Prospect, the Observer, the Telegraph, the Guardian and Islam Online. His books include (co-written with Liam Anderson) The Future of Iraq: Dictatorship, Democracy or Division? (Palgrave Macmillan, 2004) and Iraq: People, History, Politics (Polity, 2007)
Liam Anderson is associate professor of politics at Wright State University, Ohio. His books include (co-written with Gareth Stansfield) The Future of Iraq: Dictatorship, Democracy or Division? (Palgrave Macmillan, 2004)
The division of Iraq is already an institutionalised reality. The Kurdistan region, defined as the territories governed over by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) as of 2003, has existed since 1991; it is formally recognised in Article 113 of the constitution. Article 115 further provides that one or more provinces of Iraq can vote to form a larger federal region. This is almost certain to lead to one, perhaps two regions being formed in the Shi'a-dominated south and mid-Euphrates area.
By default, this leaves the three provinces largely dominated by Sunni Arabs with the choice of remaining as separate entities or merging to form a larger, more powerful, region. The logical course of action is the latter. Greater Baghdad is a complex mosaic of ethnicities, religions, and sects. It is too significant symbolically and demographically to be incorporated into existing regions and will need to have a separate regional status.
The anomaly of centralism
Those who oppose this outcome -Sunni Arabs, definitely, and Shi'a leader Muqtada al-Sadr, possibly - lack the power to change the constitutional process through political means. The Kurds, moreover, have veto power over any constitutional amendments affecting the status of their region. So, if the political process unfolds in accordance with the provisions of the constitution, the logical product is a division of Iraq along ethno-sectarian lines.
Those who reject the end-product of this constitutional process are, logically, rejecting the process itself. Yet, any alternative yields significantly worse outcomes as there are none that result in anything other than the chaotic break up of Iraq into separate independent states.
The reason for this is simple: if there is any deviation from the constitutional process - either in an attempt to placate Sunni Arab demands for a unitary state, or if the process itself collapses due to the outbreak of full-scale civil war between Shi'a and Sunni (a distinct possibility) - the Kurds have made clear that they will have no alternative but to secede and accept the consequence of their actions.
The exercise of decentralised power is scarcely unique in Iraq's history. Indeed, when considering the wider sweep of the history of the region, it is centralised rule that is the anomaly. It was also largely responsible for weakening the cosmopolitan social and political structures that had characterised Iraq's cities for nearly half a millennium.
Also in openDemocracy on modern Iraqs history and politics:
Peter Sluglett, "Iraq, Britain, and the United States: new perspectives, old problems"
(3 June 2003)
Sami Zubaida, "The rise and fall of civil society in Iraq"
(5 February 2003)
Omar A Omar, "Kirkuk: microcosm of Iraq"
(21 March 2005)
Zaid Al-Ali, "Iraq: a constitution or an epitaph"
(16 August 2005)
Zaid Al-Ali, "Saving Iraq: a critique of Peter W Galbraith"
(26 October 2006)
John Sloboda, "Sparing Saddam: beyond victors justice"
(14 November 2006)
Anthony Dworkin, "Saddams trial: questions of justice"
(20 November 2006)
The return of history
Under the Ottoman empire, the three provinces that would later become Iraq - Basra, Baghdad, and Mosul - were largely autonomous units, each being administered from the leading urban centre and each displaying distinctive ethno-sectarian compositions. Links evolved naturally through economic interaction between the provinces, not through a centralised political structure administered from Baghdad, and each of the provinces prospered from autonomous trade links with its neighbours.
This pattern was erased by the invention of the state of Iraq by the British in the 1920s. The blueprint of a strong central government was largely responsible for allowing the dominance of the state by Sunni Arabs, and the final manifestation of minority rule in the form of Saddam Hussein's authoritarian regime.
The eighty years of the 20th century in which Iraq was a unitary state undoubtedly created new dynamics within the country - including, arguably, Iraqi nationalism - but it seems abundantly clear that the older ethno-sectarian identities have been resurrected and are now the main organising forces of Iraqi political life.
An Iraq of loosely governed ethno-sectarian regions is not ideal, but it is the only way that Iraq can now survive as a coherent territorial entity. Those who argue against this are tilting at windmills. They simply fail to understand it as the logical outcome of the existing constitutional process - but it is incongruous to accept the legitimacy of the process while rejecting its logical product. Meanwhile, those who oppose the existing constitutional process have an intellectual obligation to furnish a viable alternative, and explain how an increasingly powerless United States intends to impose this on groups already committed to the current process.
