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Military temptation and institutional instability in Latin America

Latin America’s turbulence shows the limits of democratic institutions to deal with political conflict and, as seen in Bolivia, the risk of military temptation. Español Português

Military temptation and institutional instability in Latin America
A Cholita passes in front of a military vehicle guarding the entrance to Plaza Murillo after the police were attacked by the social movements supporting Evo Morales. | Gaston Brito/DPA/PA Images. All rights reserved.
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South America ended 2019 with tumultuous months, which showed us the limits of its democratic institutions to channel political conflict. Street protests against government institutions in the Andean region pointed to the inability of political institutions to handle the conflicts that divide those societies. Only in Bolivia, however, did the protests result in the early termination of a presidential mandate. In this case, President Evo Morales' decision to ignore both the constitutional law and the result of a referendum that denied him the possibility to run for a third re-election, encouraged protests from the opposition on suspicion of fraud caused by an interruption of the rapid vote count. Street protests were joined by police intimidation and a military "suggestion" that the president should step down. Under these circumstances, Morales went into exile two months before the end of his term.

Although the decline in economic growth has aggravated social tensions throughout South America, the role played by the security forces is distinctive in the Bolivian case. Moreover: in Bolivia, the Armed Forces initially demanded a decree for impunity for the consequences of repression, which had to be repealed due to international pressure from human rights organizations. If the actions of the Bolivian military signalled a return of Latin American armies to the role of political referees that characterized them for most of the 20th century, we would be facing a phenomenon with risks that cannot be underestimated. The possibility of knocking on the door of the military barracks offers an alternative to democratic negotiation. This reduces the incentives for politicians to seek compromises and to invest in the functioning of democratic institutions. In other words, cycles of institutional instability might return, such as the one experienced by Bolivia itself between 1920 and 1980, a period in which it suffered 13 military coups.

On the other hand, when lacking a military option, politicians are forced to invest in democratic solutions, even in the face of deep crises. The resulting political commitments reduce levels of violence and generate learning opportunities that allow for progress in building more durable institutions, despite the regional legacies of institutional weakness. That is why the risk of a return to military arbitration would mean throwing away the efforts of democratic construction that, despite zigzags, most countries in the region have gone through in recent decades. This possibility is particularly worrying given the increase in public support for the military. According to Vanderbilt University's Latin American Public Opinion Project (Lapop), the average support for military coups in Latin America is 39% in response to the increase in crime, and 37% in reaction to the increase in corruption. Furthermore, the growing prestige of the Armed Forces contrasts with the discredit of political parties in the regional public opinion.