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Brexit and a “People’s Vote” – what would Wittgenstein do?

The People’s vote campaigners need to directly address issues of democracy, contradiction and consistency – something philosophy has usefully grappled with.

Brexit and a “People’s Vote” – what would Wittgenstein do?
The People's Vote campaign outside Parliament, March 2019 | Claire Doherty/PA Images
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Calls for a second referendum on EU membership have been growing louder without, however, properly making the case for it. They fail to address the heart of the matter: how to show adequate respect for the democratic result of the 2016 referendum on EU membership whilst making the case for a new referendum. Ultimately, the case for a second referendum requires a compelling justification for challenging the first. The real question that the proponents of a people’s vote must confront is whether the democratic process can be suspended without undermining its legitimacy.

They need to be able to square the circle, because a democracy worth the name depends on the consistent application of its rules. The risk of violating consistency is obvious: if one democratic vote is sacrificed for some higher ideal, will not that vote be superseded by yet another vote? If not properly justified, such a logic would create a spiral of mistrust that ultimately undermines the foundations of democratic rule. Making a case for a people’s vote requires justifying an exception to the consistent application of democratic rules.

The force of consistency is so great that no escape from it seems possible, yet it is precisely because of this reason that such an attempt must be made. Wittgenstein grappled with this problem in a different context but may point to the solution. Initially he worked on the premise that thought beyond consistency was illogical and what was illogical, unthinkable; for God, he thought, could never create something that is contrary to the laws of logic. He saw this as an unconditional surrender to a mysterious force but became increasingly suspicious of it when he realised how consistency could lead to a paralysis in thought and action.