The prospects for stability in Somalia are currently in the hands of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and its supporters in Ethiopia, the African Union (AU), and the international community. But let there be no mistake about it: the decisions made in the coming weeks by President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, Prime Minister Ali Mohamed Ghedi, and the rest of the TFG will determine the success or failure of stability in Somalia.
David Shinn was the deputy director of the US State Department Task Force on Somalia during UNITAF and State Department coordinator for Somalia during UNOSOM II. He was US ambassador to Ethiopia from 1996-99 and is now an adjunct professor in the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University.Ethiopia very much wants to remove its military force from Somalia. Measures taken by the AU and international community will only have a minor impact if the TFG does not take steps that will lead quickly to a more broadly acceptable Somali government. The TFG is for the moment the only Somali authority in place. It deserves the support of the international community, but only if the TFG first makes changes that show it is prepared to engage seriously in power sharing.
This requires bringing, among others, moderates such the as former chair of the Islamic Courts executive council Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed and former TFG speaker of parliament Sharif Hassan Sheikh Adan into the government.
Sharing power
As enemies of current key members of the TFG, this will not be an easy decision for the TFG. But the alternative is to rely on the military muscle of the Ethiopian troops and the slowly arriving AU peacekeeping force to keep the TFG in power. This is neither a recipe for TFG longevity nor for the good of the Somali people. The TFG initially took some useful steps towards political reconciliation. It temporarily gained the cooperation of most warlords in Mogadishu. It seemed to reach out to a number of previously disaffected groups in the capital.
There are now indications, however, that some of the warlords are returning to the arms bazaars in Mogadishu to refill their arsenals. There has been little new outreach to disaffected Somalis not included in the government. Instead, President Yusuf announced there will be a two-month long reconciliation conference in Mogadishu for 3,000 persons beginning in mid-April.
Although Mogadishu is the right place to focus reconciliation, the proposed conference faces considerable challenges. Mogadishu is a cauldron of instability; there have been periodic attacks on major hotels, markets, the airport and other public spaces. Most of the TFG seems to have returned to Baidoa in south central Somalia for security reasons. The Mogadishu meeting has the ring of an idea designed to buy time with the international community while the TFG tries to shore up its military power. A large conclave in Mogadishu, which for security reasons may never happen, is not the answer.
If the TFG wants to survive, the best alternative is serious and immediate negotiations with those Somalis not now part of the government. If the likes of Sheikh Adan and Sheikh Ahmed are allowed to participate in the government, the TFG will gain more credibility among alienated Somali constituencies. Success will also probably require a restructuring of parliament, the 31 ministers, 5 ministers of state, and 32 deputy ministers.
International support?
The international community has expended most of its energy trying to create an AU peacekeeping force so that the Ethiopian forces, which have a long history of enmity with Somalia, can leave. Although the departure of the Ethiopians would be a positive development, it is unlikely that a muscular AU force will replace them. Uganda recently sent 1,700 troops to the TFG provisional capital of Baidoa in south-central Somalia. Ugandan president Yoweri Museveni said their mandate is to help form a national army, not to engage or disarm militias. It is not clear how much of the Ugandan force will remain in Baidoa, though a small contingent of Ugandan troops landed recently in Mogadishu, where the real problem exists. (Soon after the arrival of the Ugandan detachment, mortars struck Mogadishu's airport.)
Nigeria has said its contingent will arrive in mid-April. Burundi has promised troops, but requires both new equipment and air transport to get them to Somalia. Whether Malawi will send troops remains uncertain. The defense minister has supported the dispatch of peacekeepers, while the country's president has rejected participation in the AU effort. AU members have only pledged 4,000 of the proposed force of 8,000 soldiers.
Most observers who follow Somalia closely believe 8,000 troops are far fewer than the number required to keep Somalia under control. During the peak of the American-led UNITAF operation in 1993, there were 25,000 well-equipped peacekeeping troops in Somalia or offshore. Even then, UNITAF had its hands full.
The AU peacekeeping force raises more questions than it answers. Its estimated costs are $34 million per month. The AU does not have the money or sufficient support from the international community; pledges so far cover only the first two months of its operations. It is further unclear whether AU troops have the necessary training and equipment for their impending security responsibilities. At least the Nigerians were in Somalia with UNOSOM II in 1993 and may be marginally better prepared for the challenges they will confront. But in truth, none of the proposed African forces has the firepower or experience to deal with the urban guerrilla warfare they will encounter in Mogadishu.
With shaky boots on the ground, AU efforts are not helped by the lack of serious political will in the international community. At present, the AU operation is supposed to give way to a United Nations peacekeeping force after six months. Little progress has been made in preparing this UN mission. The clock has already begun to run.
All of these problems underscore the necessity of first repairing Somalia from the inside. The TFG must build a broader base of support that includes the voices of a wider range of Somalis. Once that happens, thorny security questions may gradually resolve themselves. At that point, an AU force will be both useful and up to the task.
