Even before the spread of COVID-19, smaller states had much to fear in international affairs. The shifting global order, instability in regional institutions and the resurgence of great power politics do not bode well for countries such as Czechia and Norway. However, it’s not these fears themselves, so much as what smaller states make of them, that determine how they can adapt and survive – or even thrive – under changing and challenging global conditions. To make the best of the scary global situation and influence the ‘post-Coronial’ international order, smaller states should use their common fears as the basis for deepening their friendships with each other and, together, contribute to a less fearful world.
Taking the example of two smaller, European states – Czechia and Norway – we can see how common fears can trigger new relational dynamics, and revitalize latent or unfulfilled partnerships. Norway and Czechia have very different histories and geographies, and their societies are often perceived to be at opposite ends of the European political spectrum. Clichéd images, however unfair, of Norwegians as busy-body ‘know-it-alls’ taking the moral high ground in international affairs, and Czechs as recalcitrant introverts, either ignoring or landing on the conservative side of issues from migration to climate change have been hard to shake off. Norway is embedded in liberal-progressive Nordic Cooperation (N5), while Czechia still beds down in the Visegrad Four (V4) together with illiberal standard bearers like Viktor Orban’s Hungary and Jaroslaw Kacyynski’s Poland.
Yet when it comes to assessing their current international prospects, in light of shifts in global and European politics, policymakers and experts in the two countries tend to see things in a remarkably similar fashion. These common assessments, combined with the realisation that, should they put their collective minds to it, smaller states can help each other, comes at a time when COVID-19 has made the need for joined-up international action to combat common threats abundantly clear. Smaller states cannot afford to simply let the great powers shape such action – and the emerging world order in their own image. Rather, they need to use their common fears as a springboard to seizing and creating common opportunities for influence.
