On January 2, the Turkish Grand National Assembly approved a military deployment mandate regarding sending troops to Libya. Senior Turkish journalist and Middle East expert Cengiz Çandar dubbed it a “mandate of adventure”, which supported the bilateral agreement Turkey made on November 27, 2019 with the Libyan Government of National Accord, whose power and influence varies from day to day. The paramount reason for hastily passing the mandate, no doubt, was Erdoğan’s desire to enter with the upper hand the January 8 negotiations with Vladimir Putin, who supports the gradually strengthening forces of Khalifa Haftar, leader of the Libyan National Army against the Libyan Government of National Accord. However, it seems that he could not reach his aim, properly.
Additionally, the coincidence between the date the mandate was passed with the date Israel, Greece, and the Republic of Cyprus signed a natural gas pipeline agreement, called EastMed, to transport Israeli and Cypriot gas to Europe, sent an entirely separate diplomatic message. In this context, Turkey, according to its own narrative, is overturning the game played in the eastern Mediterranean and bringing stability to the region by pre-empting the “rebels” in Libya supported by western forces. This is, undoubtedly, what Erdoğan’s regime and supporters see—or, more precisely, wish to have seen—in Turkey.
But the other side of this “adventure” is far different and much darker. This decision is primarily a nascent indicator that Turkey has strayed far from its classic and balance-focused understanding of foreign policy from which it began to diverge in the early 2010s. It is also an indicator that Turkey may easily intend to employ military force and take part in conflicts outside its borders.
