The selective revival of Nasserism by Egypt's current regime may help expand its support base amongst the masses, but only temporarily, as living standards continue to deteriorate.
ISIS has emerged from the wounds of the Arab world—for which the west is to a large extent responsible—and current airstrikes are pouring salt into these wounds.
Unlike during the Mubarak era, the current regime lacks a reliable civilian ally to populate the legislative branch of the state.
Many Arab countries seem to have reverted to a mode of power reminiscent of a pre-modern form of politics, where coercion is the sole source of power.
An explanation for the conspicuous absence of Arab intellectuals from the revolutionary (and counter-revolutionary) scene.
The famous slogan “The people want the downfall of the regime” follows a notion promoted by Arab autocrats to give the illusion of change and hinder the development of post-revolutionary strategy.
EU politicians can promote 'European' values by stopping their support for autocratic regimes, and by starting to ask tough questions about radicalisation.
A personal account of returning to a profoundly changed city, and of worrying trends under military dictatorship.
The main obstacle facing Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood is arguably not physical repression, but the urgent need for self-rehabilitation.
The Egyptian state has fallen prey to the internal struggles of its security apparatus. Repression has become an end in itself rather than a tool for maintaining the regime’s stability.
White men in suits support Arab autocrats while the suffering many are vilified as dangerous to the fabric of western societies: external threats or worse, immigrants attempting to infiltrate.
Arab autocrats’ power depends on more than physical coercion or the rise of Islamist extremism: it has deeper roots in the role of civil society, orientalism, and identity politics.
