Three Questions about Zarqawi

Reports are suggesting that the Iraqi insurgent leader Abu Musab Al Zarqawi was forced to resign from his role as political leader of the the Iraqi insurgency. The decision, it is claimed, followed concerns that his activities – especially the increasingly sectarian nature of his campaign – were alienating Muslims across the Arab world. No doubt, the development is a significant one. But it also raises a few questions. The first, and most obvious, one: Are the reports true? The claims were made in a television interview with Huthayfah Azzam, who is the son of Osama bin Laden’s mentor Abdullah Azzam. As my colleague Thomas Hegghammer, who is one of the leading young researcher on jihadist ideology and currently a visiting fellow at the Centre for Defence Studies at King’s, told me, Huthayfah is not an influential figure in the Iraqi insurgency, but he is an active member of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood. There are numerous ties between the Jordanian Brotherhood and the Iraqi insurgents, not least because the two countries are close neighbours and Zarqawi himself is Jordanian. Azzam, in fact, is likely to know Zarqawi and many of his associates from the time when Zarqawi set up the terrorist group Al Tawhid in Jordan. In other words, Azzam knows what he is talking about, and there is absolutely no reason why he would invent the story. The second question: What does it mean for Zarqawi? Ever since the days when he set up training camps in Afghanistan to rival those of Osama bin Laden, Zarqawi has been on a mission to become the leader of the global jihad. Indeed, in Iraq, he initially sought Bin Laden’s endorsement in order to establish his credentials. But once it was clear that it was he who was now regarded as the ‘world’s most dangerous terrorist’, he distanced himself from Bin Laden. Moreover, it is important to realise that Zarqawi's brand of jihadism makes even Bin Laden look like a moderate. Zarqawi was responsible for the beheadings of Western contractors, which shocked even Muslims with radical sympathies. He is also a leading advocate of the strategy of sectarian tension, which has brought Iraq close to a civil war between Sunnis and Shiites. Indeed it was the latter which prompted Bin Laden’s deputy, Ayman Al Zawahiri, to write a letter in which he pleaded with Zarqawi to moderate his tactics, arguing that the current campaign was alienating Muslims across the world. The combination of ego and extremism makes it unlikely that Zarqawi will simply fade into obscurity. Even if the Iraqi insurgency chooses to abandon him altogether, rather than giving up, Zarqawi and a small band of supporters may carry on regardless. Whether that would make him less or, in fact, more dangerous remains to be seen. Third Question: What does it tell us about the state of the Iraqi insurgency? It seems clear that the Iraqi insurgents are now faced with what my colleague Mike Smith and I have described as the ‘escalation trap’. If they continue to increase the level of violence, they will lose support from their constituency. They may also endanger the fragile coalition of former Saddam supporters, (mostly Sunni) nationalists and religious extremists, which had been held together by the shared determination to expel the Coalition from Iraqi lands. On the other hand, if they fail to step up their campaign, people will become indifferent, and the violence will cease to have any tangible strategic impact. Indeed, for the insurgents to capture the attention of the Western public, they already need to resort to ever more spectacular acts of violence. In a way, therefore, Zarqawi’s demotion indicates a potentially positive development. It demonstrates that even the more radical Sunnis are gradually moving away from the escalation scenario. At some point, they may even come to the conclusion that most can be achieved by engaging with the emerging – albeit messy – democratic process. The key question is how much more damage Zarqawi will be allowed to inflict upon Iraqi society before the more politically-minded insurgents make their minds up. His demotion is a step in the right direction. But only if his tendency is excluded from the insurgency altogether can the Sunnis ever hope to make the political gains they are entitled to.