Rebutting Bin Laden

This weekend saw the release of Osama bin Laden’s latest audio message. The content differed little from previous ones in which he highlighted recent political developments to ‘prove’ that the West was at war with Islam, and that Muslims across the world should rise in order to defend the ‘ummah’. He cited the election victory of Hamas and the consequent withholding of funds from the Palestinian Authority by Western donors as evidence of how the West is opposed to Muslims holding power. And he postulated that the prospect of a UN force stopping the genocide in Sudan is tantamount to another ‘crusade’ with the sole purpose of colonising the Muslim world. None of this would matter if no one was paying attention. Unfortunately, while the vast majority of Muslims wouldn’t dream of supporting Bin Laden, many buy into the notion that the West is at war with Islam. Even worse, few – if any – Western leaders have recognised the need to challenge this vicious idea. In my view, rebutting Bin Laden isn’t all that difficult, and more of it needs to be done if we are serious about winning ‘the battle of ideas’. So, let’s deal with Bin Laden’s ‘evidence’. In relation to Hamas, it’s true that, perhaps, the West’s immediate response to the election victory was a little too categorical to provide an incentive for Hamas to engage with Western concerns. At the same time, there clearly isn’t any obligation on Western governments to give money to a group which refuses to give up on terrorism, fails to condemn suicide attacks, and can’t even bring itself to recognise the existence of the country with whom it says it wants to negotiate. People like EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana have made it clear that Europe will support the new Palestinian government if it turns its back on violence and recognises Israel. This position is backed by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan and many in the Arab world. To say that it amounts to a Western declaration of war against Islam is nothing less than a bizarre exaggeration. Regarding Sudan, it is precisely because no one wants to ‘colonise’ this strategically worthless region that the international community hasn’t yet taken any action to stop the violence. Since the crisis first erupted, up to 200,000 people have been killed and about the same number have been made to flee their homes. No doubt, if the majority of the victims were Muslim, rather than railing against its alleged lust for intervention, Bin Laden would pick the case to highlight the West’s indifference. The idea of a UN force to stop this ‘slow motion’ genocide is long overdue. In fact, contrary to what Bin Laden suggests, the outrage is not that an intervention may now take place, but rather how long it has taken for the international community to make it happen. As especially the case of Sudan illustrates, Bin Laden’s messages often consist of ridiculous distortions about which little can be done other than countering them through good public diplomacy. Public diplomacy, however, can only be part of the solution. At times, it may be necessary to pre-empt the need for public rebutting by not providing Bin Laden with any rhetorical ‘ammunition’ in the first place.