The London Bombings: One Year On

In the twelve months since the July bombings, the threat from terrorism has not subsided. MI5 recently revealed that it currently considers 1200 UK residents to be dangerous and potentially violent. This number, it said, had increased by 300 per cent since the year 2003. Though the reliability of such numbers should not be overrated, the figure illustrates the scale of the problem and the urgency with which it should be confronted. After all, it must not be forgotten that the Irish Republican Army (IRA) which, until recent years, was viewed as the most potent terrorist threat to Britain, wasn’t believed to have more than 500 active members at any given time. The challenge, however, isn’t just one of numbers. The government’s ‘narrative’ into the bombings revealed that, despite the most extensive criminal investigation in recent British history, it hadn’t been possible to establish to what extent the 7 July bombers were connected to other cells, and that possible linkages to a wider network remain unknown. The threat, in other words, has become extremely diffuse, and understanding the jihadists’ constantly changing structures has become as difficult as countering them. The challenge, therefore, is both urgent and profound, and there are – in my view – three areas in which much remains to be done. First, the government’s official counter-terrorism strategy - aptly named CONTEST - states that there are four priorities, the four so-called ‘P’s’: prevention, pursuit of terrorist suspects, protection of potential terrorist targets, and increasing preparedness. What it doesn't say, however, is how these different areas of counter-terrorism relate to each other. Yet it is vitally important for the government to define what the balance should be between, say, prevention (dialogue, engagement, etc.) and pursuit (arresting and detaining suspects). Indeed, doing so would allow the government to develop a more coherent, long-term approach and facilitate the strategic allocation of resources. It would, however, also help the authorities to explain to the public what they are doing, and – thus – bring about a better understanding of the government’s counter-terrorism campaign. The second priority – the need for better communication between law enforcement agencies and the public – is directly related to the first. Our success in countering terrorism will be determined, to a large extent, by the degree to which we can persuade domestic communities from which ‘homegrown’ terrorists appear to have emerged to cooperate with the authorities. The dilemma is that it is precisely these communities which are most likely to bear the brunt of the police’s more intrusive practices, and that they are least likely therefore to view the authorities’ efforts in a positive light. Intelligence can never be totally accurate. No matter how sophisticated the processes through which it is acquired and assessed, there will be a margin of error, and mistakes – such as the Forest Gate raid – will inevitably be made. What can be done, however, is to engage in a constructive dialogue with vulnerable communities, aiming to counter the emerging sense of victimisation, taking into account their concerns, and explaining the rationale behind the security forces’ actions. In this respect, it would be necessary for the authorities to become more pro-active and seek the collaboration with community leaders. Finally, the investigation of the July bombings as well as the secret tape recordings used in a current trial against a group of alleged jihadist have made it clear – once again – that jihadism is a transnational phenomenon, and that – though the perpetrators of many terrorist acts may be ‘homegrown’ – their networks and connections are crossing borders and, in some cases, even continents. Law enforcement and intelligence agencies have done much to improve the collaboration with their counterparts from other countries. In many instances, though, these efforts continue to be hampered by mistrust, rivalries, and unhelpful institutional procedures (such as outdated classification regimes) which make successful collaboration difficult. Changing this sad state of affairs requires both constant prioritisation by political leaders and a change of mindset on behalf of those who work in these institutions. Despite these shortcomings, many of the measures and processes introduced since the July bombings have proved to sensible. On the whole, the British government and the security forces should be praised for responding in a way that reflects the urgency of the threat without falling into the trap of overreaction. While much still needs to be done to defeat the terrorists, it is equally clear that the terrorists have a long way to go in order to defeat us.