The US-Russia "reset," so named by Vice President Biden in a February speech, is far from complete, despite impressive progress over the past six months. Biden's own recent visit to Ukraine and Georgia included a furore-inducing comment about "withering" Russian power, and followed a July 16 letter from 22 Central and Eastern European elder statesmen that cast their countries' interests and US cooperation with Russia as zero-sum. All of which suggests there are plenty of pitfalls awaiting unwary practitioners of "reset" diplomacy.
Even the newly created "Bilateral Presidential Commission," symbolic of Washington and Moscow's shared resolve to fix their frayed relationship, could fail to deliver a new era of partnership. Paradoxically, the greatest danger is not that either side will fixate on minor conflicts to torpedo cooperation on shared interests, but that either might lose sight of why cooperation matters in the first place. Given the number and gravity of global challenges President Obama and his team now face-the global economic crisis, climate change, two ongoing wars, the threat of terrorism, and regional crises in East Asia and the Middle East-Russia might easily slip off the high priority list simply for lack of bandwidth. Since Russia's own renewed goodwill towards the US is based largely on the perception that it will once again be "taken seriously" as a global great power, a deficit of high level attention risks undermining the gains of recent months.
To keep the relationship "reset" on track, the US and Russia need an insurance policy for engagement in two parts: First, dramatically increase bilateral investment, so that each side has a significant financial stake in the other's security and stability, and so that there is a self-interested and well-heeled lobby in each country that can speak out against confrontation. Second, open new opportunities for grassroots interaction between the two societies, so that in future decades there will be a network of citizens with the knowledge and relationships needed for effective lobbying of both governments to stay engaged. This insurance policy approach is not unique to the US-Russian relationship, but it is especially important because without it, the momentum of the "reset" might be lost, with dire implications for global security.
The case for bulking up US-Russian economic relations is clear. Compare the volume of US-Russian trade at its height in 2008 ($36 billion) with our level of exchange with Japan ($204 billion), which has a smaller population than Russia, or with France ($73 billion), whose economy is smaller than Russia's. US-Indian trade ties, worth just $67 billion in 2008, have served as a powerful counterweight to conflict over nuclear testing, Kashmir, and climate change. And despite political, ideological and geostrategic tensions between the US and China, our economic interdependence, manifest in a $408 billion bilateral trade volume, ensures that both sides prefer peaceful dispute settlements to armed confrontation.
Even if nowhere near a US-China level of economic symbiosis is possible with Russia, Russia's natural resource wealth, underdeveloped but growing consumer products market, and highly skilled, educated work force offer diverse opportunities for increased engagement. What is needed is commitment from both sides to provide the regulatory framework and political will to lower perceived risks and costs for cautious business leaders. With increased transparency and lowered risk in the Russian regulatory environment, as well as a renewed Kremlin commitment to international trading rules necessary for WTO membership, leading global companies like Walmart, Caterpillar and Microsoft would bring direct investment, sophisticated business know-how, and new jobs, while creating a powerful business lobby in both countries to oppose destabilizing conflict.
Trade ties are key to preventing and resolving political conflict because of the premium business places on stability. But US-Russian commercial links are not as effective for keeping the bilateral relationship a high priority during times of relative calm, since companies will seldom push for deeper political or social engagement as long as they enjoy unfettered market access. It is only the emergence in the US of a strong community of individuals with close personal connections to Russia that can ensure official US-Russian dialogue and cooperation remain high on the Administration's agenda.
The model should be other affinity group networks and lobbies working to advance US cooperation with foreign governments. For decades, American Jews have been highly effective advocates for Israel's security and a close US-Israel relationship, with the pro-Israel lobbying group AIPAC routinely topping the list of the most influential groups in Washington. Americans of Indian descent have paid attention: now several lobbying groups work to strengthen US-Indian security and economic ties, and boasted a major victory with the ratification of the US-Indian civilian nuclear agreement last year. Another influential group, the National Council of La Raza, convened Hispanic leaders in June to push for comprehensive US immigration reform, important not only to Latinos in the US, but to governments in Mexico, El Salvador, Guatemala and elsewhere. While the issues at stake in the US-Russia relationship are clearly different, they are no less important. Groups like these are needed to put US-Russian cooperation on the domestic political map.
To allow stronger US-Russian affinity networks to develop, both governments must lower barriers to travel, particularly the cost, delay and uncertainty of the current visa system. Compared with visa-free travel opportunities to Western Europe and even many former Soviet states for Americans, the process for securing a Russian visa is arcane and onerous. With increased openness to travel can come more extensive educational and professional exchange programs, modeled on the successful Fulbright and Murrow exchange programs for teachers and journalists. Direct citizen diplomacy of this kind is needed to break the barrier of cynicism and distrust created by negative and distorted media coverage on both sides.
The US and Russian governments can build on over a decade of successful cooperation between NASA and the Russian space agency, and on the work of the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program, which has built communities of mutual understanding and respect among top researchers from nuclear science to bacteriology. Already Congressman Bill Delahunt (Democrat, Massachusetts) has called for a US-Russian athletic exchange program to "unlock the mystery" of Russia for average Americans. Such exchanges and collaborations are wise investments, since each additional American with deep, personal knowledge of Russia can be another voice reminding Congress and the White House that Russia matters not only in times of crisis, but as an important and permanent partner on the world stage.
The US and Russia have little choice but to begin the "reset" by dialing back tensions over urgent security challenges like Georgia, NATO expansion, and missile defense in Central Europe. Progress on resolving these differences, coupled with cooperation on counter-terrorism, drug prohibition and nuclear non-proliferation will create a new opening for productive bilateral relations. But to hold this door open over the longer term, an insurance policy is needed that includes both a bilateral economic stake in stability, and a grassroots constituency on both sides committed to keeping US-Russian cooperation high on the political agenda.
Without new guarantors of stability and political commitment, the US-Russia relationship risks grinding to a halt over the same disagreements that obstructed cooperation and partnership in the past two decades. In today's complex, interconnected and dangerous world, we cannot afford to lose another game of Russian roulette.
The author is Executive Director of the Partnership for a Secure America, a group founded by senior Democrats and Republicans to help rebuild the bipartisan center in national security and foreign policy.
