Don’t let a cloud stop the sunshine: the new president and the legacy of South–North relations

When Kim Dae-jung delivered his inaugural address as South Korea’s president on 25 February 1998, he outlined three principles of government policy towards North Korea, which together became known as the ‘sunshine policy’ – one that marked a decisive shift away from the unremitting hostility between the two states since the bitter Korean war of 1950–53.

Monument to the Liberation War, Pyongyang

These principles were: opposition to North Korea’s military provocation, refusal of any unification understood as absorption of one state by another, and active support for reconciliation and cooperation. In seeking to combine security with the need for a warmer relationship with its close neighbour and historic rival, Kim Dae-jung sought to create a new, benign dynamic of change on the Korean peninsula – one that would lead to the peaceful resolution of one of the most dangerous and intractable of all global disputes.

The new policy, emerging from a series of discussions in the period leading up to President Kim Dae-jung’s election, was informed by four key judgements.

North Korea’s system was a failure, would not revive, and could not last for a long time. North Korea would probably not simply collapse as a result of its economic problems. North Korea has no option except to change, and change has already begun. It is unlikely that North Korea will abandon its revolutionary strategy and its militant line towards South Korea, until it carries out a fundamental reform of its system.

Revolutionary Martyrs Cemetary, Pyongyang

All this added up to a policy approach by South Korea that sought to be both flexible and realistic. It separated political from economic matters, and economic cooperation from the question of military security. It advocated peaceful coexistence and mutual prosperity as the way to dissolve tensions that might lead to war. It supported conditionality over South–North economic cooperation, and gradualism in relation to political relationships. It valued the strengthening of the Republic of Korea–United States united defence system, a close mutual assistance with Japan, and cooperation with China and Russia.

South and North: the security dimension

Since the end of the Korean War in 1953, both South Korea and North Korea have been immersed in military and security issues, and trapped in the vicious circle of an arms race. From the start of the sunshine policy, North Korea’s direct military provocation against South Korea, and its dissemination of mass destruction weapons (including nuclear weapons), constituted an obvious challenge.

In June 1998, for example, North Korea infiltrated the South’s waters by submarine at the very moment when Chung Ju-yung, former chairman of the Hyundai Group, was negotiating with the North on the Mount Kumkang tourism project.

Tower of the Juche idea - Pyongyang

Meanwhile, North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons has continued, while it has sought to deal directly with the US alone, bypassing the South completely. Its missile test launch of August 1998, and its suspicious development of underground facilities in Geumchangri, provoked great controversy in the US. As the Clinton administration came under pressure from Republicans, the Seoul government reaffirmed that the development of nuclear weapons had to be seen in the context of the cold war structure of the Korean peninsula. A fundamental solution, not merely a shift of policy, was required.

William Perry, ex-US Secretary of Defense, was commissioned by President Clinton to reconsider the country’s active engagement with North Korea. His report of September 1999 proposed a series of reassuring measures – the suspension of nuclear weapons development and missile tests, easing of economic sanctions on the North, and cooperation involving South Korea and Japan – as a way of moving towards the end of the long cold war in Korea.

Stage right: enter George Bush

At the historic South–North summit talks on 15 June 2000, President Kim Dae-jung and his counterpart, Chairman of the National Defence Committee Kim Jong-il, reached an extensive agreement on principles and immediate processes towards unification, as well as over procedures for continuing dialogue between the two states and exchange visits between separated family members.

By the end of the year, a series of four ministerial talks had been held, in which economic and transport cooperation measures were agreed. However, as North Korea adopted a strategy of linking its dialogues with the US and South Korea, South–North relations came to a standstill.

The brother on the other side – South Korean soldier at Panmunjeom in the demilitarised zone

The loss of momentum was reinforced by the terrorist attacks on the US. The fifth and sixth joint ministerial meetings (the former in Seoul on 15–18 September 2001) stalled, with the latter failing to set a date for further talks due to widely differing views on the post-9/11 political situation in the Korean peninsula.

Then, on 29 January 2002, President Bush branded North Korea, Iran and Iraq as the ‘axis of evil’, warning that the US would strongly react to any development of weapons of mass destruction by these countries. North Korea’s response was that this was in effect a ‘declaration of war’.

As relations between North Korea and the US became more tense, Lim Dong-won, adviser on security and unification to Kim Dae-jung, visited North Korea in April 2002 to encourage Kim Jong-il to improve South–North understanding and to participate in the dialogue between North Korea and the US. Yet an armed clash on 29 June, which resulted from artillery attacks by North Korean patrol boats in the West Sea near the Northern Limit Line (NLL) in Yeonpyongdo, taking place at the end of the highly successful soccer World Cup tournament in South Korea, brought South–North relations to a low once again.

These were partially alleviated by the North’s swifter than usual expression of regret, and in the next two ministerial and economic cooperation summits, in August 2002, North Korea displayed a more positive attitude. On 18 September, South and North Korea held a ceremony for the groundbreaking reconnection works of roads and railway tracks linking the two countries. Construction on the Kyongeui Line is to be completed by the end of this year, the roads should open in spring 2003, and the Tonghae Line linking Jeojin and Onjongri within one year.

Next Exit: Seoul 70 km – view from the northern side of the demilitarised zone

The cooperative mood was also evident during the pioneering visit to Pyongyang by the Japanese Prime Minister, Junichiro Koizumi, on 17 September, where North Korea for the first time admitted having kidnapped Japanese citizens to use them as language coaches for North Korean spies – the biggest bilateral issue between the two countries.

In the context of this tentative thaw, the US dispatched James Kelly of the State Department to Pyongyang as a special envoy on 3 October. The discussion focused on US concerns over security-related matters – nuclear weapons, missiles, biochemical weapons – as well as human rights. Kelly stressed that a resumption of dialogue between North Korea and the US would be dependent on the North’s admission that it had developed nuclear weapons through an enriched uranium formula, and went on to abolish this programme.

In response, North Korea admitted its ongoing development of nuclear weapons, and declared that the US’s security-related concerns vis-à-vis the North could be resolved if the US abandoned its hostile policy against North Korea.

Traffic controller in Pyongyang

It seemed as if North Korea expected a change in the US’s hard-line policy to be an automatic response to its admission of developing nuclear weapons, just as the acknowledgment of the kidnapping of Japanese citizens brought a kind of improvement in relations between North Korea and Japan. At the eighth South–North ministerial talks held in Pyongyang on 20–23 October, southern representatives sought a guarantee for the observation of the Geneva agreement and the abandonment of nuclear development by the North. North Korea avoided a clear answer, while promising to solve the nuclear issue through dialogue. It became increasingly clear that if this key nuclear issue is not resolved, it will have an adverse impact on South–North relations.

Four achievements of the sunshine policy

In the first period of the sunshine policy, Kim Dae-jung has tried to follow a consistent path. Despite many difficulties and setbacks, the policy has achieved a number of goals, none definitive but all tangible advances on what went before on the Korean peninsula.

Some of 40,000 ‘actors’ in the ranks preparing in the May Day Stadium, Pyongyang - Members of the audience carry oversized books whose pages they have to turn with perfect timing and synchronicity in order to achieve the desired effect.

First, the structure of South–North relations has shifted from confrontation and distrust, to reconciliation and cooperation. There have been eight ministerial summits, whose results have vitally helped ease tensions in the Korean peninsula. Without the improvement stemming from the Seoul government’s policy of embracing the North, the great shock, which ensued from the North’s acknowledgement of its nuclear development programme, might have had catastrophic results.

Secondly, economic exchanges and cooperation between the two states have created economic results beneficial to both. The cross-border trade volume expanded from $300 million in 1997 to $400 million in 2001. Moreover, development of the important Kaesong Industrial Estate will help to facilitate the creation of a South–North economic community.

Thirdly, the sunshine policy created a foundation for North Korea to seek stable reform. As a result of the warmer wind blowing from the south, North Korea articulated economic construction as its most urgent task. Its search for better relations with western countries in order to acquire foreign currencies and to introduce advanced scientific technology led to the country sending about 500 scholars and economic officials to the US and Europe in 2001 alone. North Korea’s economic reforms of July 2002 designated Sinuiju as a special administrative district where market ideas would apply.

Fourthly, personal contacts between South and North were expanded through visits by separated family members as well as social and cultural exchanges. In the two years after the first South–North summit, 17,145 people visited the North compared to 13,103 between 1989 and 1999. About 4,500 separated families were able to alleviate their pain and sorrow. Alongside this, exchanges and cooperation in various fields, including society, culture, sports, and the arts, contributed to a sense of the underlying affinity and unity between all Korean people – a necessary precondition of unification on the political level.

Six tasks for the new government

Kim Dae-jung’s policy towards North Korea has won tangible rewards: the easing of military tension, the guiding of North Korea toward opening and reform, and economic exchanges and cooperation between the two states. Nevertheless, there are still many tasks remaining before a lasting peace system is built on the Korean peninsula. Roh Moo-hyun, the new President South Korea elected on 19 December, will have to face these challenges to build on the chances opened up by the sunshine policy.

Portrait of the Great leader made from 40,000 book pages - Mass games, May Day Stadium, Pyongyang

First, the Seoul government should make an effort to solve the problem of North Korea’s weapons development programmes, including nuclear missiles. This will ensure support from the international community for a continuation of a policy that aims to embrace the North. The previous government pursued the maintenance of peace on the Korean peninsula and support for a stable change of the North Korean system as its first priority. Kim Dae-jung adopted an approach of continuous persuasion to influence North Korea to abandon its nuclear development plan, while maintaining exchange and cooperation.

On the other hand, the current US administration’s most pressing concern is North Korea’s development of weapons of mass destruction. President Bush’s government has made it perfectly clear that it has no intention of resuming dialogue with North Korea or reinstating those oil deliveries so crucial for meeting North Korea’s energy needs, unless the North first abandons its nuclear development programme. If the new South Korean government fails to come up with effective proposals on this issue, it will lose its support in the international community and face serious difficulties in creating and maintaining a balanced peace on the Korean peninsula.

“We hope that there are not many changes” - Mass games, May Day Stadium, Pyongyang

Secondly, the Seoul government should demand that North Korea adhere to a rational attitude of reciprocity over inter-state negotiations. Over the past year, North Korea has not carried out agreements made at the South–North ministerial talks faithfully, and frequently resorted to unilateral delaying tactics. This drew criticism from opposition parties for the policies of the Kim Dae-jung government. They felt that the Seoul government gave too much to the North despite the South Korean economy facing difficulties itself. In the future, the new government has to persuade North Korea not to enter negotiations with unrealistic demands or assertions.

Salute to the nation - Mass games, May Day Stadium, Pyongyang

Thirdly, there should be a serious effort at arms reduction between the two states. Initially, trust between the two armies could be built through exchange visits of officers to naval vessels, visits of military sports teams, exchange of military students, and forums on defence, arts and sciences. At the same time, South and North Korea should begin negotiations to cut armaments and aim for a reduction of defence budgets.

“Unite the nation” - Mass games, May Day Stadium, Pyongyang

Fourthly, the Seoul government should set up comprehensive support plans for North Korea and map out ways to construct a South–North economic community. An enormous amount of money is required to connect up the railway lines of South and North Korea and to build the Kaesong Industrial Estate. However, South Korea is incapable of independently mobilising the funds necessary for the reconstruction of the North’s infrastructure. Foreign investment is needed to improve transport and energy systems in North Korea. For the construction of the Kyongeui Line, in particular, consideration should go into the creation of an international agency to attract enterprises from Japan, Russia, and the European countries. This could come, for instance, in the form of an organisation linking the railway networks of north-east Asia.

“Long live our wise Great Leader Comrade Kim Il-sung” - 40,000 in the ranks plus 100,000 on the ground - Mass games, May Day Stadium, Pyongyang

Fifthly, the Seoul government should seek ways of improving the situation of the North Korean people. With the number of defectors increasing at a rapid pace, the human rights issue is looming large in the international community. Earlier this year, North Korean refugees entered embassies in China and requested political asylum. They also staged demonstrations in Beijing requesting recognition as political refugees, up to now denied by the Chinese authorities. If the Seoul government wants to build stabilised and cooperative relations with North Korea, it needs the continued support of China for its policy towards North Korea. This dependence makes it difficult to address the refugee problem properly. However, to cope effectively with rising concern in the international community, the government needs to prepare a proposal now.

People dancing in a park in Pyongyang

Finally, consistent progress in the policy towards North Korea depends both upon the transparency of the process and on the building and maintenance of a consensus in South Korea. Only then can the Seoul government grasp the initiative in South–North negotiations. In general, people in South Korea support the policy of embracing North Korea. However, complete consent on practical ways to implement the policy has not yet been achieved. Conflicts between ruling and opposition parties, and between conservative and progressive forces within South Korea, have previously prolonged the problems between the two states.

The Grand Monument of Kim Il-sung Mansu Hill, Pyongyang

Meanwhile, North Korea’s programmes for nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction loom over the sunshine policy like a dark cloud. This, more than any other single issue, makes South Koreans feel keenly the need to implement policy toward North Korea on the foundation of a solid national consensus. They are now looking to President Roh Moo-hyun to lead them further along this careful path.

All photographs taken by Joerg Heil