Western analyses have typically considered the development of civil society as a prerequisite for both the maintenance of a democratic polity and the operation of a capitalist economy. Civil society is seen to occupy a social space between the individual and the state. The conventional pluralist model of democracy stresses the existence of multiple autonomous group structures which play a role in the decision-making process. Groups express their interests and make demands; the resultant government policy reflects competition between divergent societal interests.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Yeltsin administration hastened to embrace democracy and market capitalism in its liberal Western variant. Western advisors poured into Russia-as well as most of the other post-socialist states-seeking to assist in the promotion of democracy, an agenda that was broadly conceived as supporting civil society, an independent media, the rule of law and adherence to human rights, and contested and fair elections. In practice, much funding was directed toward civil society initiatives, with a focus on fostering NGOs.
The Russian version
Like its predecessor, the Putin administration considered the establishment of civil society a key priority, and a necessary concomitant to economic transformation and the realization of a democratic Russia. However, as Putin noted in a 2006 speech to participants at an international NGO forum: ‘Civil society in Russia differs from civil society in the so-called traditional democracies.'
Over the course of the Putin presidency, the Kremlin came to present a variant interpretation of civil society and its operation that challenged standard Western assumptions. This was a component of the Kremlin's effort to move away from Western models and articulate an indigenous Russian political response to transformation, an endeavor clearly indicated in Vladislav Surkov's presentation of ‘sovereign democracy.' According to Surkov, the Kremlin ideologist and a close associate of Putin, sovereign democracy incorporated the specific cultural and historical traits of Russian society. It applied democracy to the concrete conditions of Russia, while upholding its national interest and independence. The Putin administration's view of civil society was also influenced by the Colour Revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine, and Krygyzstan from 2003-2005, which were widely considered to be orchestrated by Western actors manipulating NGOs for their own political ends.
Civil society in its Russian incarnation presupposes a different sort of relationship of the state to societal structures than is envisioned in Western models. A strong state, with its corresponding ‘vertical of power,' is considered a prerequisite for an active civil society. Little attention is given to structures as autonomous entities; rather, the emphasis in on social groups and institutions as intermediaries between the state and its citizens. Russian societal organizations are not viewed as active participants in decision-making as much as facilitators in carrying out state policies. Civil society groups, specifically NGOs (non-commercial organizations in Russian), are seen to play a key role in performing certain social functions that had previously been the domain of the Soviet welfare state, in such spheres as health, education, and housing. The development of civil society is also routinely evoked as a means of holding the government to account, appraising the quality of state policy, and serving as a restraint on government corruption.
Role of the Public Chamber
The Russian government's top-down approach to state society interactions was indicated by the establishment in 2005 of the Public Chamber. Comprised of 126 members, the Public Chamber was envisioned, as Putin noted as its inception, ‘to promote the creation of effective instruments of feedback between society and the state.' Comprised of 17 commissions and four working groups dealing with civil society initiatives, the Chamber was also enjoined to develop linkages with NGOs. A top priority of operations, which is currently showcased in a statement by President Medvedev on its website, is to increase government funding of NGOs, as a means of reducing their dependence on foreign support. This initiative reflects a preference for NGOs that operate under the protective wing of government scrutiny and builds upon the earlier 2006 NGO law that sought to tighten restrictions on the operation of NGOs, especially foreign NGOs, or Russian NGOs receiving foreign funding.
The Kremlin's approach to civil society in the Putin era bears the earmarks of the Soviet heritage, which simultaneously reflects the centralizing impetus of centuries of Russian history. It offers an alternative (although it is similar to the Chinese government's thinking on this issue) to standard Western conceptions. Specifically, it rejects the Anglo-American notion of interest group articulation as a major determinant of decision-making. The government has been uncomfortable with the concept of groups acting as independent entities with their concomitant potential to challenge state actions, or to act as the carriers of foreign influence. Rather, the Russian government has staked its acceptance of a private space for citizen participation on the premise that group input will not be critical of the state but can become a co-opted valuable ally. The envisioned outcome of such interaction is seen as synergistic and mutually beneficial for all actors.
Speaking on civil society structures, Medvedev recently noted that ‘the voice of such groups should be heard in our society...Only in this way can our society become truly harmonious.' This ambitious scenario demands at the minimum, an acceptance of NGOs as actors by officials at all levels of the Russian bureaucracy; the strengthening of the rule of law-a favorite theme so far by Medvedev-to provide the conditions for NGOs and other civil society structures to operate; and the reduction of corruption. The latter is a condition that is related to the imposition of a rule of law, and also, somewhat contradictorily, seen as a function, rather than a prerequisite, of civil society activities. This framework does not permit a voice for overt confrontation, but it does accommodate a wide range of civil society activities that can be considered as essentially apolitical.
Is it fit for purpose?
The Putin leadership developed the concept of ‘sovereign democracy' as a conscious reaction to what was perceived of as the slavish embrace of the West in the Yeltsin era. By the 2000's, Russian political elites had decided that although they were on a path of transition, they did not want its end point to be the liberal ideal embedded in Francis Fukuyama's end of history, which in essence mirrors the ideological approach of Western democracy promotion efforts.
At the same time, there is a tension between the articulation of ‘sovereign democracy' and Russia's acceptance of market capitalism, integration into the global economy, and the maintenance, albeit in a modified format, of the political structures constructed during the Yeltsin administration.
This raises several interrelated issues. Does the leadership's acceptance of even a highly regulated form of civil society provide an environment conducive to its future evolution into autonomous structures with defined interests? Or alternatively, does the operation of market capitalism impose a concomitant set of political demands that necessitate the expansion of the private space in society, with its commensurate implications for the development of civil society in Russia? These are to date unanswerable questions.
