After Iraq

Regardless of the outcome of the US mid-term elections, one thing has become abundantly clear over the past few weeks. Three years into the Iraq experiment, we have finally entered the ‘exit phase’. Even amongst American neo-cons, the question is no longer ‘if’ but ‘when’ and ‘how’. The most astonishing admission of defeat came last weekend from Richard Perle – once known as the Prince of Darkness – who said that, had he been clairvoyant, he wouldn’t have advocated the Iraq war. Senior U.S. officials concede that the real purpose of the Iraq Study Group – tasked by President Bush to review the status of the mission – is, in essence, to help the White House find a way out. And people close to its chairman, former U.S. Secretary of State James Baker, have let it be known that the different options under consideration are all variations of the same theme, that is, withdrawal. It’s time, therefore, to move the debate from ‘post-invasion’ to ‘post-exit’. It may be hard to imagine, but the situation may actually get worse if we don’t get the exit right. Much, of course, depends on what kind of exit the U.S. will decide upon. There is little chance that the Baker group is going to recommend a sudden exit at a pre-determined date. The consequences of such a course of action would be truly catastrophic, with the Iraqis being left to fend for themselves. More realistic is a phased withdrawal, possibly with the support and involvement of Iraq’s neighbours, especially Syria and Iran. That, however, would require not just a reassessment of the American Iraq policy, but a complete turnaround of Washington’s entire approach vis-à-vis the Middle East. Can anyone imagine George W. shaking hands with the Iranian President? In most Western capitals, the impossibility of any US-led solution has triggered great anxieties. That’s because, if nothing else works, it is the United Nations which will have to carry the can. And that means that countries, which have been wise enough not to get involved, will be called upon to make a contribution. I recently spoke to a German diplomat, who told me that his country would have no good excuse for not participating in a UN peacekeeping mission to Iraq. But he also made it clear that there is little that anyone in Berlin would like their country to do less Neither is it clear that the UN would succeed where America failed. Sure, a UN mission would have greater legitimacy. Muslim nations would participate. And the various UN agencies would probably be much better at providing basic services to the Iraqis than Halliburton. But, like the Coalition, its presence would only be tolerated for a certain amount of time. The jihadists may hate America, but the UN doesn’t fare much better. Most important, there is no guarantee that the UN would have any more luck at getting the three major ethnic groups to work together. ‘There are no good solutions’, is an expression I hear a lot these days. And indeed, none of the options promise to make the region any more stable or peaceful in the short term. Having concluded that invading Iraq was perhaps the worst strategic mistake of the post-Cold War period, I guess we will now all have to get used to the idea that American withdrawal won’t be a magic wand through which all the problems will disappear. On the contrary, as unfair as it may sound, the most immediate consequence of US withdrawal may be to shift the responsibility for pacifying the country from the Coalition to the international community as a whole.