Ehsan Masood argues in his openDemocracy article British Muslims must stop the war that Sunni Islam can be split in two of the broadest divisions, which can loosely be termed Sufi (often referred to as Traditional Islam) and non-Sufi (often called Revivalist Islam).
Abdullah al-Kateb is replying to:
Ehsan Masoods article on openDemocracy, British Muslims must stop the war (August 2005)
John Wares BBC Panorama documentary, A Question of Leadership (21 August 2005)
In my opinion, such a classification is deeply flawed, for two reasons: because there is no such thing as Sufi Islam and because there is no real dichotomy between the so-called traditionalist and the revivalist. The reality is far more complex.
The myth of Sufi Islam
Tasawuf or following the path of Islamic spirituality is not a theological or Islamic school of law. It is a path more akin to moral ethics: in other words, how do I approach others and how do I view myself? It is not a school nor can it ever be described as a school. For a school or trend to exist, there is usually a common group of ideas either in theology or in the technicalities of Islamic law. Hence we have four major Sunni schools of law and two major Sunni theological schools. However, Sufis do not necessarily follow one monolithic school of law or even adopt one theological viewpoint. A Sufi can be a Sunni or even a Shia.
For example, Ayatollah Khomeini taught the works of Ibn-Arabi in his classes, who was by no means a Shia. Khomeini lectured on Ibn-Arabi as a master in moral ethics and spirituality. The doctrinal differences that might have existed between Khomeini and Ibn-Arabi did not prevent him from using such works as they were irrelevant to the subject of tasawuf.
Furthermore, Sufis can have extreme doctrinal differences. Some Sufis have verged on anthropomorphism while others have been pantheists. John Ware, in his BBC Panorama programme A Question of Leadership that occasioned Ehsan Masoods article, claims that most British Muslims follow the Sufi version of Islam; in saying this he exposes his deep ignorance about what Sufis (and Islam for that matter) actually are.
Those who do follow a Sufi tariqa (path) are not necessarily apolitical. Some medieval Sufis, such as Abu-Hamid al-Ghazali (1058-1111), wrote tracts on the political issues of their day. The late Syrian sheikh and modern Sufi, Abdul Fattah Abu-Ghuddah, was one of the main leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria. Others, such as Imam Shamil (1797-1871), led a long war of resistance against the Russian occupation of the Caucasus.
A false dichotomy
Ehsan Masoods second faulty point is the polarisation between traditionalist Sufis and political revivalists. But if Sufis are considered traditionalists, the question follows: what exactly is traditional Islam? If it is following one of the traditional schools of law then a great many of what Ehsan calls revivalist movements do precisely that. If it is following one of the classical schools of theology then again most Islamists do. Again it is not clear what Ehsan means by traditional Islam. Furthermore, many members of revivalist Islamic movements were actually followers of different Sufi tariqa.
I disagree with Ehsan when he says:
one of the more worrying aspects of the (Muslim Council of Britain) is that its more influential affiliates all have theological roots in anti-Sufi Islamism, drawing inspiration from people such as the Pakistani Islamist Abul Ala Maududi or Egypts Hassan al-Banna, founder of the Muslim Brotherhood who actively campaigned against what for their part they saw as Sufi authoritarianism.
Hasan al-Banna (1906-49), founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, historically did not have a eeply antagonistic view towards Sufi tariqa. On the contrary Hasan al-Banna was himself initiated into the Husafiya Sufi Tariqa and condemned sectarian divisions between Muslims. It is true he was deeply influenced by the ideas of the Syrian scholar Rashid Rida (1865-1935), but the latters ideas were not akin to the anti-Sufi Wahhabi movement that exists in Saudi Arabia today.
True, Rashid Rida shared with the Wahhabi some thoughts relating to the schools of Islamic law, but he differed greatly from them on broader theological issues. Rida was a student of the Egyptian scholar Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905), whose theological views were far from those of the Saudi Wahhabi or Sunni theological schools. Muhammad Abduhs own views were singular; his opinions about miracles, for example, were highly controversial amongst the scholars of his day.
Rashid Rida and Muhammad Abduh (especially their ideas on revivalism) had some influence on Hassan al-Banna, but not all their personal views found favour with him. The rift between Muhammad Abduh / Rashid Rida and the Sufis may have led Ehsan Masood to view Hassan al-Banna as a mere extension of these men, drawing the conclusion that he too was hostile to Sufis. This is incorrect.
What kind of war?
Ehsan concludes:
Panoramas John Ware correctly identified a war being fought at the heart of British Islam. The problem if you agree that there is one is not just in the evidence it collected, but that the reporter seems to be firing some of the ammunition collected and supplied by one side for use against the other.
Is there a war at the heart of British Islam? Yes, there are differences amongst various Muslim groups, differences that existed long before the events of 7 July 2005. But personally, I find the argument that the finer points of eschatology, ritual religious practice or the functions of an Islamic state have anything to do with these events unconvincing. Most of these theological issues are decades (and sometimes centuries) old; they arose long before the modern phenomenon of terrorism. The real question is: why are such issues being hashed together as if they were directly related to the London attacks?
Also in openDemocracy on British Muslims problems, concerns and divisions:
Mohammed Sajid, The gap between us
Maruf Khwaja, Muslims in Britain: generations, experiences, futures
What happened? What changed? What now? a transcript of the 21 July meeting in London co hosted by openDemocracy and Q News
Abdul Wahid, Hizb ut Tahrirs distinction
If you find this material valuable please consider supporting openDemocracy by sending us a donation so that we can continue our work and keep it free for all
Panorama did not address most of these controversial issues in the context of scripture or theology but instead implied that certain views actually lead to extremism and that 7 July is their natural consequence. The programme later describes what extremists and moderates are all about. The question that Ehsan Masood fails to answer is whether these supposed warring factions of Sufis and revivalists actually view their differences in this context? Moreover, do Ehsans neatly-defined warring factions differ significantly on the issues highlighted by the documentary? If so, which ones?
Ehsan remarks: Most viewers would see the result, the Panorama documentary, as representing impartial journalism not partisan activism. But how can the Panorama documentary really be impartial if it defines beforehand the scope of debate? Before the programme set out to investigate the level of extremism amongst Muslims in Britain, it had already defined both extremism and moderation.
I would not deny that there are differences amongst British Muslims. However, many of these differences do not warrant the kind of broad, general categorisations that Ehsan proposes. I am not against categorisation per se; categories exist in every community of people. But for a categorisation to be useful in a sociological study, it must be accurate and suitably specific to define a group.
What, then, are the categories useful to characterise British Muslims? The answer depends on the particular issue being discussed. Some differences relate to theology, others to law; some groups that differ with each other on one point may find common ground on another. The process of understanding sects and groups can be painstaking, and many journalists are unable or unwilling to undergo it. John Wares Panorama is illuminating in this respect.
A final point on the question of labels: I do not find them useful, as they lack objectivity in defining viewpoints or people. Instead, they draw on preconceived ideas to judge people. It is unfortunate that hyperbole, scaremongering and labelling of journalists and politicians can stigmatise whole communities. If a finger is constantly pointed at any community, it is only natural for its members to withdraw.
A healthy open discussion does not depend on the other side sharing or liking my views; if that were the case, the very idea of discussion and dialogue would become pointless. Labelling viewpoints or people leads precisely to this result. The ideas put forward by Tony Blair about combating extremism and evil ideologies are a euphemism for thought control. Instead of building positive community relationships, such an approach reinforces a siege mentality amongst the Muslim community and confirms the belief that dialogue is pointless.
