Damian O'Loan (Paris): The latest comparison between Gaza and Northern Ireland in terms of conflict resolution comes from Jonathan Freedland in the Guardian. The analogy was considered first by an advisor of possible Tory cabinet member, Lord Trimble; then here by Tom Griffin, and by the Independent's Robert Fisk. Disagreement has centred around the extent to, and manner in, which the conflicts are comparable. Yet we have not considered the problems in the Northern Irish peace, and what lessons they may offer.
Freedland draws three equivalent stages: firstly, he advocates an Israeli statement corresponding to Lord Brooke's landmark acceptance that Britain had no “selfish strategic or economic interest” in Northern Ireland. Secondly, like Tom Griffin, he cites the importance of communication with the extremist wing of opinion, in this case the elected Hamas, though for Freedland, because “the realisation that no military solution will ever be possible” is essential on both sides. Thirdly, he refers to the rewards administered to each side in Northern Ireland by London and Dublin, and their necessity in avoiding loss of face, and therefore grassroots traction of the peace process.
Freedland and Griffin are right to address the futility of the position of no official contact with Hamas. We may reasonably suspect that communication, as in Northern Ireland, extends from the level of infiltration to back-channel negotiation. What differs is that, while the IRA claimed to be the official government of all Ireland, they were never elected as the majority party. Refusing to speak to Hamas adds to the absence of statehood in denying the Palestinian people a reasonable chance to work towards peace. Dialogue would quickly lead to a Hamas recognition of Israel. Freedland shows how this should, and could, be publicly rewarded. The problem with secret communication is it renders this twin-track approach impossible, and excludes public pressure to progress. In Northern Ireland, the electorate have long been less entrenched than their leadership.
Yet there are major problems with the comparison. Fisk, describing the difference, says Gaza has more in common with “17th-century Irish Catholic dispossession than sectarianism in Belfast.” This is the problem with Freedland's “no strategic or economic interest” statement. It is unrealistic that Palestinians might find this credible. The US interest in Ireland probably moved from concern at the socialism inherent to republicanism in the 1970s to satisfaction at Dublin's embrace of neoliberalism. What is specific to Gaza is that Hamas would not render Palestine a client state; that Fatah may appears to have cost them public support.
One lesson that Northern Ireland appears to offer is that peace is possible once client status to greater global forces is accepted by all parties; while in Israel it is deeply embedded and in Egypt it is becoming established, in Palestine it is increasingly unthinkable. Yet, we should be very clear that this is what Tony Blair is there to accomplish – often described as a peace-broker, the Wall St Journal is more accurate, describing him as “charged with developing the economies of the West Bank and Gaza.
The problem with Freedland's second step, renouncing violence, is that republicanism has only temporarily accepted this, having “parked” the constitutional issue, its fate to be decided politically. There has at no point been acceptance that armed struggle is in all circumstances wrong; the IRA Army Council remains in place; loyalists have not decommissioned their arsenal; dissident republicanism is growing. Ireland simply offers no answer other than to defer territorial decisions, which would be counter-productive when Palestine urgently demands statehood.
More hopeful is Barack Obama's promise to remove dependency on Middle-Eastern oil. This would make an Israeli statement of neutrality imaginable, particularly accompanied by disengagement in the West Bank. Equally necessary is action holding Hamas to their publicly-stated commitment to a long-term ceasefire of a generation.
For this, we need to be open and accept that Hamas' election marked the beginning of the blockade that has been fatal ever since, that Israel broke the last ceasefire by killing six Hamas militants, and that the present war is manifestation of the international community's refusal to accept the legitimacy of Hamas' mandate.
All this is vital because the first step toward peace is international pressure on Israel to accept Hamas' legitimacy as their partners in peace. That requires us to accept that our foreign policy must not lead to Islamicist regimes being elected democratically. Northern Ireland has nothing to offer in this regard.
Where it can help is showing that leadership is offered by the grassroots. If a short-term peace can be agreed, democratic participation in Gaza should be facilitated by aid and infrastructural investment. This will allow for Hamas to move away from its apparent Islamicist nature towards a more central position, and create a Palestine-centred focus to balance the global sense of hurt felt by the Islamic community. In Northern Ireland, the voters were brought to embrace the extremes but were not engaged with the process enough. Their lack of involvement in creating peace provides a lesson in securing stability worth exporting.
Another lesson offered by Northern Ireland's failures can be gleaned by the IRA “armalite and ballot box” strategy. The British government openly admitted that the armed struggle brought results – foolish in terms of long-term security. Creating a widespread belief that politics offers more than violence would mean a carrot and stick approach not mirrored in the present military assault. The failure of the international community to do so would lead a cynic to believe that lasting instability in the Middle East is, in fact, the long-term objective of some.
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