Recent years have shown that the Russian authorities are most comfortable operating in the regime of “special operations” - whether inside Russia or outside. Sudden tactical moves rarely form a consistent and effective strategy. Yet each move - as a rule - achieves its aim: disorienting opponents and returning the advantage to the Kremlin.
On 15 January, Russian citizens witnessed the latest in a long line of these special operations: towards the end of Vladimir Putin’s annual speech to the Federation Council, the president announced his intention to introduce radical changes to the Russian Constitution. The same day, the Russian government resigned, and tax chief Mikhail Mishustin - who even experienced observers of Russian politics had to look up on Wikipedia - was appointed Prime Minister.
Undoubtedly, Putin’s intended constitutional amendments are designed to solve the “problem of 2024” - how both the regime, and Putin personally, will retain power after the 2024 presidential elections. But still, it’s unclear from the president’s words how exactly - and to what timeline - the Kremlin intends to address this issue. In the words of Sherlock Holmes, the game is afoot - but we don’t yet understand what the game and its guiding scenario will be. But just like in Sherlock Holmes, we have a few pieces of evidence, and patterns established by political science can help us interpret them.
