The United Nations security council is embroiled in another crisis over the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). At some point, unless Iran reverses its approach to uranium enrichment, the security council will have to impose sanctions on Iran. The government in Tehran cannot continue to treat the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) with such contempt without provoking the council's states including even China beyond endurance.
This article is part of the openDemocracy debate "Iran: how to avoid war?"
Click here for an overview of this debate
The danger is real that Iran will find itself exposed to attack. In January 1992, the UN security council (UNSC) declared that the proliferation of WMD is a threat to international peace and security code words for action to enforce Chapter VII sanctions (see the UNSC declaration on disarmament, arms control and weapons of mass destruction, 31 January 1992).
Moreover, in Mohamed El Baradei's report to the security council on 28 April 2006 on the implementation of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty safeguards agreement in Iran, the IAEA stated:
"After more than three years of Agency efforts to seek clarity about all aspects of Iran's nuclear programme, the existing gaps in knowledge continue to be a matter of concern. Any progress in that regard requires full transparency and active cooperation by Iran transparency that goes beyond the measures prescribed in the Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol if the Agency is to be able to understand fully the twenty years of undeclared nuclear activities by Iran. Regrettably, these transparency measures are not yet forthcoming. With Iran's decision to cease implementing the provisions of the Additional Protocol, and to confine Agency verification to the implementation of the Safeguards Agreement, the Agency's ability to make progress in clarifying these issues, and to confirm the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities, will be further limited "
These declarations add to the widespread present fear that any sanctions imposed on Iran might be just the prelude to full-blown military action against Iran action whose rationale few people can understand and whose result could be catastrophic with all manner of unforeseen effects.
Several analysts and governments have posed a range of possibilities for addressing the situation that would result in a step-by-step approach leading to a peaceable resolution of the crisis. The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty's (Iciss) report of December 2001 which identified a "prevention toolbox" listing a range of instruments that could be applied to prevent armed conflict is only one possible resource for fresh options to resolve the tension over Iran.
Also in openDemocracy on the crisis involving Iran's nuclear research:
Tom Sauer, "Iran's nuclear-escalation ladder" (January 2006)
Paul Rogers, "The United States, nuclear weapons, and Iran"
(January 2006)
Nazenin Ansari, "Iranians on the freedom path" (February 2006)
Fred Halliday, "Iran vs the United States again" (February 2006)
Bahram Rajaee, "Iran's nuclear challenge" (February 2006)
Paul Rogers, "Iran: war by October?"
(April 2006)
Kaveh Ehsani, "On the brink: the Great Satan vs the Axis of Evil"
(May 2006)
A creative option
In the present circumstances, what is needed is a set of measures "in between" sanctions and military action measures that would be designed to have a serious impact on Iran's government and citizens without destroying the lives of ordinary people in the process.
To understand how this could work, it is helpful to return to the sources. The United Nations charter was negotiated in San Francisco in 1945. It was a result of many meetings and drafts, and its purpose was clear:
- the United Nations exists to preserve peace and to protect mankind from suffering the damage and destruction that war brings
- the UN's member-states commit themselves to pursue collective efforts for the prevention and removal of threats to peace
- the UN security council has the primary responsibility to sustain peace and international security.
The security council's five permanent members have needed from the start to establish unanimity in order to adopt substantive resolutions that would allow the superpowers (the United States and the Soviet Union) to secure the support of Britain, China, and France on matters of outstanding importance to the world.
At the time of the foundation of the United Nations, there was a debate on which countries should be allowed to join the United Nations. This has gone on ever since. The "universalists" argued that all nations should be in the UN whatever their behaviour, whereas the "conditionalists" argued that membership should not be guaranteed automatically. In the event, the argument for conditional membership was successful.
As a result of this debate, there are two articles in the UN charter that could apply to Iran today. This first is found in Article 6 expulsion from the organisation. The second, and more interesting current alternative, is found in Article 5 suspension.
Article 5 reads: "A Member of the United Nations against which preventive or enforcement action has been taken by the Security Council may be suspended from the exercise of the rights and privileges of membership by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council. The exercise of these rights and privileges may be restored by the Security Council."
If Iran were to be under put under Chapter VII sanctions by the security council, it would be a candidate for the application of Article 5.
Invoking Article 5 would demonstrate the unanimity of the UN security council at a time when this is most needed. Such action would show that the principles of the UN, as set out is its charter, are not to be mocked and that they have true worth and value. The suspensions of rights and privileges would demonstrate the determination of the UN to enforce its Chapter VII security-council resolutions.
This action would reduce the criticism of the UN that it has no relevance or political courage. It would be a strong signal from the council that Iran's behaviour, its failure to comply with IAEA requirements is intolerable, even for those countries which are not prepared to support military action. The possibility of Article 5 action on Iran would also allow Russia and China an intermediate place to go following the imposition of sanctions that would not automatically mean military action. This option if considered could encourage Russia and China to be bolder in their approach to Iran.
It would too have the effect of bringing the strong feelings of the whole of the rest of the United Nations to the attention of the Iranian people. If Iran's behaviour is so bad that the rest of the world is so affronted as to suspend Iran from the UN, then that may well strengthen the hand of the moderates and reformers in Iran and encourage them down the path of confidence-building and an acceptance of Russia's offer of enrichment of uranium on Iran's behalf.
In the longer run, such action would also show that the UN has to be respected and that lack of compliance with IAEA safeguards and requests has a wide set of repercussions. Such action would thus serve as a strong signal to others who may be tempted to treat the UN security council lightly.
Also in openDemocracy on the United Nations and world peace:
Dan Plesch, "The hidden history of the United Nations" (May 2005)
Patricia Lewis, "The NPT review conference: no bargains in the UN basement" (June 2006)
Tony Millett, "The UN's real history: a response to Dan Plesch" (November 2005)
Richard Falk & David Krieger, "After the nuclear non-proliferation treaty" (April 2006)
The risk and the reward
Recommending the suspension of Iran's membership under Article 5 to the UN general assembly would have consequences both foreseeable and unexpected at the United Nations.
There are at least three potential downsides to such a course:
- the application of Article 5 would require a two-thirds majority of the UN general assembly, and there is a risk that such a process could again split the United Nations
- the resolution might not pass; it could be blocked by the large group of non-aligned states that on 28 April prevented the adoption of the UN reform package resulting from the commission appointed by secretary-general Kofi Annan
- several states will be very concerned about the precedent the resolution might set: Iran today, Israel tomorrow? This is a real concern and so the framing of such a move, were it to be taken up, needs to be carefully thought through.
It is important to remember that Article 5 can only apply to states already under sanctions. In a sense that is its saving grace; if the process has already reached that stage, it means that the state concerned is already in the line of sight of the majority of the UN.
A resolution to recommend Iran's suspension might also have two positive effects:
- it would give the general assembly a role in debating the issue, thus allowing concerns over Iran to find wider expression
- it could serve to reunite the United Nations on the central tenants of the UN charter and remind "we the peoples" of just why the UN exists at all.
In sum, not to act against Iran may well pose greater risks than taking action. The UN has been teetering at the edge of a chasm ever since March 2003, when the splits over Iraq became impossible to resolve. At the very least, whatever happens over Iran, let the purpose of the UN be known and let those who abuse the organisation be suspended from it.
