When Gordon Brown became Prime Minister, Northern Ireland was not uppermost in his mind. He inherited the St Andrew's Agreement as a result of Blair's scramble for a success story before he left office. While devolution has been restored it has not bedded down and if Gordon comes to call on Tuesday (as predicted) rather than talk about progress he will be faced with what Blair dealt with for a decade.
The central issue
The St Andrew's Agreement had a target date of May 2008 for the devolution of policing and justice. Sinn Fein has chosen deliberately to present this as a deadline but the legislation does not treat that date as such. The support of local parties is required and Sinn Fein has so far failed to secure that.
The unresolved issues of St Andrews suggested the basis of future progress. Sinn Fein's fulfillment of its new commitment to policing and justice and the abolition of the PIRA potentially could create the basis for agreement on the devolution of policing and justice.
With the conspicuous exception of the murder of Paul Quinn, Sinn Fein has largely fulfilled their commitment on policing. However no progress was made on the dismantling of IRA structures, a point evidenced by the traditional Easter statement from the leadership. Furthermore, on 6th May 2008 Martin McGuinness made it clear republicans did not wish to talk about IRA structures. He warned others not to raise the issue: "Any attempt to drag them back onto the stage is a big mistake."He repeated this advice in July.
Dr Paisley's retirement as First Minister in June 2008 gave SF the first opportunity to derail the operation of devolution by threatening not to support the election of Peter Robinson as First Minister. SF bottled it. Instead SF resorted to administrative games of blocking Executive meetings and issuing ominous warnings. While it would have been tempting for Unionism to enjoy Gerry Adams and SF being reduced to using the same tactics as David Trimble, Peter Robinson gave a commitment to talks about the outstanding issues:
"It is a matter of public record that in recent weeks I have discussed these important matters with the deputy First Minister at some length and I also met and indicated to other party leaders that I want to examine these issues with them as well. I expect I need hardly say that agreement on a way forward has not yet been reached but, for myself, while I cannot be certain, I am not gloomy about the prospects of reaching an agreement which could command the confidence of everyone. I am committed and willing to intensify discussions with the deputy First Minister and others in the period ahead to test the possibilities."
These talks bore fruit in August. Previously both the how and when of devolution had not been agreed. Agreement was now reached with a mechanism, the review committee, to take things forward. Interestingly this deal that involved two significant shifts on the part of SF.
Despite this progress, perversely Sinn Fein continued to block Executive meetings and chose to escalate by threatening the collapse of the Assembly. This prompted the first retaliation from the DUP. Robinson threatened to invoke the Ministerial Code against Sinn Fein ministers.
The use of the code by Robinson was not surprising. Since 2003 the DUP negotiating strategy had focused heavily upon it and Robinson was the architect of that strategy. The DUP, being a poacher turned gamekeeper, knew how ineffective the previous Code had been and beefed the Code up to prevent similar games in future. The fact that Sinn Fein threatened to walk off the pitch could be interpreted as a measure of success of Robinson's new rule book. Robinson has acted as the guardian of the Code even when it was unpopular to do so.
Is there more to the crisis?
Despite all the political changes the two main communities and parties largely remain closed worlds to each another and in the absence of hard facts speculation abounds.
Sinn Fein
The benign interpretation of Sinn Fein's behaviour is that they over-sold the deal to their grassroots and dug a hole for themselves. Their willingness to move in talks is an indication that they need a resolution and are willing to shift their ground to make it happen. The date is the primary goal and the earlier the date the better. The governments may sympathise with their predicament but it is virtually impossible for London to act unilaterally.
A more sceptical interpretation focuses on developments in Southern Irish politics. Following Sinn Fein's poor performance in the Irish General Election of 2007 the feeling was a chastened Sinn Fein had opted to work devolution while they licked their electoral wounds. However, the Lisbon Treaty referendum may have breathed new life into the 'southern' strategy. The UK media has credited Libertas with the central role in the successful No campaign but SF believes it deserves some of the glory too.
Previously Sinn Fein got an electoral boost from its campaign against the Nice Treaty in 2001 and may be hoping for a repetition. Sinn Fein would also hope to electorally exploit the economic downturn. A second Irish referendum is in prospect and Sinn Fein would be well placed to feed off any resentment that the first decision was ignored. The Irish local government elections will coincide with the Euro 09 elections and success could build a reasonable platform for the next Dail elections. The stronger the southern option the less requirement for a 'stable north option'. Some imagine that McGuinness is in the deal-making camp and Adams is looking southward but this is hypothetical.
The malign interpretation is that SF is attempting to humiliate Robinson to restore some sense of ethnic victory. Mitchell McLaughlin has boasted that the key republican success of the peace process was: "The degree of uncertainty and lack of confidence in the Unionist community"
Has SF opted for this strategy in retaliation for the Unionist vetoes? They can't do it within the structures so they have tried to re-engage the two governments. The governments usually prioritise Sinn Fein's concerns above everyone else's. So it seems like a risk free strategy. After all it was largely American pressure that kept a focus on policing and justice in the run-up to St Andrews; not Ahern or Blair.
Does Sinn Fein have a negotiating problem?
SF may be experiencing deeper problems. Insider accounts of the peace process suggest SF received a lot of assistance and benefitted from a predisposition of generosity towards the party. SF may simply not be the great negotiators that they have been assumed to be.
The structures and vetoes of Stormont mean that if one of NI's political communities wants something new then they have to negotiate and trade to achieve it. Sinn Fein does not seem either to have grasped this, are unwilling to accept it or poor at political horse-trading (without assistance). Compounding SF's difficulties is the fact that the DUP has been able to exercise its vetoes to nationalist annoyance but so far there have been no comparable issues for Unionists that they could return the favour.
Demands and threats have remained SF's stock and trade. Using them has got them to this stage in the process but it is not a modus operandi that can be tolerated indefinitely. Issues need to be resolved at the Executive table; not in Downing Street.
Take academic selection as an example. St Andrews meant academic selection could not be abolished without agreement but the potential compromise deal was obvious. The Northern Ireland system could be reformed to have academic selection at age 14 (part of Northern Ireland already has such a system). Sinn Fein could boast it had abolished the much criticised 11 plus. Unionism could argue it had been sensitive to concerns about the 11 plus but maintained the principle of academic selection. Plus 14 is a more sensible age for decisions about an academic or vocational route to be taken.
Instead the minister has ploughed on with proposals that will not pass the Assembly and seems to think she'll succeed if she manages to say change more often than Barack Obama. Even those in education, many of whom are sympathetic to the minister's plans, are despairing at her inept handling of the issue. Literally, SF has preferred to prolong a crisis rather than find a solution.
The DUP
Sinn Fein believes that the DUP's failure to agree is because of pressure from Traditional Unionist Voice. This only has credibility if you subscribe to SF's interpretation of St Andrew's, which the DUP doesn't. On the outstanding issues the DUP has been publicly consistent. None of these issues have been manufactured because of concerns about the TUV.
Furthermore if the DUP get the issues they need resolved it helps them in tackling their critics. The continuation of PIRA structures was the core concern of Jim Allister MEP when he quit the DUP. While he has tried to add other concerns to his list, the centrality of this issue cannot be denied.
If the DUP negotiates a sufficiently good package it can argue forcefully that its decision to work the structures rather than wait and hope for something better has been vindicated. The TUV will be reduced to sectarian zero sum alleging "Nationalists got something, we got nothing". The zero sum approach still has residual force in Northern Ireland but the power of an individual issue rarely has longevity.
The DUP manifesto does not say No to devolving policing and justice:
"While in principle we support the devolution of policing and justice functions we believe this can only happen when there is the necessary support within the community. We have indicated that we do not believe there would be support for the devolution of such powers to a Sinn Fein Minister in the foreseeable future."
Sinn Fein has now accepted they will not have the policing and justice portfolio. However, the DUP has been hampered by its inability to sell the practical benefits of devolution of policing and justice powers. To do so, would have fed fears they were going soft on the issue.
Like everywhere else in the UK, communities are plagued with anti-social behaviour but waiting for Westminster to legislate will involve a long wait. After almost 80 years there is probably a stronger consensus on policing in Northern Ireland than there has been ever. It is widely accepted the police service is poor. As the NIO is publicly starry eyed about the PSNI and chooses to ignore discontent it is unrealistic to suppose they will do anything about policing.
The other issues
As with most negotiations there are also side issues. For Unionism there is the government's failure to nominate a Unionist representative to the Intelligence and Security Committee. Unionists also have no desire to assume responsibility for policing knowing the future policing budget has significant shortfalls.
Sinn Fein is preoccupied with an Irish Language Act. The governments dropped this into the St Andrews Agreement at the last minute without Unionists acceding to it. To a degree the blocking of the proposals was a message to the governments as well as Sinn Fein that this sleight of hand was not appreciated. There is no flexibility in the DUP manifesto on this issue.
Interestingly, the Unionist community is not particularly happy about the present cultural arrangements in Northern Ireland. Thus, some developments are not impossible. However an Act, which has become a political totem pole, isn’t possible. The Loyal Orders have expressed unhappiness with the draft proposals of the Parades Review. The Executive is legally required to produce Irish language and Ulster-Scots strategies. However, Republicans dislike any linkage between these two strategies.
Other contentious issues are a resolution to the education dispute, the development of the Maze site and more recently the need for Treasury support to delay the introduction of water charges for another year to mitigate the credit crunch.
However with this and other such matters both Unionism and Nationalism face a choice. Do they prefer to resolve issues or to cherish grievances in order to maintain communal loyalties? Are they prepared to engage in the necessary horse-trading?
Keeping it on the power-sharing pitch
It is doubtful if Brown and Cowen are open to Adams suggestion of returning to the drawing board. However, the London and Dublin reaction to the recent IMC report shows the traditional willingness to indulge republicans. If the stated aim of the governments is political stability, this is the wrong way to achieve it. Rewarding SF's tantrums is a recipe for more.
In the past the governments have been happy to indulge SF and this may have contributed to getting the process to where it is. However, if devolution is to succeed a different approach is necessary. SF needs to learn to reach accommodation locally not seek the two governments to intervene on their behalf. Stability will be produced by giving parties no other option but to resolve their differences and fight their battles on the power-sharing pitch.
