Ultimately, the fate of Turkish democracy appears to be intertwined with that of the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Democracy Party (HDP).
President Erdoğan's readiness to circumvent elections shows that promises to end the conflict were contingent on securing a mathematically permanent conservative-nationalist electoral bloc.
Nobody asks who those are in the basement, or why the Patriotic Revolutionary Youth Movement (YDG-H) would open fıre on an ambulance which comes to pick up those wounded people.
The resemblances to interwar Italy are unmistakable, and the results are gradually turning out to be almost as fatal.
European leaders have mostly stayed silent. Neither Francois Hollande of France nor Angela Merkel of Germany have spoken out about major Turkish infractions of justice and free speech.
There were two Gezi moments: one, a resistance to neoliberal authoritarianism; the other, a defence of representative democracy and ‘the national will’, for whom Gezi spelt the end of democracy.
EU and international organisations welcome the Turkish Government’s policy changes to curb the number of refugees entering Europe. But if this will work remains to be seen.
The region’s people already know quite well that any policies pursued in the region are military-related, and have not brought peace but only more conflicts.
Those gathering spontaneously after the assassination of Hrant Dink have been part of the Gezi movement — in a non-violent way, manifesting their desire to be the Subjects of their own lives.
Pervasive and diverse, instances of violence against women can only be fully comprehended in the political contexts that give them purpose and meaning.
While the Turkish government claims that all original residents will be able to return to Sur, it is likely that, similar to what happened in New Orleans, many of those who have fled will not come back.
