French voters torpedoed the European Union constitution on Sunday 29 May. The Dutch look set to torpedo it again for good measure when they vote on Wednesday. The tortuously negotiated constitution will sink unsalvageably. This represents a serious reversal for the EU: its credibility will be damaged and its capacity to evolve, by implementing necessary reforms (many of which are contained in the constitution), will be in question.
But ominous talk of more serious repercussions should be discounted the sinking of the constitution is not about to reverse a half-century of European integration. Although it would be wrong to take the EU for granted (as it would any institution of democratic government anywhere), the EU is more durable and far more flexible than it is often given credit for and its capacity to function under the existing dispensation is now proven beyond doubt (fears that its workings would grind to a halt after taking in ten new members in May 2004 have come to nothing).
Also in openDemocracys Europe: after the constitution debate, Patrice de Beer, John Palmer, Krzysztof Bobinski, Gwyn Prins, Neal Ascherson and Frank Vibert draw lessons from the French and Dutch campaigns
If you find this material valuable, please consider supporting openDemocracy by sending us a donation
So much for the real, but exaggerated costs of the constitutions demise. What about the upsides of the campaigns, of which there has been little said? At a time when referendum is a dirty word in Brussels and pro-EU critics of direct democracy feel vindicated because the debates in both France and the Netherlands often veered from discussion of the constitutions text, its worth documenting the good that has come from the referenda, as has happened in other countries that have held EU votes. Elites are forced to unlearn their jargon-filled euro-speak, electorates inform themselves about arcane EU matters that they would normally have little time for and myths about the EU are confronted, if not always exploded.
In France, debate ignited. Rallies were thronged, books on the constitution sold in their tens of thousands and TV debates sparked lively discussion, not glazed eyes as is usually the case when the EU comes up in the normal course of events. A turnout of 70% gives some indication of the level of engagement. This, to a greater or lesser extent, mirrors the experience of other countries that have held referenda on treaty changes. The injection of human drama and passion into an often dry and technical debate shows that, given the right circumstances, people are prepared to inform themselves.
And while in this case the yes camp did not win, the fact that people have the power to say no is reassuring, and thus likely to boost long-term legitimacy in the project. Earlier experience in Denmark and Ireland, whose voters rejected treaties only to reverse their decisions at the second time of asking after some of the concerns they raised were addressed, is evidence of this.
Referendum campaigns also boost legitimacy by narrowing the gap between elites and electorates. While it may have been justifiable that the European project was elite-driven in its early years (because of the technocratic nature of what it did), this wont do any more. The dramatic expansion of EU powers since the mid-1980s, combined with falling trust in ruling classes and declining popular willingness to defer to politicians and bureaucrats, suggests that sooner or later the union will face a crisis of legitimacy.
Most pro-EU politicians of the establishment acknowledge that a disconnection exists because voters dont understand how the enterprise works. But they often complain (if only in private) that many voters are all too ready to knock Europe, but far less ready to do the hard work of informing themselves fully before they do so. They also say that voters dont appear preoccupied by EU matters, even at the most opportune moment European Parliament elections so forcing unwanted detail on them wins no votes.
But no matter how true these points may be, it is up to political leaders to lead, and because they have failed to come up with an effective alternative method of reducing the legitimacy deficit, unpredictable and messy referenda appear the only way of making the EU less elitist.
Fighting for the integration cause in referenda brings politicians back to the real world with a bang. They are forced to start looking at the EU through the eyes of voters who know little about it. They quickly begin to unlearn their euro-speak. They are forced to address the many conspiracy theories about the EU that its all a fiendish plot by (take your pick) neo-liberal capitalists, meddling socialists, secular fundamentalists or neo-imperialists. While this gives populists a platform, leadership is about understanding voters concerns, explaining them away by force of argument if they are bogus and setting out how they can be addressed if they are real.
None of this is not to say that referenda are ideal. They are not. They give opportunists of all hues the chance to whip up fears about matters entirely unrelated to the issue at hand. But despite their many flaws, referenda have shown themselves to be the only way of engaging voters with the integration project. The lesson of this weeks referenda is not that there should be no more changes to the EU put to votes, but that pan-EU referenda should be held to give everyone a say. They might not create overnight the elusive European demos, but they are the best available option.
Further Links
The EU Constitution (pdf)
Reader-friendly EU Constitution
A brief history of the EU
Yes Campaign
No Campaign
EU website
European Voice
EurActiv
E! Sharp
