Tony Klugs proposal for an international protectorate as the way forward to a settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian dispute generates mixed emotions. My heart tells me that he may be correct. The roadmap is indeed deeply flawed in several particulars; so much so that its chances of survival cannot be rated very much higher than that of all previous efforts to end to the horrific cycle of violence. Against that background, attempts to chart a novel course are always welcome, and Klugs creative idea is at least as good as any other that has hitherto been proposed.
The problem is that my head tells me otherwise. Once focus shifts from the high ground of political contexts to the acute detail of military enforcement, the defects of Klugs proposal seem to outweigh its charms.
The fatal flaw of the international protectorate
There is a paradox in this situation. After all, at the very crux of Klugs argument lies the contention that it is the roadmap that is naïve, and that a transitional protectorate would be more practical.
The roadmaps major and fatal weakness, he writes, is its lack of an effective enforcement mechanism. The Quartet will only monitor, evaluate, assist and facilitate If it is to achieve its destination, what it needs is a sturdy, bullet-proof vehicle an unassailable institutional framework which no amount of traps, diversions or land mines can derail while it drives toward a comprehensive peace based on parameters already well-known.
Klug claims to have identified precisely the sort of vehicle required in a protectorate administration (the third tier of his proposed framework), whose security tasks would be entrusted to military personnel drawn from countries assented to by both the Palestinians and the Israelis.
One possible source for the required troops is Nato (as suggested by Thomas Friedman). Alternatively, it could fall to a coalition of the willing and acceptable, which may include troops from the US, the UK, Canada, Australia, possibly Turkey, possibly Egypt, possibly Jordan or others.
The idea sounds attractive, but it seems to me to be entirely impractical from a military viewpoint. This flaw is fatal. As Klug correctly acknowledges, the most serious threat to an Israeli-Palestinian agreement does not now stem from an absence of sufficient political goodwill in either camp. The majority of both peoples are by now so thoroughly fed up with the situation that even those of their leaders who have a reputation as hardliners appear ready to seriously consider options that not very long ago seemed entirely improbable. (As Amos Elon long ago predicted, exhaustion is indeed the great peacemaker.)
The real threat to progress, rather, lies in the ability of the minority of so-called militants to kindle and re-inflame passions by continuing to perpetrate acts of violence. Unless their ability to do so is severely restricted and, eventually, permanently impaired, no plan can ever succeed.
The crux: military intelligence and military action
The devil, then, is in the military details. And from that perspective, Klugs idea of a transitional protectorate fails to take account of two basic operational requirements: military intelligence and military action.
Military intelligence is the precondition of all military operations. Without some hard knowledge of the adversarys capabilities and possible intentions, no commander can possibly make appropriate dispositions of his own forces. This cardinal rule applies as much to insurgency and counter-insurgency situations as to the conventional battlefield.
Intelligence is painstakingly built up from a variety of sources, some human, others electronic (a category that today includes, especially in low-intensity conflict, eavesdropping on conversations conducted over cellular telephones). Hence, intelligence requires an extended infrastructure.
Even assuming that an international protectorates security apparatus would be capable of deploying the required technical capabilities (itself a far more complex task than is often realised), would it have the time to do so?
As Tony Klug would surely be the first to admit, momentum lies at the very heart of his proposal. What he wants to avoid is a repetition of the frustration-inducing stalemates of the past. But by imposing the need for intelligence gathering on an entirely new military body, composed of persons unfamiliar with the terrain, context and personalities, he is really asking for the clock to be stopped. Thats not going to happen. Instead, extremists will use the hiatus to roam and do harm at will.
It might be argued that this problem could be overcome by giving the protectorate forces access to the intelligence assets that both Israelis and Palestinians now have in place. That prospect is highly improbable (given the symbolic importance of their impartiality and independence, would the protectorate forces wish to be dependent on the Israelis and/or the Palestinians for their intelligence? Given their laager mentality, would the parties themselves be prepared to risk their sources by telling all that they know?).
But even if possible, an intelligence pool under Protectorate auspices would not be very effective. Here, too, the reason is grounded in military practicalities. Military intelligence is useful only if followed by immediate military action. And what military action would the Protectorate forces be prepared, or equipped, to take? Even if they had warning of an impending attack, could they take the necessary pre-emptive measures? If outrages are committed, could they possibly undertake hot pursuit or any other form of retaliation?
Even in their simplest versions, either scenario would require the protectorate forces to be in prior possession of an absolutely cast-iron mandate to cross Israeli-Palestinian boundaries at will (I shudder to think how long it would take to negotiate that little item).
Moreover, as anyone who has been to the West Bank and Gaza strip surely knows, most situations will inevitably be deeply complex, primarily because no clearly-defined boundaries in fact exist. In many locations, the proximity of Jewish and Palestinian settlements not only creates a political nightmare, but also invalidates many military conventions.
Pundits may continue to wax eloquent about separation of forces, perimeter defense, and buffer zones; soldiers in the field know that, given the existing demographic patchwork, such terms are often meaningless.
To expect protectorate forces to overcome these difficulties and act as an effective constabulary force is, therefore, to ask for the impossible. The sad example of the Temporary International Presence in Hebron (TIPH), established in the wake of the Hebron agreement of 1997, shows that disappointment and despair are bound to follow.
Any attempt on the part of protectorate forces to accomplish their mission could well turn them into targets of random physical attack from both sides. Indeed, they will have to invest so many resources in defending themselves that they will have little to spare for any other mission.
Ultimately, they will be forced to adopt the classic military stratagem of force protection, and simply hunker down in their barracks. That posture might ensure that they do indeed become (in Klugs terms) bullet-proof, but is hardly likely to bring the warring parties any closer together.
Bi-lateral co-operation, not international intervention
In fact, then, the protectorate idea points us precisely towards a route that we ought not to take. It creates the false impression that there might be a short-cut to Israeli-Palestinian accommodation. Even worse, it creates a straw man on whom both sides can pin responsibility for their own failures.
Instead, progress should begin at the very basic level of day-to-day security, with a series of very specific military arrangements in which the two sides have a joint and direct investment. In practice, this translates into three vital measures: first, the establishment of absolute unitary control over the firearms of all shapes and sizes held in vast quantities across the West Bank and Gaza strip (in other words, disarmament of both the Jewish settlers and the Palestinian gunmen); second, a phased withdrawal of the Israeli army of occupation; and third, the establishment on the ground of joint patrols and intelligence-sharing frameworks.
The fascinating but frequently neglected precedent of the Israel-Lebanon Working Group (ILWG, established in the wake of operation Grapes of Wrath in April 1996) shows that third-parties can certainly help facilitate progress by helping to lay down ground rules of coordination. But that is where they should stop. A more active form of international intervention, especially in the guise of a protectorate, seems more likely to endanger such structures than to consolidate them.
One last word. Of course, it needs no spirits from the vast deep to tell us that the level of Israeli-Palestinian security cooperation envisioned by the roadmap will not be accomplished overnight. The two sides will have to engage in a learning process. The results will necessarily be cumulative, rather than instantaneous and the process itself undoubtedly bumpy. But that is no reason to declare the entire notion a non-starter. From a strictly military viewpoint, it does indeed seem to be the only viable game in town.
openDemocracy warmly thanks Elisheva Mironi and Ariella Yaari of Britain Israel Communications and Research Centre (BICOM) for their great help in facilitating publication of this article.
