The terms of the Hutton Inquiry set up by the British government in July 2003 in the aftermath of the death of a distinguished biological weapons scientist and inspector were made clear at the outset. The task given to Lord Hutton was ...urgently to conduct an investigation into the circumstances surrounding the death of Dr Kelly. It is a mark of these litigious and conspiracy-theory-ridden times that such a task was given to one of the United Kingdoms senior legal officials, a distinguished Law Lord, to perform. The case of David Kelly was never a case for a Law Lord: it was a case for a coroner.
Doing a coroners job, Lord Hutton delivered his verdict loud and clear in the report he published on 28 January 2004 (paragraphs 14 and 467): I am satisfied that Dr Kelly took his own life.
That, one should have thought, is that. A man killed himself: a tragedy for his family, certainly, but hardly a case for a full-scale judicial inquiry involving the prime minister, cabinet ministers and heads of the intelligence services, MI5 and MI6.
But then something of Alice in Wonderland and The Emperors New Clothes has permeated this inquiry. The one thing which is most obvious has been the one thing nobody has been saying David Kelly killed himself. Even publicity-seeking Guardian letter-writers ought to recognise the validity of Lord Huttons reasons for this considered and surely conclusive verdict.
If we accept as all but deranged conspiracists now do that the hand that held the knife was Kellys own, what on earth was there ever to investigate? Ordering an inquiry into why a man has killed himself is like ordering an inquiry not into whether, but why a person murdered someone. Such things are beyond the fullest understanding of psychologists, let alone judges, and the only person who could have given us the answer on this one was dead before the inquiry began.
Read Anthony Barnett on Alastair Campbell's role, and David Elstein on the implications for the BBC
So what was this inquiry for?
Some people made the mistake of thinking that this inquiry was the big one that in the Royal Courts of Justice, the reasons for Britain going to war would be investigated. For those of us who attended, it was plain from the outset why so many members of the public queued to watch. This was to be the anti-war lobbys judicial revenge: from the courts, Lord Hutton would do the job the marchers had sought to do on the streets. This was to be their Watergate when an arrogant government seen as intent on war would finally be brought to book. This wasnt their inquiry.
It was made clear at the outset and again in the final report, that the issue of the existence or non-existence of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in Iraq, like the issue of the reliability of intelligence relating to them, was not one which falls within [the] terms of reference (para 9). If anyone thought the Hutton inquiry was about why Britain went to war, they hadnt read the first piece of paper about it. And if they say now, as many are bound to, that this was some kind of whitewash, then they dont know how many times, as a judge in Northern Ireland, Hutton brought in judgments against the governments of the day.
For many, then, this was not so much about actual war, as a political battle political opportunism. The Conservative Party wished the Hutton Inquiry to be the moment the Blair government fell. But it must not be forgotten that the Conservatives not only voted with the government for war, but did so after their then leader had been shown the relevant intelligence. Their present call for a full public inquiry into why the government sent Her Majestys Armed Forces to war is effectively asking for an inquiry into why they made their own decision. No, this wasnt their inquiry either.
Nobodys inquiry?
The government has been vindicated, and the new Leader of the Opposition has very small fare to throw in what was meant to be his big moment. In fact he has two words: he has subconsciously (228.7) and he has fault (432), relating to the conduct of the Ministry of Defence.
The fault is the interesting one. The extent to which the Ministry of Defence was found to be at fault is this: the MoD failed in advance to inform Dr Kelly that the press office was going to confirm his name if a journalist suggested it (432).
The only extent to which the government can be blamed is this: Kelly was in breach of civil service procedure (253); Kelly had on not one occasion, but repeatedly, leaked information to the press; Kelly was identified by the press; Kelly needed protection from the press; the MoD did not give him sufficient protection.
It takes an amazing bias for anyone to put the blame of Dr Kellys subsequent hounding onto the MoD. He was not being hounded by the government. It was not government cameramen and interviewers who were thundering down to his Oxfordshire village. Having betrayed his employers, his employers acted though not as ideally as they might have done in trying to protect him from the very people he had been so keen to speak with before. In fact, the MoD behaved with remarkable magnanimity.
So it seems that this was nobodys inquiry. And so, naturally, there are already calls, from more corners than the Conservatives, for a new inquiry, both into WMD and the wider reasons for going to war. There is one reason why this cannot happen: it is impossible.
An inquiry into the reasons for going to war would, even in its narrowest remit, be an investigation into the workings of the British intelligence services. For two weeks in 2003, the Saville Inquiry into the Bloody Sunday shootings in Northern Ireland in 1972 questioned men who were serving in the intelligence services at the time. For national security reasons as well as for their own safety, all were anonymous, all spoke from behind screens, and one could not turn up because of new Article 2 considerations. What documents could be produced were very heavily redacted for Article 2 and national security reasons. What questioning was possible was limited to questioning that did not impinge on Article 2 and national security issues. That was with people who had been in the field thirty-two years ago. An inquiry in 2004, inquiring into intelligence from 2002 and 2003, would not move forward very far.
The security services are answerable to the government, but they must not be compromised and agents lives put at risk to satiate public appetite, nor must they (as I trust the Blair government has now learnt) ever be politicised. National security in Britain, as in all nations, goes beyond today or tomorrows government.
A culture of cynicism and spin
A single good thing has come from this costly mess. The BBC has been damned. Its reporters extremely grave (275.3) allegations of deception against the prime minister and his staff have been ruled unsubstantiated. Editorial control at the BBC has been judged defective (291.2). These are serious matters matters which the British press, including, urgently, the print media, must consider.
There is a culture in British journalism and among the general public which has long been identified a culture of cynicism. It is a culture which leads presenters and interviewers to assume that a politician is lying rather than to assume he is telling the truth. It is a corrosive attitude: it led one reporter to believe it acceptable, however early in the morning, to make an unfounded allegation of an extremely serious nature against the prime minister of the United Kingdom.
Alastair Campbell, the prime ministers then senior communications adviser, led the charge, and it is a good thing that he did. Campbell came to symbolise the destructive culture of spin that will some day do for this government, but I believe his Damascene conversion to be genuine. He saw, as too few people have, that though it is right and proper in a democracy to have a functioning and critical press, it is not right to permit a culture in which unsubstantiated lies against politicians are de rigueur. Nor is it ever right that the press which hounds people is the same press which tries to lead them in mawkish and ultimately insincere mourning for people of whom they knew or cared nothing.
