Of late, and for good reason, there is added urgency in voices seeking to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The solutions proposed range from the sublime option of a bi-national state fulfilling all the political aspirations of the two nations, to what has become a patently ridiculous option of creating two viable states. But it is as clear as daylight that, in the foreseeable future, there will be neither a bi-national state nor two viable states between the Jordan and the sea.
Also in openDemocracy, Palestinians differ over the one-state solution; see Omar Barghouti, Beyond relative humanity to a secular democratic state
(April 2004) and Linda Benedikts two-part interview with Sari Nusseibeh, What future for Palestine? and Faith, not optimism (April 2004)
The vision of creating a single, bi-national, democratic, secular state in the whole of historical Palestine has a long pedigree dating back to the 1920s and, in a climate of despair, it is now being revived. Interviews in the Israeli press with Meron Benvenisti, a veteran proponent of the idea, and Haim Hanegbi, followed by a raft of articles by Ahmad Khalidi, Tony Judt, Naseer Aruri, and others from around the world has prompted emotional debate on the subject inside and outside Israel.
This option of a single bi-national state has the obvious benefit of not having to impose an artificial division on what is a natural geographical unit inhabited by two major ethnic communities. According to its advocates, the bi-national solution is inevitable because the two communities are so closely interlinked and interdependent that separation is impossible. An Islamic bi-national state is also the preferred choice of the radical Palestinian movements. For the meantime, however, it enjoys little support from members of the wider Palestinian and Israeli communities, who want to protect their own identities rather than throw in their lot with what each sees as a hostile adversary. For all its logic, the idea has little grass-root support and is detested by the great majority of politicians. Coming at a time when the two communities are locked in a violent conflict, the bi-national option is a non-starter.
Given the history of the conflict to date, the two-state option would seem to hold out the best chance for its peaceful resolution. Since the 1930s, the call first for partition and then for two states for two peoples has been seen as the most equitable solution to an intractable problem. In its present form, the model aims to put an end to the century-old conflict by dividing the land roughly along the 1948 Green Line, in compliance with Security Council resolutions 242 and 338. Israel would be required to withdraw completely from the West Bank and Gaza to allow an independent, sovereign Palestinian state to be established in those areas, with Jerusalem as the shared capital of the two states.
For some, the emergence of two states living harmoniously side-by-side appeared to be a dream coming true during the early years of the Oslo period and it has recently been resurrected from the ashes of the intifada in the shape of the Geneva Accords and the Ayalon/Nusseibeh agreement. President Bushs original roadmap was intended to guide the two parties towards the two-state model. There is widespread support on both sides for this solution and until recently it enjoyed the backing of much of the international community, including most Arab League countries, the US and the European Union.
However, the two-state solution is inherently problematic since even if the political will existed to achieve this option, it would be extremely difficult to implement given the ferocious opposition of the settler camp and the depth of the Israeli occupation. (See Eyal Weizmans excellent three-part analysis: Sharon and the Geometry of Occupation, openDemocracy, September 2003).
While the world blathers on about what should be, facts are being changed on the ground. Any chance a genuine two-state solution might have of bringing peace is being comprehensively quashed by the Israeli governments two-pronged assault on it. On one front, driven by the Greater Israel champions who have reluctantly conceded that their maximalist vision is untenable, the government in Jerusalem is doing everything in its power to augment existing settlements on the West Bank. Pronouncements by Israeli officials of a withdrawal from Gaza and bits of the West Bank notwithstanding, expansion of the settlements and their infrastructure of roads, services, etc. continues apace. Therefore, with each passing day the chance of creating two viable states becomes more and more remote.
On the other front, having failed to crush the Palestinians by military means, Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon has resorted to territorial means. To this end the Israeli government is erecting what it calls the fence. The Palestinians call it the wall. Built almost entirely on West Bank land, the barrier is creating a reality that will determine the geopolitical shape of the region for years to come and stands in direct contradiction to the internationally recognised interpretation of the two-state solution. Its labyrinthine, projected route and location expressly preclude the possibility of two viable states, thereby preventing the emergence of a unified Palestinian polity. While arguments rage around the barriers merits and demerits, legality or illegality, Israeli bulldozers are changing the political landscape.
As it snakes through the terrain, the barrier is effectively dividing up the land between the Jordan and the sea, probably leading to Israels de facto annexation of approximately 45% of the West Bank, its precious water resources as well as 400,000 Palestinians (including the residents of East Jerusalem) who will remain on the western side of the barrier. Human rights organisations estimate that the barrier will have a negative effect on the livelihood of at least 210,000 Palestinians, and irreversibly damage the economic prospects of a Palestinian state. Indeed, the mere existence of a barrier of any sort is seen by some as inimical to the long-term interests of both Israelis and Palestinians.
Israel is using the fence/wall as an instrument both to enforce and to sustain the Sharon Plan an enlarged State of Israel incorporating the settlement blocs to the west and a truncated, fragmented Palestinian state east of the barrier. Connections between its isolated territorial islands will be subject to Israels control. As they have done in the past, Sharon and his supporters will continue to disguise their intentions by alluding to security requirements, claiming to be striving for peace and employing an array of other disingenuous stratagems, and many, including those in high places, will be fooled.
It could be argued that the barrier is only a temporary measure and that modifications will be made once the situation stabilises. This is an unlikely prospect considering Israels expansionist tendency and the current balance of power in the region.
The immediate danger for all concerned is that the fence/wall is yet another in a long line of (blunt) instruments of oppression that is far more likely to inflame Palestinian passions than extinguish them. The overall plan now the most fundamental element in Israeli government policy and viewed by many Israelis as a legitimate attempt by their government to reconcile the irreconcilable demands of security, the settlers and democracy is perceived by the Palestinians as politicide a term Baruch Kimmerling coined to describe a gradual but systematic attempt to cause their annihilation as an independent political and social entity. It is bound to be resisted, fiercely.
All the hypothesising about solutions or peace talks is futile because there is only one scheme on the table right now. The peace process is defunct, making all references to it totally meaningless and misguided. Moreover, Bushs roadmap is in tatters since his meeting earlier this month with Sharon. In a sharp reversal of established US policy, the president, far from demanding that Sharons plan comply with the roadmap, wholeheartedly endorsed it.
What we are left with is an inexorable thrust towards the realisation of Sharons plan, albeit not its ultimate, Greater Israel incarnation. It is the only game-plan in town and it appears that nothing and nobody is going to deter Sharon from executing it (though he may be forced to make certain cosmetic changes to the barriers convoluted route). And, conveniently for its prime minister, Israel has reached the conclusion that there is no partner for peace. It will have to take all decisions and steps unilaterally.
There is no escaping the fact that, unless some new factor enters the equation very soon, we will face a situation where Israel occupies the whole area west of the fence/wall while the Palestinians are reduced to about 55% of the West Bank in what at best can be described as an archipelago of isolated territories, cantons or enclaves, at worst as Bantustans or detention camps. It wont be a viable state by a long chalk and it is a recipe for disaster. Speculation about other scenarios is pie in the sky.
