The interim prime minister of Israel, Ehud Olmert, chose the eve of the elections for the Palestinian Legislative Council to declare that ensuring the future security of Israel meant establishing the national boundaries of the Israeli state. The substance and the timing of his speech reinforces a dilemma for the Palestinians that has been particularly acute in the wake of Israel's evacuation of Gaza in August 2005: how to respond to suggestions (particularly in Washington) of a "provisional Palestinian state" being established in the West Bank and Gaza.
The chances for a durable peace settlement between Israelis and Palestinians may depend in large part on how the latter answer this question.
American officials have proposed that a provisional state is "the best that can be achieved in the circumstances". Conveniently, it also suits the current United States policy of conflict management rather than resolution. This stance perpetuates a tendency to plump for precipitate or biased schemes aimed at endorsing Israel's more delusional plans. To make matters worse, the proposal is couched in diplomatic language that equates to a "take it or else" approach to the Palestinians.
The Americans do have the political savvy to chart a more constructive and impartial course, which would couple the provisional state to a definite timetable, leading to a viable, permanent Palestinian state in the foreseeable future. In this form the provisional state might have some merit. However, the administration is under the sway of the combined forces of the Christian right and the pro-Israel lobby, resulting in a provisional state proposal that is simply American-speak for imposing on the Palestinians a dysfunctional state, lacking most of the basic prerequisites of statehood, without offering a clear vision of a viable state in the future.
Also in openDemocracy on Palestinian experience and political dilemmas:
Linda Benedikt, "Faith, not optimism: Sari Nusseibeh interviewed" (April 2004)
Stephen Howe, "The death of Arafat and the end of national liberation"
(November 2004)
Eóin Murray, "Welcome to Costa-del-Gaza"
(July 2005)
John Berger, "Undefeated despair" (January 2006)
Jane Kinninmont, "Life after Sharon: Palestinian prospects"
(January 2006)
Eóin Murray, "Palestinians' time of choice" (January 2006)
Yasser Abu Moailek, "Fatah's awkward 'independents'"
(January 2006)
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Significantly, the provisional-state idea also coincides with Israel's desire to retain the bulk of West Bank settlements without ruling over the more than 2 million Palestinians who live there. In attempting to solve this demographic-geographic conundrum, the conception takes no account of Palestinian aspirations for a contiguous, sovereign and independent state. This is the nub of the conflict and unless it is addressed properly nothing will be resolved and the wounds will continue to fester. By inflicting a half-baked state on the Palestinians, the US and Israel are postponing the day of reckoning rather than settling the dispute.
A provisional state is essentially a euphemism for the Israeli government's plan to oversee the creation of a series of fragmented cantons in the West Bank that, they hope, will buy some time and perhaps quell the Palestinians' demand for real statehood. It does not alter the fundamentals of the occupation, coinciding precisely with the prevailing view on territory, according to which anything close to the June 1967 lines is anathema. Moreover, while Israeli leaders seem to be clinging to the principle of unilateralism, they are not proposing to follow the Gaza evacuation with similar steps on the West Bank any time soon, and will probably opt instead for the "independence for security" formula championed by Ariel Sharon which was his way of saying that if the natives are quiet he will give them some goodies.
In any case, the notion that Israel will determine the nature of the Palestinian state is in itself arrogant and misguided. The Palestinians have a right to self-determination and in the absence of genuine negotiations towards a final settlement it would be foolhardy to believe they are not going to exercise it, the Israel Defence Forces notwithstanding. Given the history of anti-colonial struggles since 1945, and the limits of military power, the advantage would seem to be with the subject people. In short, the Israeli occupation of the West Bank is not sustainable and repackaging it into what passes for a provisional state is the height of political folly.
A flawed logic
Three further flaws in the provisional-state proposal are worth noting. First, it accentuates the asymmetrical balance of power that exists between Israel and the Palestinians, and presses the Palestinians into a corner, leading to further humiliation. The importance of this factor cannot be exaggerated, as the Palestinians, with some justification, feel they are being dealt a few crumbs.
Second, it accepts the status quo on the ground. The US insists that "Israeli settlement activity would have to end in order to assure Palestinians that when it came time to negotiating final borders, they would be able to achieve a state with contiguity and territory." Is it not obvious that even if settlement activity were to cease completely tomorrow, the present extent of settlement, with its attendant infrastructure, precludes any possibility of a contiguous Palestinian state now and in the future? It follows that, at some point, the vast majority of Israeli settlements in the West Bank, and not just the handful that Israel is considering giving up in "painful concessions", will have to be abandoned in order to achieve such a state.
Both Bush and Israeli leaders are emphatic that the Palestinians "impose an enduring ceasefire", before any type of settlement can be considered. This puts the cart before the horse, since it is widely accepted that a necessary first step to achieving a lasting ceasefire is for the Palestinian people to have a meaningful political horizon. Because the provisional-state idea falls far short of their minimalist aspirations on many counts, instead of acting as a disincentive to potential subversives, it will spur them on.
Third, and perhaps the greatest drawback of a provisional state is that, instead of reducing the scale of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, it is bound to exacerbate two existing, interconnected trends: Israel's entrenchment in the West Bank and Palestinian radicalisation. Under the aegis of interim-type arrangements, Israel has been and will continue to consolidate its hold on the West Bank by establishing "facts on the ground", with or without American approval. With every passing day the settlements are expanding and the future Palestinian state is shrinking. For this reason a provisional arrangement serves Israel's interests, and is to the detriment of the Palestinians.
From the Palestinian perspective, the sequel to this state of affairs is that as time goes by without a final settlement, the force required to drive Israel out of the West Bank will need to be correspondingly greater hence their radicalisation, growing extremism and frustration. As the stakes gradually rise, the ultimate resolution of the conflict necessarily becomes harder to achieve.
What's more, by deferring a workable two-state solution, the provisional arrangement will lengthen the odds on it ever actually materialising. This raises the spectre of the single/bi-national-state option, which, in the light of the dilatoriness of the US and the depth of Israel's occupation, looks increasingly likely.
Lindsay Talmud was born in South Africa and now lives in Israel, where he works as a translator
Also by Lindsay Talmud in openDemocracy:
"From the sublime to the ridiculous" (April 2004)
Israels choice
The time has come for Israelis to realise that a viable, as distinct from a provisional, Palestinian state is in everybody's interests and that delaying its implementation will only lead to more bloodshed. The Bush administration should have the good sense to build on Ehud Olmert's intervention by further disabusing Israelis of any illusion that time is on their side and press for a fully-fledged, sovereign and independent state with agreed borders for the Palestinians. This would offer Israelis the only realistic hope for the security they crave and could lead to peace with most of the Arab world, as envisaged by the Saudi initiative launched in 2002.
It is within the power of the United States backed by the Quartet to bring about an equitable, if imperfect, resolution of the conflict, approximating the lines of the Clinton parameters of December 2000. Anything short of this has little chance of success. Such a solution could be achieved within a relatively short timeframe through a series of closely-monitored steps that both sides would be obliged to follow a roadmap with teeth.
The early months of 2006, with both Israelis and Palestinians in the throes of political transition and intense national debate, is an appropriate time for the correct measure of balanced intervention. The prospects for this are bleak, as the Bush administration will not act contrary to the will of its right-wing constituency. The provisional-state proposal remains on the agenda, without due consideration of its disastrous consequences.
