Uzbekistan’s gift to radical Islam

The events surrounding the suppression of a protest on 13 May in Andijan, on the eastern edge of Uzbekistan’s Fergana valley, are now inviting the description of Uzbekistan's Tiananmen Square. What was originally reported as the death of twelve protesters is now believed to have been a massacre of hundreds of Uzbeks, and the prelude to a weekend of bloody clashes in a number of towns across the central Asian republic’s eastern region.

The strict media control exercised by Uzbekistan’s government has restricted the access of journalists and NGOs to towns in the affected regions, and makes accurate reporting of the events difficult. This is just part of a long-term policy in which the state imposes tight limits on freedom of speech and media portrayals of President Islam Karimov and his regime.

This regime is nominally democratic, but in practice it has outlawed all opposition parties, and the president maintains rigorous control over the country. Elections are fought between pro-Karimov politicians, and the secret police continue to play a significant role in the running of the country. Freedom House gives Uzbekistan one of the lowest marks in the world for political representation and civil liberties, while Human Rights Watch published a 300-page document in January 2005 highlighting examples of torture. According to the report: “Uzbekistan’s disastrous human rights record is long standing … with major violations of the rights to freedom of religion, expression, association and assembly.”

Also on Uzbekistan and central Asia in openDemocracy:

Malika Kenjaboeva, “Uzbekistan: Stalinism without state benefits” (November 2001)

Malika Kenjaboeva, “The US and Central Asia: the test case of global democracy” (June 2003)

Sabine Freizer, “Midnight in Tashkent” (April 2004)

Mary Dejevsky, “Kyrgyzstan questions” (March 2005)

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But since the events of 9/11, another image of Uzbekistan is widely circulated in the west: Uzbekistan as the ally of the United States in the “war on terror”. By actively engaging in the war, by allowing the US to establish a base from which to fight terrorism abroad, Karimov has become a “key regional ally” of the United States and its coalition.

This has provided legitimacy for him to “bring the war home” by using it as a weapon against dissidents within Uzbekistan. His adoption of George W Bush’s own language has permitted him to act brutally against an alleged terrorist threat and be handsomely rewarded with funds from the Pentagon.

The phrase “one man’s freedom fighter is another man’s terrorist” may be a cliché in many contexts, but in Uzbekistan it is a fairly neat summary of the contradictory views at work. The most prominent critics of Karimov may indeed be Muslims, but so are 89% of the population, and this alone does not make them terrorists.

Indeed, Muslims in Uzbekistan are far more moderate than those elsewhere in the region (for example, Afghanistan). But their poverty in a country that remains one of the poorest regions of the former Soviet Union, allied to Karimov’s recent clampdowns on business, is likely only to intensify their alienation and lead some of them at least towards a radical path.

Craig Murray, former British ambassador to Uzbekistan, has said that the Andijan protestors were democrats, “more Turkey than Taliban”. The recent calls for reform from below in Uzbekistan have been pro-democracy and pro-business, calling for an end to corruption and poverty rather than (for example) an imposition of sharia law. As Marta Brill Olcott of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace comments: “Poverty not religion is the root of the recent conflict”.

True, both moderate and extreme Islamic organisations exist in Uzbekistan. Islam remained stronger in Uzbekistan than in other republics during the Soviet period, and is still far more active than in neighbouring states. There is some support for Hizb-ut-Tahrir, a group which claims to be non-violent in its desire to see the formation of a central Asian Islamic state. The main militant group, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), which was linked with al-Qaida, suffered heavy losses during the US-led invasion of Afghanistan in late 2001, although some splinter groups have returned to operate in Uzbekistan.

These groups have been particularly associated with the Fergana valley. But the wholesale characterisation of this fertile, densely populated region as a hotbed of militant Islam has meant that state attempts to root out militant groups have led (as Freedom House reports) to the victimisation of many innocent civilian members of moderate Muslim organisations for “anti-constitutional activities”.

Karimov’s tactics are counterproductive. He has used the war on terrorism to crack down on political opposition, and the perceived threat of Islamic terrorism to justify his repressive style of leadership. However, crushing social and economic protests in such a brutal way is exactly the way to breed religious fundamentalism.

The nature of the regime in Tashkent means a complete lack of space for civil society to operate. Freedom of association is restricted and regulated against. When all other points of political organisation have been made illegal, the mosque provides the only space for discussion. If Islam is the only way for an angry people to vent their frustration then there will only be one result.