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Al-Qaida, the next stage

The dispersal of the al-Qaida idea across many national territories takes some pressure off the "far enemy", the United States. But developments in Nigeria could represent a new danger for Washington and its allies.

A number of developments from the "greater middle east" to west Africa highlights the varying fortunes of the al-Qaida movement over recent years. In Pakistan and Yemen, drone attacks on al-Qaida affiliates continue with an intensity that is little recognised outside military circles. This week, a senior al-Qaida intelligence specialist, Abu Ubaydah Abdullah al Alam, was reportedly killed in Pakistan, and in Yemen two paramilitary fighters were killed in Marib province, the third attack in six days (see Long War Journal, 21-22 April 2013).

In Somalia, the Shabaab movement is conceding territory to advancing African Union forces, as well as facing criticism from some radical Islamic scholars (see Mohamed Mubarak, “Challenge to the Hard Core”, Jane's Intelligence Review, May 2013). In Iraq, however, groups allied to al-Qaida are on the offensive against government security forces and Shi'a communities.

In Syria, jihadist elements among the insurgents are gaining strength, a trend that parallels deep divisions in the more secular opposition forces. The United States is becoming ever more cautious about supplying the rebels, a stance that worries its Israeli ally, for Israel in particular fears that Bashar al-Assad's regime could eventually fall to an unstable coalition with a very powerful Islamist component.

Washington itself, though, has been able to draw a degree of relief from the dispersal of the al-Qaida "idea". Many of the newer “offshoots” appear to have nationalist rather than transnational agendas, even as they benefit from open routes of transnational cooperation. The jihadist groups may target western workers (as in the In Amenas raid in Algeria), and the possibility of attacks arising from within western cities remains (as indicated by the Boston incident). But a repeat of Madrid (2004) or London (2005), let alone 9/11, has been avoided. Indeed, few al-Qaida affiliates - Yemen apart - even pay much attention at present to the “far enemy” of the United States.

The Nigerian case

Yet this limited comfort may be deceptive, if developments in Nigeria are a guide. There, Boko Haram is continuing to evolve into one of the most potent of Islamist movements. The group, founded in 2002, rose to prominence following an attack on the police HQ in Maiduguri, northeast Nigeria, in 2009 (see "Al-Qaida franchise: the Nigerian case", 25 August 2011). In the aftermath its leader Mohammed Yusuf was captured by the army and handed over to the police, where he died in custody, becoming a martyr to its followers. Since 2009 Boko Haram has been active across the north (and particularly the northeast), but its operations further south include bombing the United Nations offices in Nigeria's capital, Abuja.

The very high death-toll in these years of fighting between security forces and Boko Haram, probably well over 3,000, owes much to the Nigerian security apparatus's tendency to use intense force in response to incidents. Some politicians call for negotiations, but the police and army see armed power as the only way is to defeat the movement. This approach is reflected in a military assault on Baga village on the shores of Lake Chad that reportedly left over 180 people dead and scores wounded, and 300 houses destroyed (see "High death toll feared in Nigeria after Boko Haram battle", Deutsche Welle, 22 April 2013).

Despite such operations and other repression, however, Boko Haram shows few signs of wilting. Indeed, it has produced an offshoot called Ansaru, which has its own agenda as well as being prepared to work with the main body of Boko Haram (see Adam Nossiter, “Nigerian unrest adds Qaeda element”, New York Times, 23 April 2013).

Ansaru is far more transnational and less concerned with domestic issues. Its representatives have even said that it is unacceptable for groups such as Boko Haram to attack and kill other Nigerians. The splinter's dominant message is that Ansaru will move towards kidnapping foreigners and holding them for ransom, which can be a very profitable way of raising funds.

On its own this may appear a minor shift in a neglected conflict. But against the background of al-Qaida's wider disperal it could well turn out to be very significant.

Until around January 2013, al-Qaida could be characterised as a scattered if still potent idea, whose various loose affiliates (again excepting Yemen) tended to focus on their local struggles and eschew the idea of a global contest (see "Al-Qaida, idea in motion", 4 January 2013). The importance of Ansaru is that it embraces this wider concept in a way that echoes the ambition of the al-Qaida of more than a decade ago. If it persists and broadens its appeal, either in Nigeria or even in neighbouring countries, it could be the harbinger of "the post-al-Qaida world".

This provides one more reason why the Nigerian authorities might well try other approaches than reliance on heavy military force in addressing the problem of Boko Haram and now Ansaru. It is even more important for them to resist any offers of military help from the United States and Britain. The deployment of foreign special forces and armed-drones in Nigeria is all Ansaru needs to enable it to grow.

About the author

Paul Rogers is professor in the department of peace studies at Bradford University, northern England. He is openDemocracy's international security adviser, and has been writing a weekly column on global security since 28 September 2001; he also writes a monthly briefing for the Oxford Research Group. His latest book is Irregular War: ISIS and the New Threat from the Margins (IB Tauris, 2016), which follows Why We’re Losing the War on Terror (Polity, 2007), and Losing Control: Global Security in the 21st Century (Pluto Press, 3rd edition, 2010). He is on Twitter at: @ProfPRogers

A lecture by Paul Rogers, delivered to the Food Systems Academy in late 2014, provides an overview of the analysis that underpins his openDemocracy column. The lecture - "The crucial century, 1945-2045: transforming food systems in a global context" - focuses on the central place of food systems in human security worldwide. Paul argues that food is the pivot of humanity's next great transition. It can be accessed here

Read On

Department of peace studies, Bradford University

Paul Rogers, A War on Terror: Afghanistan and After (Pluto Press, 2004)

Oxford Research Group

Paul Rogers, Losing Control: Global Security in the 21st Century (Pluto Press, 3rd edition, 2010)

Long War Journal

Islam in Nigeria

Eva Evers Rosander & David Westerlund eds., African Islam and Islam in Africa (Swallow Press, 1997)

Stephen Ellis, Season of Rains: Africa in the World (C Hurst, 2011)

Toyin Falola & Matthew M Heaton, A History of Nigeria (Cambridge University Press, 2008)

More On

Paul Rogers is professor in the department of peace studies at Bradford University, northern England. He is openDemocracy's international-security editor, and has been writing a weekly column on global security since 28 September 2001; he also writes a monthly briefing for the Oxford Research Group. His books include Why We’re Losing the War on Terror (Polity, 2007), and Losing Control: Global Security in the 21st Century (Pluto Press, 3rd edition, 2010). He is on twitter at: @ProfPRogers

A lecture by Paul Rogers on sustainable security, delivered to the Quaker yearly meeting on 3 August 2011, provides an overview of the analysis that underpins his openDemocracy column. It is available in two parts and can be accessed from here


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