Skip to content

The war on Iraq: its effect on the Arab world

Published:

The United States and Britain remain adamant that war is the only way to disarm Iraq of its arsenal of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The Iraqi military are no match for the overwhelming force that the US and its allies have assembled; regime change will become a reality the moment the coalition armies reach Baghdad.

The war may be quick and decisive, with pockets of resistance remaining, mainly in central Iraq. If Iraq uses any WMD during the conflict, then the advocates of war will have a perfect retrospective justification for their action, and Iraq will risk facing the wrath of US tactical nuclear weapons – in short, a similar situation to that during the 1991 Gulf war.

This forceful change of regime by a foreign military power will be a new reality in the modern Middle East and a practical exercise in the process of education by example.

Some countries in the region see the war in a positive light, while others look on it as a nightmare. In this article, I will assess in turn how each country will be affected by a war in Iraq – based on its own particular current interests, sensitivities and problems.

Jordan

Jordan is already suffering from the current intifada in Gaza and the West Bank, a situation intensified by the country’s own high Palestinian population and its strong historic ties with the West Bank. The economy is faltering and social unrest is being felt across the country, especially in the refugee camps.

The rise in influence of Hamas and other Islamic groups is worrying officials. The Palestinians and some East Jordanians have always shown sympathy with the Iraqi regime, mainly thanks to its backing for the intifada and its economic support of Jordan.

Jordan gets its oil from Iraq at half-price at a saving of $300 million every year in return for food, medicines and clothes – making the country highly dependent on Iraq. In case of a war in Iraq followed by a new regime, Jordan will have to pay international prices for its oil imports from Iraq, for Iraq will need every cent to rebuild what three wars and eleven years of sanctions have destroyed.

Moreover, the influx of refugees from Iraq will be greater than during the 1991 war where a total of 400,000 refugees crossed the border into Jordan. Most of them subsequently left, but an Iraqi community of 80,000 remains. The next wave of refugees will be of two types: those who are simply looking for a shelter to save their souls from the bombing, and those who are running away from Iraq with no intention of returning at all.

Meanwhile, if Jordanian fears of a massive transfer of Palestinians from the West Bank become real, that situation would be a catastrophe. The Islamists’ voice will be louder than ever; extreme spirits would be in the ascendant for many days to come. Jordan would need a lot of economic support. Yet, in my view, the possibility of mass transfer of Palestinians to Jordan by Israel is remote.

Syria

The Syrian regime will be under heavy political pressure to start a process of disengagement from all extremist and ‘rejectionist’ Palestinian fronts that have been long based in Damascus. Syrian support of Hizbollah in southern Lebanon would become a card in Syria’s pocket that it can no longer afford to keep. The United States has made very clear statements about the need to completely remove the threat Hizbollah poses to Israel, and the daily examples of Hamas activity in the occupied territories.

Economically, Syria will lose the supply of oil it is receiving from Iraq, namely 150,000 barrels per day at a price of $5 a barrel. The cost to Syria will be of the order of $1 billion.

Syria is quietly preparing field hospitals and relief facilities near its border with Iraq, though it denies this. After the war, its influence in Lebanon will diminish. Syria will have to distance itself from all organisations considered as terrorist by the west and Israel. Syria will have to seriously re-engage in the peace process with Israel.

Saudi Arabia

The hard-line Islamists in Saudi Arabia will be more active than ever, especially those who are against the presence of US troops in the country referred to as ‘the land of the two holy mosques’ by Osama bin Laden. In the short term, I am not worried about Saudi Arabia but in the long term it will cease to be the main oil supplier to the US, which is constantly looking for oil in new areas of the world in preference to investing in traditional fields. US support for Saudi Arabia will slowly diminish.

The Saudi government will have to clamp down harder on all the more extreme Islamists; this is possible but not without difficulties. The Saudis cannot continue to ignore US requests to use their territory as a launching pad against Iraq; at the last moment the Saudi position could become more actively supportive of war, though not as clearly as in 1991.

The Saudis will have to start a process of change within its social and educational system. This prospect is outlined by Crown Prince Abdullah in a proposed ‘Arab Charter’ – submitted at the Arab Summit Conference in Bahrain in March 2003 – which calls on regional leaders to end ‘the silence that has gone on for too long’ about the ‘explosive situation in the area’ (clearly a reference to the social, economic and political stagnation that has fuelled discontent and contributed to the rise of Islamic radicalism in the Arab world).

Crown Prince Abdullah will also recommend an Arab free-trade zone by 2005, and a tariffs union by 2010, to create the long overdue Arab ‘common market’. In my view, the Saudi regime will remain strong and will be able to handle the aftermath of the war positively.

The PLO and Hamas

The Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) will lose all the financial and moral support it has been receiving from the Iraqi regime. Even though Iraq cannot do much to support the intifada militarily, the PLO has always felt psychologically that Iraq is its main support in its struggle against Israel.

The PLO will lose a lot of ground to the hard-line Palestinian Islamists. Hamas will continue to receive support from Islamic extremists in the region and beyond. There will be tremendous pressure on the PLO to help stop the intifada and start peace negotiations with Israel. Yet in the absence of PLO control of Hamas and Islamic Jihad, this will be very difficult. A weakened PLO will not be able to deliver a peace package to the Palestinian people that they will consider just and lasting.

It will therefore be necessary for the US to engage wholeheartedly with the PLO/Israel peace talks, in order to come up with an agreement that has benefits to both parties. What happens then to the Islamic radicals remains to be seen; but an Islamic Palestinian state on the Iranian model has no chance of acceptance by the five permanent members of the United Nations (UN) Security Council.

Egypt

Egypt is formally against the war on Iraq, but will have no choice but to support it unofficially. Egypt has received around $80 billion from the US in financial and military aid since the signing of the peace treaty with Israel in 1979. Support for the US position is in the national interest irrespective of how the bulk of the population feel.

In my view, Egypt is capable of overriding the negative ramifications of the war, economically and politically.

Israel

Israel’s main military threat in the region will be eliminated. It will continue to be the only nuclear power in the region, with total military, economic and political support from the US administration, the Senate and the House of Representatives.

Israel will want to end the state of war with the new Iraqi regime. The new regime in Iraq will have to start peace talks with Israel, thus weakening the negotiating positions of both Syria and the PLO vis-à-vis Israel.

It will not be a surprise to see the reactivation of the old Iraq Petroleum Company oil line from Kirkuk to Haifa. Israel will insist on a peace treaty with the new Iraq which will give it strategic depth on its eastern borders all the way to Iran.

Israel’s strategic relations with Turkey will grow further so that the encirclement of Syria will become tighter than ever.

Conclusion

The Arab world must realise that the United States has a new plan for the region. This plan, generated after 9/11, calls for the restructuring of societies in the Arab world so that there will be no room for extremism, social injustice and dictatorship. If necessary, the US is willing to forcefully implement its plan in the region. Dependency on Arab oil will slowly diminish.

The US military will redeploy in the new Iraq, which will become its main base in the region. Arab regimes will be expected to stamp out Islamic fundamentalists and to show tolerance to other religions. It will be interesting to see how quickly Arab governments will recognise the new regime in Iraq?

Israel will become the US’s strongest-ever ally in the region.

The Arab world will need a lot of wisdom to face these new post-war realities – for the well-being of any nation in the world begins with wise leadership.

Thanks go to the South Asia Forum. Formed by Khalid Nadeem in 2000, this is a conflict resolution and foreign relations forum which aims to bring nations in conflict to the table, focusing on the Middle East and South Asia.

openDemocracy Author

Ali Shukri

Ali Shukri, a former head of the private office of King Hussein of Jordan, is Senior Associate Member at St Antony’s College, Oxford.

All articles
Tags:

More from Ali Shukri

See all

The Syrian factor

/