The process of European construction is in a profound state of disarray a condition that dates at least as far back as unexpected difficulties encountered in the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, only temporarily obscured by the concentration necessary to create the euro. Nor may we continue to seek consolation in the alibi of the inevitable pains associated with growth. For a living, human organisation, not knowing how to deal with growth is just as serious a problem as not knowing how to achieve that growth in the first place.
A worrying trend, for example, is that of perceiving mechanisms of strengthened cooperation (once known as variable geometry) as the automatic panacea for all contradictions. While these might be valid methods for transitory situations (involving ex-eastern bloc countries, the UK or potential rebels from among the current members) flexibility can only help to gain extra time. Sooner or later, the right degree of homogeneity must be established if we are to avoid the risk of the whole system collapsing. In fact, variable geometry pre-supposes the existence of a sufficiently ambitious and cohesive hard core to steer the process. The main problem facing Europe is not the issue of how to manage the periphery, but how credibility can be restored to the centre.
The retreat from politics
How did the six founding members manage to create a winning model of integration, whose success has gradually drawn together all those who were initially resistant, whilst managing only partially to convince the newcomers of the value of the supra-national goals which were implicit within the original aims? In other words, what are the real, deep reasons that underlie both the growing success of economic integration and at the same time the persistent difficulties of political integration? How far can the elements of this contradiction be reconciled? These questions have become a crucial issue ever since public opinion burst unreservedly upon the system.
Political managers would do well to pay close attention to the message that public opinion appears to be sending. A message that is asking for more Europe in the sense that people are generally aware that in the era of globalisation, many problems exist on a scale which is at least continental, and that national states can no longer tackle these challenges alone. The public also wants greater subsidiarity and therefore more de-centralisation: less red tape and greater freedom, but also greater assurances and protection from the new uncertainties created by globalisation, immigration and the prospect of a multi-ethnic society, to say nothing of the impact of new technologies.
People are shying away from politics because they perceive it to be the domain of broken promises. At the same time they reject politics as mere management of the status quo and look back nostalgically upon the grand mobilising aspirations of bygone ideologies.
All this is clearly contradictory, though there is nothing wrong with that human nature is contradictory. Politicians who reject the idea of overcoming these contradictions through new millennium eco-movements or populist demagogy, should not however forget what Jacques Delors described as the principal function of politics: to inform and to educate.
The risk of virtual Europe
It is striking that governments simultaneously want to maintain close control of the workings of the European institutions and yet refuse, when communicating with public opinion at home, to assume full responsibility for decisions made at European level. By hiding behind the myth that an anonymous and remote Europe is better placed than anyone else to justify necessary but unpopular decisions, governments are actually the chief culprits in allowing Europes institutions to become the terrain for a gratuitous campaign of denigration. During this current, extraordinarily crucial phase of European integration, it would be a great help if all those concerned realised that there is a serious problem: the de-legitimisation of the entire structure. Concealing the fact that Brussels shortcomings primarily reflect the weaknesses of each individual country not only worsens the crisis in Europe, but also (which is far worse) contributes to the general alienation of its citizens from politics.
A second issue requiring clarification is what challenges should be faced collectively at European level. An institutional, or indeed constitutional framework cannot be redefined if there is no clear integration agenda. From all sides, for example, the cry goes up for a European economic government to work alongside the Central European Bank. However, in the absence of a thorough definition, this proposal remains dangerously suspended halfway between the suspicion of a means of limiting the autonomy of the Bank and blind faith in the advent of an authority possessing the same powers as the federal US government! Sheer common sense suggests that it is worth reviewing the actual state of play in Europe as regards responsibilities for management of the economy. Even after expansion, the truth is that the budget of the community is destined to remain relatively modest in size, and in any case insufficient for European public expenditure to aspire to even a minimal role as a macro-economic regulator.
Take another example: the European Parliament. Successive treaties have significantly increased its effective powers. But the ways in which it has exercised those new powers is not promising. Heedless of the absence of a true common foreign policy and the lack of European competencies in ethical or moral matters, the Parliament has displayed a worrying tendency to give in to such temptations as the passing of sanctions against other countries, and deliberating on issues such as abortion or cloning. This engenders the risk of making Strasbourg the home of a virtual Europe, with a potentially negative impact on an already less than glowing public opinion.
In the field of economic integration, where the real powers lie, the Parliament seems to have become the forum even more so than the Council of Ministers for arguing the case for protectionist and corporative measures. With regard to the liberalisation of financial markets, it seems to be preparing to succumb once more to the temptation to put institutional relations before the actual substance of decisions. This happened in the past during the liberalisation of the telecommunications industry and, even more worrying, during the recent attempt to distort the European directive on take-over bids. The future credibility of European institutions will largely hinge on their ability to organize themselves as a government of the economy which can restore impetus and competitiveness to the continent. During this extremely arduous process it would be truly paradoxical if the Parliament were to assign itself the role of a brake to change.
The challenge of the real Europe
The real testing ground will be the economy. Public opinion and operators alike instinctively sense the potential of the integration of markets and of the euro. But they still perceive globalisation, new technologies and the need for adaptation of the triumphant post-war European social model as threats rather than stimuli, or sources of opportunity. The primary role of Europes leadership is that of demonstrating that the transformation is achievable and that decline is not inevitable. As in the heyday of the Treaty of Rome, the Single Market and the creation of the euro, this requires the ability to single out clear objectives that are supported by credible tools and implemented on schedule.
As regards the organisation of the market, the European Union has all the responsibilities it needs. Instead, it is worth focusing efforts on processes of simplification, transparency and greater efficiency in management, above all in order to accelerate the liberalisation of markets in a wide range of sectors where the latter process still remains unfinished. It is important, furthermore, to begin spreading awareness that, as regards the management of the internal market and of competition, the call for subsidiarity is no more, in many cases, than a cover for protectionist whims.
Meanwhile, the monetary and macro-economic constraints introduced across Europe following the creation of the euro require the introduction of greater flexibility in the real economy. Without this, the euro will be unable to yield its positive effects in terms of stability and development. In some measure, this flexibility can be fostered by European decisions as to the completion of liberalisation and the market, but in part (the future of the welfare state, the labour market, taxation) it remains an area of national responsibility. How can we avoid a bizarre version of the prisoners dilemma whereby each partners paralysis reinforces the others?
Lastly, there is the international dimension of economic policy, where two gaping holes remain in EU credibility. The first is the question of who should represent Europe in international relations. The second issue is that of the management of overall commercial relations an area that Nice unfortunately failed to tackle in a satisfactory way.
Making real Europe real
To build the Real Europe, we still need a clearer definition of the borderlines between what is European and what is national, for their leaner and more effective management. European legislation, for example, is well renowned for being both barely comprehensible and excessively bound up in red tape. However, few people realize that this situation is not the fruit of some fiendish institutional design, but rather stems from use of the directive tool, which leaves broad scope to individual states in the national application of the directives. National administrations tend to weigh down the texts of the directives with additional riders, with the result that citizens and operators alike end up being obliged to apply European legislation that is no longer consistent and is additionally burdensome.
The solution is very simple: replace the directives with directly applicable regulations. Of course, this requires acceptance by national parliaments of a strong measure of centralisation. It therefore presupposes a clearer definition of roles. Approached in these terms, European Economic Government is no more than the organisation into a coherent programme of the many and varied tools which the Union already has at its disposal.
What conclusions may we draw for the future of the institutions? The first is the primary responsibility of governments in fulfilling their required educational/informative role in debates at national level. The second conclusion is that Europe will probably have to resign itself to long-term cohabitation with an institutional system based on the co-existence of strong supra-national vs. inter-governmental elements.
The third conclusion is that we are, as ever, dealing with a problem of leadership. As in the past, we must look to a Franco-German accord coordinated with the Commission. Not because of anything magical or inevitable about this combination, but simply because the development of Europe, and above all the interminable process of the UKs taking on board a sense of belonging to Europe and Italys never-ending journey towards the reform of its own political system, mean that there are no other alternatives.
The Franco-German axis has proved a formidable driver, not because it has been based on common interests, but as the fruit of an extraordinary feat of will power, stemming from the awareness of a need. The locomotive has worked so far because it has managed to be the promoter of integration projects, and has avoided tackling Franco-German differences over two key issues: supra-nationality and the relationship with the United States.
This ambiguity has nevertheless taken its toll on the power of the driving engine and has made it increasingly difficult to pull the other carriages with it as the number of members has grown. Hence the growing importance of a dynamic role for the Commission. And hence the absolute need for France to complete its seemingly never-ending process of emergence from Gaullism.
The main weakness of the European Union still lies in the limits of its social and economic project and in incomplete evidence of truly shared, common values. A renewed focus on the Real Europe is the only way to prevent the EU from becoming the victim of a twofold rejection: by those who see results which have failed to match up to expectations, and by those who fear the advent of a power-hungry super-State.
