Identity matters on an individual and group level, as it determines how we see ourselves in relation to others. Identity therefore shapes our behaviour and also the behaviour of others towards us.
The development of a European identity is perhaps now more critical than ever. Looking at the huge transformations Europe has undergone over the last decade, it is easy to forget what this continent was like even 15 years ago, when Europe was still divided, let alone 60 years ago in the middle of the Second World War. It is our responsibility as Europeans to make Europe work, and to remember, as Jorge Semprun does so well what can happen if Europe doesnt work.
Vaclav Havel put it well in a speech to the European Parliament in 1994. He said:
Many people might be left with the understandable impression that the European Union, to put it a bit crudely is no more than endless arguments over how many carrots can be exported from somewhere, who sets the amount, who checks it and who eventually punishes the delinquent who contravenes the regulations. And he goes on:
That is why it seems to me that perhaps the most important task facing the European Union today is to come up with a new and genuinely clear reflection on what might be called European identity, a new articulation of European responsibility, an intensified interest in the very meaning of European integration in all its wider implications for the contemporary world, and the recreation of its ethos, or, if you like, its charisma.
Identity as a social construct
But how is identity created? What are its constituent elements? Identity cannot just be reduced to nationality and place of birth. It has an extremely powerful emotional dimension which is hard to quantify, and subsequently to influence. Identity is not a given, but a complex social construct.
Six interlinked forces play an important role in identity construction.
The family
First, there is the family. Clearly, the way my parents feel about their identity will affect me greatly, whether this is intentional or not, and whether they talk about it or not.
Language
Secondly, there is our language, and, equally importantly, the languages we do not speak. In the Netherlands, the fact that most people are bilingual and many even trilingual says something about their identity and their ability to operate within Europe. Similarly, the lack of motivation in Britain to learn another European language betrays a facet of British identity: the relative unwillingness to think of oneself as European.
Education
Thirdly, the educational system. Schools are an important factor in instilling, even producing identity. Teachers and textbooks generate pronounced forms of regional, national and European identity. Even university research is often reluctant to look beyond national borders; for example, subjects such as history are mostly steeped in a particular national tradition of thought.
Government policy
Fourthly, government policy. Governments provide space for certain identities to flourish. This can happen through educational policies, and through a whole host of cultural policies from giving regional languages official status to exchange programmes for students with other European countries.
Media
Fifthly, there is the media sector. Print and electronic media contribute enormously to the formation of national or regional identities, not only by overtly focusing on them, but also by playing on the emotions of their audiences through the language they use. They help to create shared spaces in which events, emotions and language become common reference points.
Its revealing, for instance, how the British media stresses the foreignness of issues, events and personalities in other parts of Europe, rather than a joint European background. In fact the media in almost every country in Europe remains focused on its own national frame. However, we all face common challenges, from education to transport to health care, but the media very rarely point out the lessons that can be learnt from other European countries.
Icons of identity
Sixth, there is a final composite factor that simultaneously expresses and reinforces identity: the icons of identity explored, among others, by Henrik Stenius. National anthems, national flags and national days are the most obvious national emblems but there are other, unofficial icons: buildings, clothes, food and drink.
Icons give us an emotional sense of belonging, of trust and security. In the UK, the national currency and imperial weights and measures have become icons symbols just as much against Europe as for Britishness.
Looking at these six factors it becomes clear that identity is a product of many processes within our societies, a social construct. We need to be aware of these interwoven processes so that identity can be adapted to the needs of a new Europe.
Three common fallacies
What has been problematic with the issue of identity in Europe comes down to three fallacies:
The belief that identity is essentially unchanging, almost mystical is the first. If you regard something as static, any attempt at interference will be interpreted as a violation: the unchanging becomes the unchangeable.
This approach is deeply ahistoric. Although its proponents generally concede that history has something to do with the formation of a particular identity, they imagine this process to have come to a stop. We all know examples of political parties that have written this into their programme the Front National in France comes to mind. To adapt one of Brechts thoughts you could ask: if the identity no longer corresponds to the people, wouldnt it be better to change the people rather than the identity?
Changes in identity can be gradual as a result of immigration or a changing world role, or they can be very dramatic, as the collapse of communism shows.
Look at South Africa. Despite all the difficulty and continuing problems, the country successfully redefined itself. Ending apartheid and inequality, it became a nation that stood for the development of all, new multiracial identity, and new national symbols. The most important icon, though, was Nelson Mandela. He symbolised in person the new South Africa and its belief in equality and reconciliation.
The second fallacy is to regard identity as a zero sum game. This assumes that there is only a fixed amount of identity available, and that has to be shared out like slices of cake. In terms of regional, national and European identity, this means that any increase in European identity automatically diminishes its regional or national counterparts.
Seen from another perspective, if I do not want my own regional and national identity to be diminished, I cannot agree to a strengthened European identity. This is the attitude of much of the anti-globalisation protests: my identity is threatened by internationalisation as my group is being subsumed into ever larger groups.
But, as Richard Kearney has illustrated in the context of British-Irish relationships, identity is not a zero sum game and it is non-exclusive. We should look at it as several layers which communicate with and enrich each other. One layer does not detract from others, and may even give more prominence to another one.
In a number of European regions regional identity has been boosted by European integration, partly because the regions saw Europe as a way of loosening the links to their nation state. In some areas, such as the economy or defence, the European layer will be relatively strong, in other areas such as education, regional and national identity will become more prominent.
If this is so, the concept of a pure identity becomes counterproductive, failing to recognise the existence of other levels and preventing the cross-fertilisation between them. All the changes that have taken place in European countries after the Second World War in terms of immigration and the multiracial make-up of society changes on a regional and national level must be reflected on the European level. European has never been synonymous with white, and the modern immigration of many people from other continents and cultures has only reinforced the need to rethink Europes relations with the wider world.
The third fallacy is that identity can be imposed from above. The European Union in past decades attempted to introduce a European identity with an anthem and a flag. During the Italian EU presidency in 1995, provision was made to boost European identity in areas of great symbolic value and therefore capable of contributing towards an enhancement of shared community values. Those areas were culture, youth, tourism, education and health care. The single European Act of 1986, which charges the audiovisual policy of the EU with strengthening the European identity, is another example.
But as all these attempts were top down, unease grew within the EU about its democratic legitimacy, its efficiency, its transparency. The concept of the nation state gained renewed strength, since people did not want to accept an identity imposed on them by a European Union they thought of as bureaucratic, wasteful and far removed from the citizen. Reality had caught up with the image-makers.
Building an identity for the 21st century
What kind of European identity should we aim for today? And how should we go about creating it? Enlargement and globalisation make it more important than ever.
As Rosemary Hollis and Heather Grabbe emphasise, the dynamics of enlargement must alter the identity of existing EU member states as well as of accession countries. The identity of EU citizens pre-1989 was characterised by the antagonism between east and west, and by much ignorance about central and eastern Europe. Not much has changed. Few people in the EU today know about their future EU partners in the east. If we remember how much work went into building the driving partnership between France and Germany, the scale of the task becomes apparent. Only through a co-ordinated set of initiatives can knowledge about each other be increased and links established.
A number of initiatives of this kind are already taking place, the different strands of the INTERREG programme for instance. Only by getting to know and by working with other regions and national bodies do we experience Europe. Nothing can replace this practical form of identity building.
Much more needs to be done. The languages and cultures of the new member states must be taught. There should be many more school exchanges. We need to make use of new technology: schools could use the internet to establish a network of partner schools in several countries. The media not just public service broadcasters have a real responsibility to advance our knowledge of the new Europe, in east and west alike.
We also need to be more imaginative in the search for icons of this new Europe. At present the European Union feels distinctly western, with its main institutions in Belgium, Luxembourg and France. At the very least, there needs to be a symbolic counterbalance, making us aware of the enriching effect of integrating the accession countries. This is the first key element in constructing a new identity: embracing the dynamism of enlargement.
The second one is to stress equality and solidarity. Given the huge differences between the regions, this will be crucial in creating a cohesive new Europe in which there are no second class Europeans.
Globalisation forces us to apply these principles beyond European borders. European identity should express this, and not just refer to internal matters. This is made easier by the fact that our populations now have many ethnic components. Europeans of African origin can help us arrive at a new relationship with African countries, one that spreads the benefits of globalisation to those who need it most. This solidarity also has a military dimension, with which European countries are now slowly coming to terms.
The third element in building the identity of the new Europe is to take the concern of the citizen as our point of departure. Politicians all over Europe have come to realise that there is only one remedy against the rise in Euroscepticism and alienation from European institutions: focusing on the benefit Europe brings to its citizens, even if it only improves their lives in the medium and long term.
It should be possible to come up with one declaration of the European Union which starts by talking about its citizens. Have a go, Giscard dEstaing!
