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Behind The Saudi-Qatari spat and the fragmentation of the GCC

The sanctions on Qatar aim to force the government of Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani to alter its foreign policy – particularly regarding its warming relations with Iran.

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People buy food at a supermarket in Doha, capital of Qatar, on June 6, 2017. Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates and Yemen joined Saudi Arabia and Egypt in severing relations with gas-rich Qatar, with Riyadh accusing Doha of supporting groups, including some backed by Iran. Picture by Nikku/Xinhua News Agency/PA Images. All rights reserved. The 5th of June decision by Saudi Arabia (KSA) and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and their allies and proxies – Egypt, Bahrain, the Maldives, Mauritania and rival governments in Libya and Yemen – to sever diplomatic and other links with Qatar can be read as payback for Qatar’s support of the wave of uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa in 2010-2011. It represents, for KSA and UAE, another phase in their process since 2011 to reverse the changes brought about by the uprisings. These had seen the two countries deploy troops to successfully protect the Bahraini monarch, increase their aid to Morocco and Jordan –which were at the time experiencing large protests–, and financially and diplomatically support the Egyptian military’s ouster of president Mohammed Mursi in 2013.

The sanctions on Qatar aim to force the government of Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani to alter its foreign policy – particularly regarding its warming relations with Iran, and to end its financial and political support for Islamist dissidents in the region such as the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas.

The Saudi-led move followed and was encouraged by US President Donald Trump’s visit to KSA in May, and his 21st of May speech in Riyadh where he supported stronger action against Iran, and spoke out against terrorism – including Hamas in his list of terrorist groups.