German chancellor Angela Merkel (CDU) and Prime Minister of Hungary Viktor Orbán. Hannibal Hanschke/Press Association. All rights reserved.Altiero Spinelli, the founder of European federalism, wrote in the ‘Ventotene Manifesto’ (1941) that, “The dividing line between progressive and reactionary parties (…) falls along the line, very new and substantial, that separates the party members into two groups. The first is made up of those who conceive the essential purpose and goal of struggle as the ancient one, that is, the conquest of national political power (…). The second are those who see the creation of a solid international State as the main purpose; they will direct popular forces toward this goal, and, having won national power, will use it first and foremost as an instrument for achieving international unity.”
In essence, Spinelli was writing about a division between ‘nationalism’ and ‘federalism’. These days, 76 years since Spinelli (with the help of fellow prisoners Rossi and Colorni) jotted down his Manifesto; nationalism is again centre stage, while the idea of ‘federalism’ (or, more broadly, that of political integration) has been eroded by the malfunctioning and woes of the European Union (EU). Together with the decline of inter (and supra-) national institutions, however, nationalism is corroding the quality of democracy itself. For the sake of simplicity, let us divide the western world (and Europe) into ‘West’ and ‘East’, older and newer democracies.
For more than twenty years Western Europe has witnessed the rise of populist nationalisms. The faces of Geert Wilders, Marine Le Pen, Matteo Salvini, Nigel Farage and their likes are by now well-known and familiar to many, in the media, academia, and of course among voters. We have been reassured about their democratic credentials and respect for the ‘rules of the game’, but how far can we trust them? Can we trust somebody (Geert Wilders), who has repeatedly called for the ban of the Koran? How far has Marine Le Pen truly cut ties with her father’s legacy? Intolerance, racism, nationalism, criticism of ‘European values’ can hardly co-exist with democratic values and institutions, particularly at times of persistent economic crisis. Parties and politicians can pay lip service to democracy, but their real choice and actions will be influenced by the conditions they are living in (the ‘structures’ of so much social theory…). Furthermore, populist nationalism is also the outcome of the weaknesses of ruling classes which have too often chosen the not-so-democratic (yet comfortable!) option of ‘grand coalitions’, which in a sense are the degeneration of Spinelli’s ‘pro-international’ forces.
