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Explaining the jihadi threat in Tunisia

We must say that this scenario is both similar to and different from those in other countries of the region where authoritarian regimes fell in 2011.

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Demonstrations in front of the Bardo museum,March 19, 2015.
Demonstrations in front of the Bardo museum,March 19, 2015.

Demonstrations in front of the Bardo museum,March 19, 2015.Demotix/ Hamideddine Bouali. All rights reserved.Wednesday, March 18, a few days before the Easter holiday for European and western countries, a jihadi attack struck in the middle of the capital of Tunisia. Because this action was perpetrated in an area in which the Parliament and the famous Bardo museum are very close to each other, it is not clear whether the jihadi strike was directed at the Taghout (the Tyrant in Quranic language) or at the tourists-Kafiryn (the western unbelievers). Independently of any original plan, at the end of the day the official death toll was of 23 victims, the majority of whom are foreigners.

The first clue to understanding the dynamic and motivation behind the attack comes from the jihadis themselves. This is an official statement that appeared on the official Okba ibn Nafaa media website « Ifriqiya ». The second is a recorded audio statement made by the Islamic State, blessing the operation. The first communiqué was written in a very `strange` style, because very familiar in its language and formulation, describing the way the operation had developed and ironically addressing itself to those official Tunisian authorities and media that they supposed must be wondering about the « mysterious » dynamics of the operation. For those writing the statement, it appears this was just as simple as taking the metro, going past a police station in Bardo and entering the parliamentarians’ compound. A way of saying « don’t bother to dig deep for an explanation, it was just as simple as that ». The second ISIS statement was short and not in the form of a denunciation but rather a blessing conferred on the action that had taken place.

These few elements give us some indication of the operation, and permit an attempt at analysis, albeit with a certain degree of caution. The  first conclusion to be drawn is that the operation is likely to be coming from the group Okba Ibn Nefaa, a not very well identified katiba (brigade) of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). That would not be a surprise since the group has been in a declared state of war against the Tunisian state (Taghout) since at least 2013. We don`t know exactly the strategy of this group, but we can deduce some elements from experience, their communiqués, and initial security inquiries. It is indeed a jihadi group, very small in origin, located at the frontier between Algeria and Tunisia. Some sources believe this group to have emerged  during and in the aftermath of the Azawad Islamic state in Mali. Composed mostly of Algerians, other nationalities had also integrated themselves into it after a while. It seems that the reason for participation in this group in particular was no more than the need to relocate after the defeat in Mali. According to security sources, the group had a role in helping with the logistics on behalf of those who wanted to go to Mali and who needed arms supplies for that purpose.