
War photographer John Cantlie in the Pech valley, Afghanistan June 2012. Wikimedia Commons/Unknown. Some rights reserved.Hostage-taking has recently been a major issue in the war against terrorist insurgent groups in Africa and the Middle East. The position held by the UK Government is that one should never bargain with hostage-takers. The government’s view is that any other position is foolish in that it only encourages more hostage-taking. However, whether you believe this policy to be desirable or not, there is something strange and misplaced about the intransigence with which it is held.
First, let’s assume that the hostage-takers are bargaining in good faith: that they will hand over the hostage to the government in return for money or perhaps in exchange for prisoners that the home government – or a third party – holds. It is the duty of the government to safeguard its own citizens and it is prepared to invest in order to reduce their likelihood of death, in automobile accidents for example. Therefore it would seem reasonable at least to consider whether some form of exchange should take place with hostage-takers. It would seem sensible if the government were prepared to pay, say, £50k to reduce expected deaths on a dangerous stretch of road by one, or spend the same money on a surgical procedure that would save one life, that they should be prepared to pay the same fee to release a hostage.
However, the government’s viewpoint is that such a policy is weak and counterproductive because it simply fuels more hostage-taking. The argument is a 'rule utilitarian' one and is rigorously developed in game theory. The argument is as follows. Hostage-taking is costly and dangerous for terrorists. Hostages must be guarded, fed, and perhaps moved frequently in order to evade the SAS. If the government adopts a rule that it never pays a ransom, then this will deter any hostage-taking because there is a positive cost but no monetary return to the hostage-taker. If the government can credibly claim that it will always act tough and never pay the ransom, this policy then takes on the magic property of allowing the government to never actually have to act tough, because no one will take hostages.