Excerpted from ‘ISIL, JAN, and the war economy in Syria,’ by Rim Turkmani, (LSE, 2015), which is based on original empirical research drawing on interviews with a range of respondents who live both inside and outside ISIL held areas in Syria. It explores how the collapse of the state and the spread of the war economy enable ISIL’s expansion and JAN’s infiltration in Syria with particular focus on ISIL and presents options to counter this dynamic.
Demotix/Björn Kietzmann. All rights reserved.One of the least discussed aspects of ISIL is its practice of governance. ISIL’s governance highlights a pragmatic side backed up by effective planning, and is informed by an awareness of the impact that poor governance would have on its ability to hold on to power. Governance is more important to ISIL than JAN because the sole control of territory is at the core of ISIL’s vision. It seeks to impose itself as the only legitimate actor, the state, the actor who has monopoly over violence and the only one in charge of the public good as it defines it. It thus assumes responsibility for governance, which in itself becomes a way for ISIL to reinforce its control. Its reputation for governance, centred on security provision and delivery of basic services, is a key recruiting tool not only for fighters but also for civilians to move to or remain in their areas. The local populations in areas under ISIL control fear the consequences of rising up against the new oppressor but also see no urgent need to, as they are frequently more secure under ISIL control.
ISIL enters areas afflicted by weak governance, an active war economy and ongoing conflict with the intention of changing this situation and imposing control. This is done not for the benefit of the people but as a means to ensure longevity of its rule. The imposition of law and order is always the first priority. This ensures that like a state, ISIL has a monopoly on the legitimate use of force. No other parties are permitted to carry weapons, with the exception of tribes that have sworn allegiance to them and were allowed to keep their arms under the condition that they are not used against ISIL. Unlike in the rest of Syria, there are no rival militias or any other form of power to rival the dominant one in ISIL-controlled areas. As a proto-state ISIL provides its own police, security services and even its own intelligence. Robbery, extortion and murder are reported to have almost disappeared in ISIL-controlled areas. Even tribal disputes seem to have decreased.
