After watching the first presidential debate between Sen. John McCain and Sen. Barack Obama, one of the only lasting thoughts on my mind was how over-simplified they present the ongoing conflicts in Georgia to the American public, and how dead wrong they both are in seeking to address them.
They are both correct in stating their support for the Georgian people and their young democracy in the face of Russian expansionism, and that the disproportionate (and perhaps premeditated) military actions of the Russian Federation during August must be strongly addressed. Furthermore, they are both correct in promising Georgia assistance for humanitarian and reconstruction purposes. After all, Georgia is an important ally in the region, and her friendship must not be abandoned.
However, that is not whole story.
The conflict that erupted in South Ossetia in August, very well could have started in Abkhazia earlier in the year. These regions have been involved in two very unique secession struggles with the central government in Tbilisi since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The fact that these regions continue to provide sparks of violence in the volatile Caucasus is testament to the failure of international and Georgian policies towards them.
The attempts to reunite Georgia according to its Soviet borders have over the last fifteen years have focused on 1) isolating South Ossetia and Abkhazia from the outside world, 2) refusing to recognize the legitimate concerns of the local populations, 3) incorrectly addressing the conflict as solely and primarily between Russia and Georgia, and by 4) stubbornly following dogmatic policies long after they have already shown themselves to be failures.
The next American president, together with the efforts from European allies, must address these failed strategies of the past in order to prevent the West (and Georgia for that matter) from stumbling into an expanded war in the Caucasus.
During the debate McCain told the American people a story regarding his trip to South Ossetia, where he described a billboard proclaiming Vladimir Putin "Our President." For those unfamiliar with the situation this may have been frighteningly demonstrative of the Russian aggression against the Georgian people. However, Saakashvili must not have explained to McCain that the Ossetians are first and foremost not ethnically a Georgian people, and furthermore, that they endured a horrendous war initiated by the Georgians in 1991. The latter of these reasons especially explains why South Ossetians hold the goal of reuniting not with the Georgian state, but rather with their ethnic brothers in North Ossetia, who happen to lie within the Russian Federation.
Furthermore, McCain-who has never been to Abkhazia-seems to lump together the differing goals of South Ossetian and Abkhaz leadership. In Abkhazia, you will not find posters proclaiming Putin as their president, and you will not hear the similar desires to join Russia. Abkhaz also fought a vicious war with the Georgians, and given their long and complicated past under Georgian leadership (including Josef Stalin) desire nothing less than their full independence. Joining Russia, with whom their past is equally tragic, is not an option for the Abkhaz.
McCain, however, believes that once South Ossetians and Abkhaz get a taste of freedom-which in his mind means living under the Georgian flag-they will realize they were wrong in their own ambitions all along. In his ignorance of history, though, McCain "fails to understand" the constant, perceived threat from Georgia that these territories live under.
An Abkhaz official once wrote to me, "There are two faces of Saakashvili: one is looking West and looks pretty, liberal, and nice. Another face is looking at Abkhazia and it is deceitful and aggressive."
Obama, for his part, twice raised the issue of Russian peacekeepers in the regions. He stated that Russian peacekeeping forces in Georgia prior to the conflict "made no sense whatsoever," and called for their replacement with a more international force. While the internationalization of peacekeepers in the conflict zones is not in and of itself a misguided proposal (although the peacekeepers in South Ossetia are already a mixed force), it has long been clear the Abkhaz and South Ossetians are more comfortable with Russian protection. Proposed changes in peacekeeping formats are seen as a way of removing their only shield of defense against Georgian military action.
He also proclaimed that the Russians must abide by the six-point ceasefire agreement, and pull out from South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The latter statement shows Obama is similar to McCain in not fully examining the conflicts' history, as they fully warrant. In the recent years, Russia has been the only supporting ally of the regions and now they seek to be under a Russian military umbrella-much like Georgia desires to be under NATO.
While the two candidates for president may be seemingly instep with each other on the American relationship with Georgia, their significant differences with respect towards the use of diplomacy would suggest that both would not continue the current approach in resolving the ongoing disputes Georgia holds with South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
McCain mirrors Saakashvili in choosing to deal only with one's allies. On the other hand, Obama is a proponent of inclusion and the utility of talking to adversaries. McCain's philosophy has been amply applied in the Caucasus over the last decade and a half, and the results were seen in August. The impact Obama's would have is, of course, unpredictable and yet to be seen.
Although, after fifteen years of failing to outreach to the Abkhaz and South Ossetians, Georgian dreams of a reunified country may have already been lost. What remains uncertain is whether an Obama presidency would attempt to open up to these regions in order to improve their living conditions-without the preconditions of them rejoining Georgia precipitously.
