Taksim Square, July 24. CHP supporters stand under Turkish flags, including portrait of Ataturk, founder of modern Kemalist Turkey. Petros Kardjias / Press Association. All rights reserved.European reports about the developments in Turkey since July 15 are quite equivocal: the attempted coup was the beginning of the end of what had been left of Turkish democracy since AKP came to power in 2002, since Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was elected prime minister in 2003, and since he became president in 2014.
Without a doubt, the growing authoritarianism of the Turkish government is real and worrying. Since July 15, tens of thousands of security personnel, judges, academics, journalists etc. have been discharged and/or detained. Many universities, schools, publishing houses, newspapers, radio stations and online media outlets have been closed down. Employees of Turkish universities are currently not allowed to leave the country, some cannot even cross the boundaries of the city they live in. The state of emergency provides the Turkish government with the liberty to extend pre-trial custody, to search civilians, to impose curfews, curb the consumption of alcohol, limit private festivities and so forth. All of this is catastrophic and sends the signal that president Erdoğan aims to consolidate his power with ever growing authoritarianism.
But the inner-Turkish discussion of the attempted coup and its aftermath consists of more than the "being against Erdoğan" which dominates European interpretations of the developments. In fact, it is much more nuanced than this black and white perspective. I believe that it is only on the basis of a full understanding of both perspectives that adequate answers can be developed to the question how the relationship between Europe and Turkey should be shaped in the future. That is, if the answer is not merely aimed inwards, towards Europe, but also wants to include those who are suffering most from the attempted coup and its aftermath, namely the population of Turkey.
