A report from the South Waziristan Institute of Strategic Hermeneutics to the al-Qaida Strategic Planning Cell (SPC) on the progress of the campaign.
Thank you for inviting us to provide a further analysis of your present situation and future prospects. We understand that this is request arises primarily from the speech of President Barack Obama in Cairo on 4 June 2009, as well as from the current offensive of the Pakistani army into the Swat valley and adjacent areas.
You have, as before, made clear that you wish us to be frank, especially as we build on our earlier analysis of the impact of the Obama presidency ( in, for example, "The SWISH Report (12)" [6 November 2008] and "The SWISH Report (14)" [9 April 2009]). We appreciate that our last report was only two months ago, and we understand that some of our earlier comments have resulted in an intense debate within your group. We are pleased that, in such circumstances, you are willing to hear us further develop our analysis.
We begin with a brief outline of some of the key elements of our earlier analyses:
* We suggested that much of your success in the period 2001-08 was due more to the policies and approaches of the George Bush administration, and less to the prowess of your movement
* We advised you in October 2008 that a John McCain administration would be the desirable outcome in terms of the continued development of your movement
* We therefore recommended that you intervene in the election to help ensure this result, but you did not do so in the manner suggested
We concluded in our most recent report, on 9 April, that you had a difficult period ahead - but that some advantages remained:
* The Iraq conflict was far from over
* There were promising developments in Somalia and parts of north Africa
* The Obama administration's emphasis on Pakistan and Afghanistan was likely to prove useful
* Obama cannot serve more than eight years, whereas your movement measures its aims and expectations in many decades.
The Cairo speech
As we expected, the style of the Barack Obama administration has been radically different from that of his predecessor. This was particularly noticeable in the speech he gave in Egypt, delivered to a capacity audience in the great hall of the University of Cairo.
This was an effective performance that combined oratorical skill with clever content, not least in terms of extensive quotations from the holy Qur'an. The United States president expressed relatively strong support for the Palestinians and was indirectly critical of those regimes across the middle east that you despise and seek to replace. Of less concern to you was his focus on human rights, the role of women and the need for economic development; but we should warn you that all of these elements will have resonated with peoples across the region.
You will remember that our earlier assessments included the judgment that the greatest effect of an Obama presidency would be the change in style. We have to say that the Cairo speech was clear confirmation of this. You should be concerned at the impact of this development because it will tend to diminish support for you, even if there is no great shift in US policy itself towards the region.
This leads us to examine core elements of that policy as they relate to your aims.
Israel
While Obama's was unambiguous in stating the United States's strong backing for Israel, his open recognition of the Palestinian situation and his implied criticism of Israel policies do represent a significant change. Israel is countering this with an intense focus on Iran, seeking to portray the Tehran regime as the major threat which must take precedence over any prospect of negotiations with the Palestinians.
We are writing this report in advance of the first round of the Iranian presidential election, but we must say that if a reformist candidate emerges as the winner at the end of the process, then in the eyes of the United States this will diminish the salience of Israel's concerns. In that event, a lessening of the so-called "existential threat" will mean that Israel will have little option but to succumb to pressure from the United States to make progress in negotiations. This will be singularly bad news for your movement. Much, therefore, depends on the result of the election in Iran - and this is something over which you have no influence.
Iraq
Against the background of talk about political progress, violence persists in Iraq. This is, in general terms, good for you in that it is likely to ensure a slowing of the US withdrawal and a continuation of what is widely seen across the region as foreign occupation. You are no doubt facilitating the maintenance of the violence, but you should not underestimate the determination of the Obama administration to maintain the planned rate of withdrawal. Once again, the performance of this new administration is not helpful to you.
Afghanistan and Pakistan
We now come to the core issue of our latest assessment, and - even if it makes for uncomfortable reading - it is an area where we must be absolutely open with you.
Your Taliban associates have expanded their activities across southern and eastern Afghanistan and northwestern Pakistan, to the extent that large swathes of Afghanistan are under their control; as are significant areas of the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). The United States is reacting by means of a troop "surge" in Afghanistan, and by putting very strong pressure on the Islamabad regime to target the militias in NFWP and possibly even FATA.
The US surge may have some effect and the actions of the Pakistani army are pushing back Taliban and other militias and forcing them to disperse. We do not expect this US military effort to wrest control of much of Afghanistan from your associates. Nor do we expect the Pakistani army to be able to consolidate its recent gains (which may, in any case, be greatly exaggerated). In both cases your associates are playing it long.
What is apparent, though, is that when your partners take control of territory they are initially welcomed by local populations because of the order they bring, but that the rigidity of their rule means that within months they tend to lose popularity. This is similar to the experience in Afghanistan between 1996 and 2001, although the timescales are longer. When the Taliban took over most of Afghanistan in the mid-1990s they were widely welcomed on account of the stability and order that followed, in marked contrast to the warlordism and banditry that had previously been in place. Yet within five years they were becoming disliked and even detested.
We appreciate that you would argue that the form of Islamist governance that your movement would seek to install might be somewhat more sophisticated than that of your Taliban associates, but we are far from convinced of this. We therefore suggest to you that, should you succeed in taking control of populations in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Somalia or elsewhere, it is unlikely that your current theological and political intentions can be translated into sustainable rule.
You will perhaps appreciate that this analysis fits with our long-held assessment that much of your perceived success so far has been due to the incompetence and stupidity of your western opponents rather than the quality of your movement's strategy.
Prospects
We would add, however, that this does not mean that you are facing defeat. Far from it. For we suggest that without a thorough reappraisal of its policies in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the Obama administration will continue to present you with a "far enemy" that consistently aids recruitment to your cause. What we are saying is that you are unlikely to get further than a protracted war. You are, in other words, unlikely on present trends to ever move towards that Islamist caliphate that you so desire.
In this light, and if this analysis is accepted by you, you may well decide that it will be necessary to modify and perhaps moderate the nature of the Islamist rule that you would introduce. We are, however, unconvinced that your leadership is capable of making such a change - however intelligent, thoughtful and experienced your own strategic planning cell may be. Your current dilemma, as a professional strategy group, is twofold: first, that your movement requires a forceful, determined and not very intelligent enemy, which can no longer be guaranteed; and that your chosen approach is governed by powerful violence while your political follow-through is, on current evidence, unsustainable.
This does not mean that "the war on terror" (as your far enemy terms it) is coming to an end. Again, far from it: we see it lasting many years yet. But we also see it eventually fading away in, from your perspective, ultimate failure.
How, then, might you be viewed by, say, 2060? On present trends we anticipate that the international-security context will then be one of massive inequalities of wealth in an environmentally constrained global system in which transnational elites endeavour to maintain control in the face of desperate anti-elite movements and insurgencies. These will be diverse, both in their origins and in their ideologies and belief systems. Some may well be modelled on your movement. In that event, your final destiny might prove to be seen as an early symptom of a global trend that goes far beyond one religious tradition, rather than a phenomenon of great note in its own right. Your movement will be a footnote rather than the substance of history.
We recognise that such an analysis goes well beyond the remit that you gave us, and you may well find it easy to reject. However, should you wish us to develop it further we would, rest assured, be happy to oblige.
Wana
South Waziristan
11 June 2009
This is the fifteenth report openDemocracy has published from the South Waziristan Institute of Strategic Hermeneutics (SWISH). Ten have advised al-Qaida, two the British governments of Tony Blair and Gordon Brown, one the United States state department, and one the incoming Barack Obama administration:
"The SWISH Report" (14 July 2004) - to al-Qaida:
"The immediate requirement...is therefore to aid, in any way within the framework of your core values, the survival of the Bush administration."
"The SWISH Report (2)" (13 January 2005) - to al-Qaida:
"You are... in the early stages of a decades-long confrontation, and early ‘success' should not in any way cause you to underestimate the problems that lie ahead."
"The SWISH Report (3)" (19 May 2005) - to the British government:
"We believe that disengagement from Iraq, more emphasis on post-conflict reconstruction in Afghanistan, and vigorous diplomacy in support of a two-state Israel/Palestine solution offer you the best short-term hope of avoiding further damage to your government's credibility in relation to the United States-led war on terror."
"The SWISH Report (4)" (1 September 2005) - to the United States state department:
"What we find quite extraordinary is the manner in which the full extent of your predicament in Iraq is still not appreciated by your political leadership."
"The SWISH Report (5)" (2 February 2006) - to al-Qaida:
"The greatest risk to your movement is that the opinions of some of the sharper analysts on both sides of the Atlantic begin to transcend those of the political and religious fundamentalists that currently dominate the scene. If that were to happen, then you could be in serious trouble within two or three years."
"The SWISH Report (6)" (7 September 2006) - to al-Qaida:
"(The) influence of your movement and your leader is considerable, but you are not in control of your own strategy; rather, you form just one part of a wider process that is as diffuse and unpredictable as it is potent. You could point to the United States failure to control its global war on terror and you would be correct to do so. You could then claim that it is your own movement that is setting the pace - but you would be wrong. The truly revealing development of recent months is that we have reached a point, five years after 9/11 where no one, but no one, is in control."
"The SWISH Report (7)" (7 December 2006) - to al-Qaida:
"In Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as across the wider middle east, it is the power and influence of the United States that is in crisis. Your movement may not be entirely coherent and the overall circumstances may be more complex than a few months ago, but it probably has greater potential for enhancement and further development than at any time in the past five years."
"The SWISH Report (8)" (16 May 2007) - to the British government:
"Radical changes in your policies in relation to Iraq and Israel are essential, together with a review of policy options for Afghanistan. More generally, you must start the process of reorientating political and security thinking towards the real long-term global challenges."
"The SWISH Report (9)" (29 November 2007) - to al-Qaida:
"Our broad conclusions are that your prospects are good. Developments in Iraq should not worry you; events in Afghanistan and Pakistan are markedly positive for you; and the work of your associates elsewhere, including north Africa, are a bonus.
We do have to confess to one concern that may surprise you...In a number of western countries the issue of global climate change is rising rapidly up the political agenda and one of the effects of this is to begin to make some analysts and opinion-formers question the western addiction to oil."
"The SWISH Report (10)" (29 February 2008) - to al-Qaida
"It is said that revolutions change merely the accents of the elites, and we fear that such would be the consequence of your movement coming to power. A lack of flexibility would lead to unbending pursuit of a false purity that would decay rapidly into a bitter autocracy, leading quite possibly to a counter-revolution.
If you really want to succeed then you have to engage in thinking that goes far beyond what appear to be the limits and flaws of your current analysis. We would be happy to assist, but we doubt that your leadership will be willing to allow us to do so. We therefore submit this as possibly our last report."
"The SWISH Report (11)" (11 September 2008) - to al-Qaida
"In any case, whatever his actual policies, we most certainly would expect under an Obama presidency a marked change in style towards a more listening, cooperative and multilaterally - engaged America. That must be of deep concern to you. A more ‘acceptable' America in global terms is the last thing you want"
"The SWISH Report (12)" (6 November 2008) - to al-Qaida
"If the far enemy began to lose interest in your core region, then your movement really would be in trouble. We will explore this further in a later report; but at this stage, we would suggest that this could emerge as the most potent threat to your movement."
"The SWISH Report (13.1)" (8 December 2008) & "The SWISH Report (13.2)" (15 December 2008) - to the Obama Transition Team:
"(The) standing of the United States across the middle east and southwest Asia is much diminished and its military forces are mired in a dangerous and long-term conflict in Afghanistan that is exacerbated by major problems in Pakistan. We do not believe that victory has been achieved (or will soon be achieved) in Iraq; and we hold that the al-Qaida movement has been dispersed into a loose network that is and will remain extremely difficult to counter.
We are aware that our advice in three of the four major aspects covered in this report - Israel-Palestine, Iraq and Afghanistan-Pakistan - is considerably more radical than anything you currently propose; but you have requested our advice and we have given it. We acknowledge that to accept it is much to ask of you, perhaps especially because it represents a very different outlook not just from the neo-conservative vision of a "new American century" but from some of the assertive realists that you have already invited into your administration."
"The SWISH Report (14)" (9 April 2009) - to al-Qaida:
"(The) conflict in Iraq has enabled thousands of young paramilitaries to travel to Iraq to get combat experience against highly trained and well-armed US troops in an urban environment. This has proved a far better training-ground than was available to these fighters' predecessors who were engaged in fighting low-morale Soviet conscripts in rural Afghanistan in the 1980s. The impact and effectiveness of this new generation of paramilitaries on the future of your mission is difficult to predict, but our Washington office informs us that this outcome is clearly understood among thoughtful military analysts and is causing considerable concern."
