Afghanistan is currently experiencing a resurgence of insurgent activity in the south and east of the country. Recently the violence has also spread to provinces traditionally considered "stable". In May, a suicide attack killed three German soldiers in the northern province of Kunduz, thousands of miles from the Taliban strongholds in Kandahar.
To date, the international response to the violence in Afghanistan has been overwhelmingly military, contrary to the best practice taught by theorists of counter-insurgency.
Marcus Skinner is a research analyst at the Centre for Conflict and Peace Studies in Kabul, Afghanistan.
His research concentrates on state building and counter-insurgency, post conflict development and government legitimacy.While the military pursuit of insurgents in Afghanistan may win battles, it will not win the war. In dealing with any insurgency, the local population constitutes the centre of gravity. Without their support, military victory may be obtainable (as in the French experience in Algeria), but abiding political victory will be impossible; and without winning the battle for political support, long-term stability is a fantasy.
Local support
So how do you win the support of the people? First, by showing an appreciation of the social and cultural sensitivities of the region in which forces are operating; second, by ensuring security; and finally, by improving economic conditions through providing services such as water and electricity.
In Afghanistan, such social and economic infrastructure has struggled to emerge. Outside Kabul, and particularly in the south and east where the greatest insurgent activity is taking place, the results of the $13 billion spent on reconstruction in the past six years are hard to see. In contrast, the military side of the counterinsurgency is very conspicuous. Air bombing campaigns and other operations are killing more and more civilians. Aggressive house searches conducted by the international troops have become commonplace.
If the counter-insurgency is to succeed, it is crucial to develop a better understanding of the impact these acts are having on the wider battle for popular support. Reducing the number of civilian casualties is obviously important. But international forces must first develop a better understanding of Afghan society, and the social implications of military actions.
The civilian toll
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"Tackling the Taliban"One of the most shocking cases to date has been a strike order by troops acting under the mandate of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), which operates under different rules of engagement than the NATO forces. In Shindand, western Afghanistan, near the border with Iran, at least 49 civilians were killed and 2,000 left homeless.
The nature of counter-insurgent conflict in Afghanistan makes civilian casualties inevitable and their reduction difficult. On the one hand, the Taliban's ability to blend with the civilian population and conduct guerilla attacks makes it hard to isolate insurgent targets. On the other hand, the international force, lacking support back home (particularly in Europe and Canada), cannot tolerate the negative publicity generated by the death of its soldiers.
As a result, the military response so far has been to rely on the blunt, removed force of air power. However, in a collective society like Afghanistan, which places greater emphasis on familial loyalty and unity, such operations seriously erode local support for the international forces, and alienate potential local supporters.
As the MP Khalid Farooqi has pointed out, "If they bomb a whole village just to get one insurgent, they will create more enemies for themselves. And once the people stand against them, it will be very hard to control the situation". Senator Khan, representing Helmand, has likewise warned that rising civilian casualties are leading to increased support for the Taliban.
Raids and searches
More regular, and in some ways more damaging than bombing raids, have been the aggressive house and personnel searches conducted by the international forces.
These activities trample on personal and communal Afghan codes. It is especially crucial for the military operating in Afghanistan, and particularly in the southern provinces, to understand the importance of Pashtunwali, the social code shared by many Pashtuns.
Honour, the sanctity of the household, and the interior place of women - often not even to be seen by other men - are important for many Pashtuns. Equally significant is respect for those who hold power in specific communities such as Mullahs or village elders.
House and personnel searches violate this code and produce feelings of guilt, shame and loss of honour. This in turn strengthens resentment for the international forces, and changes people's attitudes towards the international presence.
By contrast, the Taliban, who appear to respect these codes, are able to maintain the support of the civilians, exploiting western mistakes for the purposes of propaganda. One of the most commonly used images in Taliban propaganda shows an American soldier searching an Afghan woman.
Damaging consequences
The impact of these practices is well illustrated by recent incidents in Nagarhar province, where members of the Provincial Council complained to the UN that foreign troops were conducting operations and searching houses with little concern for civilian security and local traditions. Maulvi Abdul Aziz Khairkhwah, a member of the council, said that the unwarranted searches were fuelling the continued security troubles in the province.
Consequently, if the ongoing campaign against the Taliban is to succeed, it is vital to develop a deeper sensitivity to the mores of Afghan people. Military operations must be conducted with a degree of respect for traditions, via established channels of authority such as village elders. By engaging in dialogue with these respected figures and gaining their support, the international forces will gain greater credibility.
Although such measures will not guarantee the complete support of the people, many of whom take exception to the mere presence of international forces, they will go some way to winning over wary hearts and minds. If this can be achieved, NATO, US and Afghan forces will find the civilian population more accommodating and supportive of their efforts to overcome the Taliban, and the counter-insurgency may actually begin to succeed where recently it has only struggled.
