As UK public spending continues to be slashed, the defence lobby is out in force at Westminster, seeking similar protection to that afforded to budgets for health and international development. The British army could be cut to a complement not seen for 250 years. The repeated pledge by the prime minister, David Cameron, to oppose any further troop cuts rings hollow in light of a report this week from Malcolm Chalmers of the Royal United Services Institute. Even with a ring-fenced budget for the Ministry of Defence—highly unlikely given the current public-spending environment—troop numbers would probably have to fall by 15,000 over the next five years.
We will get a sense of parliamentary opinion this week when the House of Commons debates defence spending today. The defence lobby is likely to be pleased with the result but the vote will have no direct consequence and little impact on party leaderships. Public opinion generally shows a weak attachment to defence spending, one that dissipates further when faced with the challenging opportunity costs arising elsewhere.
So when the pressure is on, why does the UK’s ‘independent nuclear deterrent’ appear to enjoy absolute protection from cuts, when it will soon take up 10% of the defence budget and around 35% of the procurement budget? The answer can be found in the many myths surrounding the system.
