An Iraqi friend in Turkey said recently that he can smell war out there. This comes after the major attack by the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) on 7 October 2007, which killed thirteen soldiers near a town in Sirnak province, about thirty kilometres inside the Turkish border. Turkey has moved about 100,000 troops with heavy equipment to its borders with Iraq. On 17 October, the Turkish parliament authorised a military raid into Iraq in an attempt to eliminate bases used by Kurdish militants.
Safa A Hussein works in the Iraqi National Security Council. He is a former deputy member of the dissolved Iraqi Governing Council, and earlier served as a brigadier-general in the Iraqi air force and as director of a research and development centre
This article was first published in BitterLemons.org
The extraordinary media coverage and focus on PKK activities and Turkish military deployments has contributed to generating tremendous public pressure on the Turkish government to stage an offensive against the PKK in its northern Iraqi "safe haven". Four questions arise. Is this only about PKK attacks, or are there other factors behind the crisis? What options does Turkey have? If there were a Turkish intervention, how big would it be? What would be its objectives?
Nation, region, nation
The PKK with its history of terrorist activities and its announced objective of establishing a Kurdish state on Turkish soil is undoubtedly considered a major threat to Turkey's national security. It incites extensive aggressive nationalist feelings among Turks. But three additional important factors are relevant as well.
First, Turkish domestic politics. A number of attacks earlier in 2007 - including a suicide-bombing in Ankara on 22 May and a bombing in Istanbul on 10 June - have played directly into the hands of the military and members of the ultra-secularist political opposition, who are using the PKK issue to show the Turkish electorate that the ruling Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi (Justice & Development Party / AKP) is unable to contain the Kurdish threat.
Also in openDemocracy on the Turkey-PKK crisis:
Soner Cagaptay, "Turkey and the Kurds: everybody's problem" (5 November 2007) Second, the geopolitical issue. The Turks oppose the creation of an independent Kurdish state (or highly autonomous Kurdish region) in Iraq because they feel it would encourage Kurdish separatism in Turkey. About 15 million Kurds live in Turkey, comprising 20% of its population and making them the second largest ethnic group. This number forms roughly 55% of the world's Kurds.
Then too, the geopolitical fallout from the demise of Saddam Hussein's regime in Baghdad is beginning to crystallise in northern Iraq. "A vacuum was formed in northern Iraq and that vacuum became practically a camp for terrorist activity", stated then Turkish foreign minister (now president), Abdullah Gul. This situation is similar in some ways to the vacuum created in 1991 after the defeat of Saddam in the first Gulf war, which generated a four-year-long civil war among the Iraqi Kurds, in which both Iran and Turkey intervened.
Also in openDemocracy on Turkish politics after the Iraq war:
Murat Belge, "The Turkish refusal" (20 May 2003)
Katinka Barysch, "Turkey and the European Union: don't despair"(27 November 2006)
Gunes Murat Tezcur, "Turkey divided: politics, faith and democracy" (4 May 2007)
George Schöpflin, "Turkey's crisis and the European Union" (23 July 2007)
Gunes Murat Tezcur, "Turkey's political opening" (24 July 2007) Third, the Iraqi Kurdish regional government (KRG) hasn't acted against the PKK. The KRG may want to oppose PKK actions, but may not wish to risk moving toward civil war among the Kurds. Perhaps more important, the Iraqi Kurdish leaders see the crisis as presenting them with some valuable bargaining power vis-a-vis Turkey.
The strategic menu
Thus, Turkey has only two options: military and diplomatic. The diplomatic option means in practice negotiating for Iraqi Kurd assistance against the PKK. This could include preventing the PKK from using Iraqi soil, arresting its leaders, and an end to logistical support and all PKK activities inside Iraq. But negotiations would not be easy; the Iraqi Kurds would demand a high price from Ankara: formal recognition of the Kurdish-administered north of Iraq as part of the federal state of Iraq and of the KRG's representatives. It might also include withdrawing Turkish opposition to the inclusion of oil- rich Kirkuk as part of the Kurdish self-rule region. Thus far, Turkey has been bargaining overtly with the Baghdad government alone.
The military option may take the form of a major or limited incursion. A major incursion is not likely. True, Turkey has an army of half a million troops equipped with Nato-standard arms and backed by air support. The PKK, meanwhile, is estimated to have some 4,000 lightly-armed fighters in Iraq. But its base in the harsh, mountainous terrain of northern Iraq denies the Turks the capacity to maximise their superiority. If there were a conflict, it would most likely be fought on the guerrillas' terms. Also, a major incursion could destabilise the neighbouring section of Turkey, where an estimated 10 million Kurds live. It would also disrupt Turkish trade with Iraq, which amounts to more than $5 billion dollars. Such an incursion at this time would be opposed by Iran, the European Union and the United States.
A limited incursion is more likely. Turkish troops may move into Iraq to create buffer-zones and forward operating bases against Kurdish attacks and to pressure the KRG when the need arises. There was a precedent for such a move during the 1990s. In addition, Turkey may launch "hot-pursuit" operations inside Iraq. Such a limited incursion would serve as a signal to both Kurds and Americans that there are limits beyond which Turkey is not prepared to go. It would also put Turkish troops in a position to exercise control in the region in the event that the situation in Iraq gets completely out of hand.
