Reconstructing the ‘War on Terror’

The fifth anniversary of the 9/11 attacks is, first and foremost, an occasion on which to commemorate the victims of that terrible tragedy. However, it is also an opportunity to reflect on what has happened since. No surprise, then, that the newspapers are full of balance sheets which evaluate the failings and accomplishments of the ‘war on terror’, declared by the United States shortly after the Twin Towers came down. In President Bush’s view, the ‘war on terror’ has been a success, because there haven’t been any further attacks in the United States, and because Bin Laden and his followers are ‘on the run’. This may be correct, the critics say, but it doesn’t mean we are any safer. On the contrary, they claim that the very notion of a war was wrong to begin with: it led us to seek quick, military solutions, and it encouraged Muslims to believe that the West’s ultimate aim was to destroy Islam. Inevitably, the truth is somewhat more complex. When listening to the critics, it is hard to escape the conclusion that they think it would have been better had the United States not responded to the 9/11 attacks at all. All the problems, they appear to suggest, stem from America’s response rather than from the awful act of terrorism which triggered it. That position is not only mistaken, it is also morally reprehensible. The freedom with which jihadist militants could operate in Western countries prior to 9/11 was truly shocking. Places like Finsbury Park Mosque in London had become jihadist training camps at which young Muslims were taught to hate the liberal societies in which they had been brought up. Before 9/11, we had become accustomed to turning a blind eye to the most outrageous expressions of anti-Americanism and anti-Jewish prejudice, believing that they were simply ‘different views’ which needed to be understood in their unique cultural and political context. Some on the Left even justified the Taleban regime in Afghanistan, arguing that people should be allowed to interpret human rights in different ways, and that any attempt to oust them would amount to colonialism against which any form of resistance was legitimate. Clearly, had the White House NOT responded to the 9/11 attacks, the problem wouldn’t have gone away. The way in which the rise of militant jihadism had been ignored for reasons of political correctness or because of sheer ignorance meant that, sooner or later, our complacency was bound to be punished. That, of course, doesn’t mean that the American response to 9/11 was appropriate, sensible, and effective. The ‘war on terror’, indeed, came to be seen as a purely military strategy which appeared to be more about imposing a political order that suited American interests, not addressing the concerns and grievances which the jihadists had managed to exploit so successfully. As a result, the positive vision associated with the ‘war on terror’ – the promotion of democracy – was sidelined, if not totally discredited. Democracy became a ‘dirty word’, not to be mentioned for fear of provoking a discussion about the mess in Iraq. Worst of all, the idea that it was necessary to take ‘whatever means necessary’ meant that America willingly surrendered much of the moral and political authority on which its leadership of the ‘free world’ had rested. Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib may be nothing when compared to the legacy of horror left by Saddam Hussein’s rule. But they are powerful symbols, which have made America and, by extension, the West look hypocritical, and done some real damage to all efforts to promote the values enshrined in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights. It is obvious that militant jihadism is an evil that needs to be confronted. It seems clear, though, that the ‘war on terror’ that has been waged since the autumn of 2001 is not likely to solve the problem, make us safer, or the world a better place. The fifth anniversary of the 9/11 attacks would be a good point at which to publicly launch an updated version of the global campaign against militant jihadism. One which places far more emphasis on the need to win the ‘war’ of ideas. One which aims to strengthen the voices of the moderates in the Islamic world, and the majority of Muslims in the West which are desperate to ‘fit in’. One which never surrenders to terrorism, but also never surrenders the values on which our societies are based. Constructing such a strategy requires the architects of the ‘war on terror’ to own up to their failures and misconceptions. But it also calls on the critics to take the threat from militant jihadism seriously.